S01A0100. HAYNES v. WELLS.
S01A0100
Supreme Court of Georgia
NOVEMBER 1, 2000
106 S01A0100 (538 SE2d 430)
SEARS, Justice.
Aрpellant Norreese Haynes appeals the trial court‘s ruling that because Haynes was not an eligible candidate for the fifth district seat on the Clayton County School Board, his name must be removed from the November 2000 election ballot. Fоr the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Haynes and appellee Barbara Wells were the only two people to file and qualify for the Democratic primary for the fifth district seat on the Clayton County School Board, and were the only two people on the ballot at the primary election held on July 18, 2000. Haynes received the majority of votes, but Wells filed an election contest, contending that Haynes was not eligible to vote in the fifth district at the time of the primary, and thus was ineligible to run for the fifth district seat on the school board. A hearing was held on the challenge on September 18, 2000, and the trial court issued a judgment on September 20, 2000, ruling that Haynes was not an eligible voter of the fifth district at the time of the primary and was therefore inеligible to run for the fifth district seat.1 Very shortly thereafter, Haynes moved for an expedited appeal in this Court, which was granted.
1. Haynes argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was not eligible to vote in the fifth district on the primary date, July 18, 2000. The trial court found thаt in the week before the April 28, 2000, close of qualifying for elected office, Haynes moved in with his cousin, who lives in the fifth district. Haynes claims that on April 20, 2000, four days before declaring his candidacy for the fifth district seat, he filed a request to change the addrеss on his driver‘s license to reflect his cousin‘s address. He argues that under both federal and state law, a change of address form submitted for purposes of a driver‘s license also serves as notice of a change of address for voter registration.2 Thus, Haynes urges that he should have been listed as
We reject Haynes‘s arguments as meritless. As found by the trial court,
Haynes filed his driver‘s license change of address form on April 20, 2000, and declared his candidacy for the fifth district seat four days later, on April 24, 2000. In the normal course of business, his change of address form could not have been acted on by the Clayton County Registrar within that four-day period. In fact, the records of the Clayton County Registrar show that Haynes‘s voter registration was not changed as of April 24th, and thus he was not eligible to vote in the fifth district when he declared his candidacy for the fifth district seat.
Haynes must bear complete responsibility for his ineligibility to vote in the July 2000 primary. Prior to the close of qualifying on April 28, 2000, Haynes could have presented a change of residency directly to the Clayton County Registrar.5 Had he done so, he would have been properly registered within the fifth district when he declared his candidacy. Because he did not do so, however, Haynes was properly registered at an address outside of the fifth district when he executed his Declaration of Candidacy for the fifth district seat on April 24. Thus, according to the dictates of the Elections Code, Haynes was ineligible to run for the seat, and his declared candidacy was illegаl.
2. Haynes argues that the trial court erred in ruling that he was required to be eligible to vote in the fifth district at the time he declared his candidacy, because he was only required to be eligible to vote in the fifth district on the date of the election. We disagree.
Each candidate . . . [filing] a notice of candidacy shall accompany his or her notice of candidacy with an affidavit stating: . . . [t]hat he or she is an elector of the county or municipality of his or her residence eligible to vote in the election in which he or she is a candidate.
Furthermore,
3. Haynes claims that the trial court erred by not addressing whether its ruling was entirely consistent with Article II, Section II, Paragraph III of the Georgia Constitution, which states that “No pеrson who is not a registered voter or who has been convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude . . . or who is the holder of public funds illegally shall be eligible to hold any office . . . in this state.” Haynes argues that this constitutional provision, as well as Article VIII, Section V, Paragraph II of the Georgia Constitution (concerning the residency requirements for school board members) are the only permissible qualification limitations that may be imposed upon candidates for local school boards.
Hоwever, our review of the record reveals that this issue, while raised below, was not distinctly ruled upon by the trial court. “We will not rule on a constitutional question unless it clearly appears in the record that the trial court distinctly ruled on the point [cit.]”6 Hence, this enumeration is deemed waived on appeal.7
4. Finally, we reject Haynes‘s argument that the trial court should have required appellee Wells to prove that at the time Haynes registered as a candidate, his address was not within the fifth district. The relevant statutes, discussed in Division 2, supra, required Haynes to filе an affidavit attesting that he was eligible to vote in the fifth district. Thus, the statutes place the affirmative obligation on Haynes to establish his qualification for office. Wells is not required
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., who dissents.
BENHAM, Chief Justice, dissenting.
By affirming the judgment of the trial court, the majority opinion rejects the person selected by the electorate, then selects the person rejected by the electorate, and then insulates the person rejected by the electorate from further challengе. Such a resolution of this dispute seems to be contrary to fundamental principles of democracy and American jurisprudence, and I must respectfully dissent.
1. In addressing appellant‘s claim that he was eligible to run for the Fifth District seat on the Claytоn County Board of Education, the majority opinion affirms the trial court‘s narrow and restrictive interpretation of
The majority opinion goes on to affirm both the trial court‘s determination leaving the challenger the only person authorized to be placed on the ballot, and the trial court‘s refusal to reopen the process for other individuаls to qualify. The record shows that Haynes, the winning candidate, received 528 votes and the challenger received 371 votes. Clearly, the electorate chose Haynes over the incumbent Wells. Since there were no other contestants in the race and the time for write-ins has expired, Wells will stand elected, even though the electorate rejected her for the position. In justifying its approach, the trial court ruled that re-opening the primary would be pointless and a waste of money.
In assessing this situation and the role of voters in the democratic process, I find myself in agreement with Justice George T. Smith who was joined by Justice Hardy Gregory in their dissent in Daniel v. Barrow, 256 Ga. 318 (348 SE2d 649) (1986): “An election is either valid or invalid. Once this court found irregularities ‘sufficient to changе or place in doubt the result(s)’ . . . it should have ordered a new election. [Cit.] . . . This is a frustration of the free choice of the electorate, and casts a doubt over the entire primary.”
2. Although the majority opinion says it does not reach the constitutional issue raised by appellant‘s challenge to
3. In Division 4, the majority opinion, without any citation of authority, casts on the party responding to the election challenge the burden of proving that he properly qualified to run in the electiоn. Such an approach is contrary to the traditional principles of civil procedure.
The approach taken by the mаjority unnecessarily turns civil procedure on its head by misinterpreting what the trial court actually did in this case. The trial court ruled that the deposition of Haynes showed that the address at which he was registered to vote at the time he sought to qualify was not in the Fifth District of Clayton County. The presentation of that evidence by Wells met the challenger‘s burden of proof as to that part of the challenge to appellant‘s qualification. Notwithstanding the trial court‘s ruling, the majority opinion goes evеn further and impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to the winning candidate. Such an approach is contrary to Georgia jurisprudence and it is contrary to reason.
For the reasons outlined above, I respectfully dissent.
DECIDED NOVEMBER 1, 2000.
Zimring, Smith & Billips, Matthew C. Billips, Maribeth Kijowski, for appellant.
Parks, Chesin, Walbert & Miller, David F. Walbert, Donald M. Comer II, for appellee.