41 S.E.2d 289 | N.C. | 1947
This was a petition for the sale for partition of certain real property in Durham by the surviving children and remaindermen under the will of the late Atlas M. Rigsbee. The proceeding was instituted 5 March, 1946.
The property described in the petition was devised by the testator to his daughter Sallie A. Rigsbee for life with remainder in fee, on failure of issue, to the testator's surviving children. These are all parties to the proceeding. Sallie A. Rigsbee died unmarried and intestate 19 September, 1945.
In this proceeding F. G. Satterfield, J. G. Satterfield and Walker Stone, doing business under the firm name of Satterfield Stone, were permitted, over objection, to intervene. They filed pleadings alleging that pursuant to certain leases executed to them by Sallie A. Rigsbee on two of the lots described, in 1925 and 1935, renewed in 1944, they had erected two large tobacco auction warehouses (both under same roof), at a total approximate cost of some $73,000, and that by the terms and provisions of these leases they had the right to remove the buildings from these lots at the expiration of the leases or when by devolution of the title the leases were terminated. They asked authority of the court to remove the buildings.
The parties to the original proceeding denied the interveners' right to the buildings on the ground that whatever rights the interveners had *110 under the leases expired at the death of the lessor, that none of the remaindermen was party to either of the leases, and that the buildings were permanent structures and erected with full knowledge and understanding that Sallie A. Rigsbee had only a life estate in the lots leased to them. They further allege that interveners had protected themselves against the contingency of the falling in of the life estate during their term by requiring substantial bonds from the lessor.
It was admitted that interveners used the buildings erected by them on the leased lots as tobacco auction warehouses, known as Liberty Warehouse 1 and 2, during the entire period covered by the leases, and since the death of the life tenant have continued to occupy and use the warehouse during the tobacco marketing seasons of 1945 and 1946. No consent to its use, or waiver of any right by any of the remaindermen was shown. The lease of 1925 was for fifteen years with privilege of extension for five years additional. The lease of 1935 was for ten years, and the lease of 1944 was for five years. The annual rental began with $2,800, and the highest was $4,280, but the amount was made subject to the varying conditions of the tobacco market.
It was not controverted that the buildings referred to were erected on concrete foundations, with 100,000 feet of floor space, partially concrete. It was stated that the buildings covered half a city block.
Each of the leases contained the provision that in consideration of the fact that the lessor had only a life estate in the lots, the lessor should give bond in penal sums of $30,000, $5,000, and $35,000, respectively, conditioned upon lessees' peaceful occupancy, with further condition that "if by reason of the death of the lessor during said term, or if for any cause lessees shall be put out of possession of said premises," the obligation to be in full force.
Judge Frizzelle heard the matter on the appeal from the order of the clerk permitting interveners to be made parties, and also on the merits as to the rights of the parties under the allegations in the pleadings, and, after finding the facts, adjudged that interveners were proper and necessary parties, and further that the buildings erected by the interveners on the leased lots were trade fixtures and as such the personal property of the interveners, and that they were entitled to remove them within a reasonable time after the death of the life tenant.
The plaintiff and defendants remaindermen excepted and appealed. There was no controversy as to the facts. The question of law presented is whether the lessees of the life tenant, after the death of their lessor, were entitled, as against the remaindermen, to remove the buildings which had been erected by them on the leased premises.
It was provided in each of the leases that all improvements and fixtures placed on the premises by the lessees should remain the property of the lessees, with right of removal, at the termination of the leases whether by expiration of time or by act of law, within a reasonable time. But the remaindermen were not parties to either of the leases and were not bound by any of the terms wherein expressed. As to these leases the remaindermen were strangers. There was no privity between the lessees and the present owners of the fee. Upon the death of the life tenant the title to the real property passed by operation of law to the remaindermen unaffected by any leases the life tenant had executed or any agreements she had made with respect thereto. The life tenant could not create an estate to endure beyond the termination of her own estate, nor could the lessees thereafter claim any rights under her leases. Tiffany Real Prop., 3rd Ed., 247;Armstrong v. Rodemacher,
Recognizing these principles of law, the interveners, the lessees of the life tenant, however, base their claim upon the general principles of law relating to trade fixtures, and contend that under the circumstances of the case the buildings erected by them come within the definition of trade fixtures, and independent of any express agreement the structures were stamped with the character of personal property, and hence removable at their option. They contend that this position is available to them against the remaindermen.
