139 Mo. 416 | Mo. | 1897
This suit was instituted by the guardian of the heirs of one Joseph Greenabaum on the policy of insurance set out in the above agreed statement of facts for $5,000 in the first count of the petition, and for the further sum of $300, the amount of assessments alleged to have been paid to the defendant company by the said Greenabaum on said policy during his lifetime, in the second count. Defendant by answer admitted the making, issuance, and existence of the policy sued upon, and set out in full many of its conditions, terms and requirements, among which are the following: ‘‘In case of the self-destruction of the holder of this policy, whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane.....the policy shall become null and void apd the widow and heirs or devisees of such member shall have no claims for benefits on this company, provided that in case of such self-destruction or suicide of the holder of this policy, then this company will pay to his widow and heirs or devisees only such an amount, on this policy as' the member shall have paid to this company on this policy in assessments on same, without interest.” And further pleaded that as a basis for the certificate or policy' that was issued by defendant to said Greenabaum a written application signed by him was sent to the defendant company containing among others this question and his answer
But two questions'are presented in the discussion of this case. First. What meaning is to be given to the clause of the policy: “In case of self-destruction of the holder of this policy, whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane, this policy shall become null and void?” And, second, does section 5855, Revised Statutes 1889, apply to insurance companies doing business in this State on the assessment plan? That
Plaintiff contends that the above recited condition in the policy is void, and is made unavailing to defendant by said section 5855; and further that even though said sectio’n shall be held not to apply to defendant •company, still the conditions of the policy do not attach when it is shown as in this case, that the insured was insane to such an extent as to be unable to form any intent to take his life.
I. Does section 5855, Revised Statutes 1889, apply to the policy issued by defendant doing business as an assessment plan insurance company, under the provisions of article 3, of chapter 89, of the statute? In the closing sentence of section 5869 of said article 3 we find this language: “Provided, always that nothing herein contained shall subject any corporation doing business under this article to any other provisions or requirements of the general insurance laws of this State, except as distinctly herein set forth.” No such provision as that contained in section 5855, of article 2, is found in article 3, which is, with a few express exceptions, a complete statute in and of itself providing for the incorporation and regulation of associations, societies and companies doing a life or casualty insurance business on the assessment plan, the mode and manner of the conduct of their busness and how they shall be controlled, operated, etc. ■
The language of section 5869, of article 3, can mean nothing short of a declaration by the law-making
In the case of Hanford v. Mass. Ben. Association, 122 Mo. 50, the same position was assumed by plaintiff there as is asserted by plaintiff here. There it was sought to charge an assessment insurance company on its policy issued to plaintiff .on the life of her husband notwithstanding certain misrepresentations made by plaintiff’s husband, that in no way contributed to the contingency on which the policy became payable. The company contending, that section 5849, of article 2, regarding misrepresentation did not apply to it, by reason of the provision of section 5869 (above quoted) exempting assessment companies from its operation. Appellants and plaintiff in that case contended and urged that no good reason could be suggested why the provisions of sections 5849 and 5850, of article 2, should be made to apply to old line or premium paying, and mutual insurance companies, and not to companies doing business on the assessment plan, as plaintiff here contends, for the application of the provisions of section 5855, that no valid reason can be shown why a policy holder under an assessment company should be
The author of the opinion in the Hanford case sharing with the appellant there as here, the same view as to inability to see any good reason why the provision named should apply to old line and mutual insurance companies and not to those doing business on the assessment plan, did however, see and recognize the binding force of section 5869, and in deciding that case uses this language: “We are at a loss to see any good reason why the two sections concerning misrepresentation should be applied to what are denominated old line companies and not to these assessment plan companies, but the language of the proviso just quoted (5869) is strong and explicit. By it corporations doing business under that article, (3), are not subject to any other provision or requirements of the general insurance laws, except as distinctly herein set forth. The effect of this proviso is to say that the two sections concerning misrepresentation shall not apply to assessment plan companies.....We must therefore conclude that sections 5849 and 5850 do not apply to assessment plan contracts.” The existence of the positive and explicit language of the proviso of section 5869, furnish alike the rule and its reason for the discrimination made between the holder of policies issued by old line and assessment insurance companies, and must be upheld and maintained without regard to what we may think of its propriety or wisdom. All that has been said as to the inapplicability of sections 5849 and 5850 to the assessment plan insurance companies by reason of the provisions of section 5869 of article 3, for the same reason and with equal force is to be said of section 5855. •
II. If the words of avoidance used in the policy
To one disposed to be critical, it might be difficult to reconcile the statement that the deceased died from the effect of a pistol shot which was discharged intentionally while in the hand of the deceased upon and
In the case of Adkins v. Columbia Life Insurance Company, reported in 70 Mo. 27, which was an action on a policy of insurance issued to plaintiff on the life of her husband containing these words of exemption “that in case of the death of said insured by his own act and intention whether sane or insane the company shall not be liable,” and where under the agreed statement of facts upon which the case was submitted it appeared that plaintiff’s husband committed suicide and “that, at the time he committed suicide he was insane; that his mind was so far impaired that he did not understand the moral character, the general nature
Whether by that opinion it is meant to restrict the non-liability of the insurance companies, where the words of avoidance used in the policies are “in case of the death of the insured by his own act and intention, whether sane or insane” to such cases, as where the
But whether the case of Adkins v. Insurance Co. be regarded as an, authority in favor of the contention of the respondent herein or not, as is most vigorously insisted by him, and without regard to what views we might entertain as to the requisite mental power necessary to be possessed by an insured at the time of effecting his own destruction, to authorize the defeat of an action when the words of avoidance in a policy are “in case of suicide,” “death by one’s own hand, act, or intention,” or “in case of the self-destruction of the insured,” we think that when to those words is superadded the words “whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane,” the issue as to the extent of the mental capacity of the assured is eliminated, and all conditions of insanity are included within the exemption.
To hold otherwise, and assert as contended „by appellant, as well .as by some of the authorities cited, that notwithstanding the superadded words, the exemption is aimed at only such as are guilty of an “intelligent, conscious, criminal self-destruction” and not to all insane insured who take their own life, is to deny.to the added words “whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane,” any significance whatever.
It seems idle to contend that the insurance companies did not intend and that the insured did not understand by the addition of the words, “voluntaiy or involuntary, sane or insane,” to the words “suicide,” “self-destruction,” “self-murder,” and the like, after judicial construction had been given to the last named words unfavorable to the contention of the companies in all the earlier cases, when the insured was shown to have been insane at the time of effecting his death, and the companies sought to deny their liability, that some less restricted liability was not contemplated by both the insurer and insured.
Some of these qualifying and limiting words have been adopted by the insurance companies and inserted into the avoiding clauses of their policies, from suggestions that are to be found in the earlier opinions of the courts, as to what words the company might have chosen in addition to the general words “suicide,” “self-murder,” and “self-destruction,” and such like kindred expressions, if the insurance companies desired to make the exemption in their policies effectual to defeat all responsibility when the death of an insured was effected as the result of his own effort regardless of the question of the mental power and capacity of the insured at the time of accomplishing the deed. The words “voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane,” and other similar qualifying and limiting words, seem to have been introduced into the modern policy for the express purpose of avoiding the force of the interpretation which had been given by the courts to the general words that had theretofore been used, and to obviate all uncertainty as to the non-liability of the company in all cases when death was effected as the result of action mn the part of the insured, whatever
Courts will not become so critical or analyze so closely the literal, technical meaning of words or expressions employed in the everyday business affairs of life as to deny to them their common and popular meaning, as understood and interpreted by the multitude to whom those expressions are daily addressed; but will view and construe them in the light of the public understanding and assume that such was the aspect in which they were viewed and considered by the parties to the contract at the time of using them. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.