In view of the fact that the buildings here claimed by the interveners consist of two large warehouses under one roof, erected on concrete foundations, with 100,000 feet of floor space, covering half a city block, it is somewhat difficult to conceive of them as personal property, but conceding that under the rule stated by Mr. Justice Story in Van Ness v.Pacard,
The general principles of law relating to the question presented by the appeal in this case have been frequently stated. From 36 C. J. S., 967, we quote: "A lessee from the tenant for life has no greater rights than the tenant for life himself. The lessee's rights cannot be increased by an agreement with the tenant for life, not assented to by the remainderman, giving the lessee the right of removal." In 22 A. J., 744, it was said, "Where the fixtures are of such a character that, in the absence of any contract on the subject, they constitute, in law, a permanent accession to the estate, it has been held that a tenant for life cannot, by contract with his tenant, so far bind the remainderman as to authorize the removal of such fixtures by his lessee after the termination of the life estate." From 1 Tiffany Real Prop., 3rd Ed., page 88, we quote: "Since a tenant for life cannot, in the absence of an express power, create an estate extending beyond the measure of his own estate, it follows that if such tenant leases for a term of years, and the life estate comes to an end by reason of his death or of that of the cestui que vie, the interest of the lessee also comes to an end, and he cannot retain the possession against the reversioner or remaindermen. Even though the reversioner or remainderman desires to continue or to revive the lease made by the life tenant, he cannot do so, since he is not in privity with the latter." And again from the same author, page 247: "In the absence of a statutory power or of an express power to that effect in the creation of the estate, one having a limited estate in land cannot, as against the person entitled in reversion or remainder, create an estate to endure beyond the normal time for termination of his own estate. This self-evident principle has been applied in the case of the making of a lease for years by a tenant for his own or another's life, the rights of the remainderman or reversioner being recognized as superior to any claim on the part of the lessee."
In Sanders v. Sutlive Bros.,
In Jones v. Shufflin,
In Matlock v. Kline,
The question involved in Hafflick v. Stober,
Apparently the Court here sought to draw a distinction between those cases where personal property as such was attached to the freehold, and *114
those cases where the fixtures were essentially realty and could be regarded as personalty only by reason of a special contract to that effect. We deem it unnecessary here to pursue this line of distinction or rest our decision upon it. We think the effect of the death of the life tenant was the extinguishment of the estate for years. Matter of O'Donnell,
The interveners cite Ray v. Young,
In the case at bar, however, the interveners took their lease and erected permanent buildings with full knowledge that the lessor had only a life estate. It was so stated in the leases. And to protect themselves against the contingency of the death of the life tenant during the term they required of her bonds aggregating $70,000. The penalty of these bonds was to be decreased each year conformable to the length of the term "to the date or time when the lessees shall be put out of possession of said property."
The interveners also cite Merrell v. Garver,
The doctrine of fixtures has been frequently considered by this Court, but none of the decisions bear directly on the question here presented. These cases usually arose out of the relationship of landlord and tenant, or where the claim for the removal of fixtures which had been attached to the freehold by the tenant was based upon an agreement or understanding express or implied on the part of the owner. Pemberton v. King,
There is authority for the position that by agreement between the lessor and lessee with respect to fixtures attached to the land for the purpose of trade, so as to constitute trade fixtures within the meaning of the law, structures which would otherwise be classified as realty may become impressed with the character of personalty even as against third parties. But we do not think the circumstances here are such as to invoke, that principle in favor of the interveners. Hafflick v. Stober, supra; Jones v.Shufflin, supra, In R. R. v. Deal,
It seems to be generally held that what is a fixture and its incidents are to be determined by the manifested intention of those concerned.Pennington v. Black,
There is no privity here between the lessees of the life tenant and the remaindermen. In Bogle v. R. R.,
While the decision of the question here presented, and ably argued on both sides, is not without difficulty, we reach the conclusion that we should not depart from the well settled principles of the law of real property in order to aid the interveners in a situation in which they have been placed as result of a contingency which they had fully considered, and against which they undertook to make provision by the requirement of bonds from their lessor. Nor may the fact that interveners remained in possession for several months before action was taken by remaindermen to assert their title be held to bar them or constitute acquiescence. Stewart v. Matheny,
For the reasons stated, the ruling of the Court below that interveners were entitled to remove the buildings from lots 1 and 2 described in the petition must be held for error. So much of the judgment below as adjudges the title of appellants to the land described in the petition and remands the cause to the clerk of the Superior court of Durham County for further orders with respect to the sale of said lands is affirmed. The costs of the appeal will be taxed against the interveners.
Modified and affirmed. *117