82 Tenn. 246 | Tenn. | 1884
delivered the opinion of the court.
On October 21, 1884, at half past three o’clock in the afternoon, the defendant, Y. M. Rizer, conveyed tó H. H. Cook, in trust, for the benefit of all his creditors, his real and personal property, and immediately thereafter acknowledged the deed for registration and delivered it to the trustee. The deed was noted for registration in the register’s office of Williamson county, in which county the realty and personal chattels then were, at thirty-five miuutes after six o’clock •on the next morning. On the same day the deed was
. On December 9, 1884, H. H. Cook, as trustee under the deed of assignment of Rizer, filed a petition in each of the attachment suits, for the purpose of being let in to defend his rights therein. These petitions were on the next day ordered by the court to be removed from the files, .because filed without leave of the court. On the same day Cook made an application for leave to file his petitions, which motion, after consideration, was denied on December
The orders or writs asked for are such as this-court is authorized to make or grant in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and not upon original applica
His petitions and bills show that Cook claims tire property in controversy only under his trust deed. And under that deed he must either have acquired a title to the property prior and superior to that of the attaching creditors,' or be a purchaser pending the litigation of these suits. In neither event can his petitions to become a defendant be sustained. Eor these .suits not involving the title to property, and only seeking to enforce debts, there is no statute authorizing such intervention; and there is no such practice in equity as the making of a person a defendant on his own application over the objection of the complainant: Comfort v. McTeer, 7 Lea, 652; Ogburn v. Dunlap, 9 Lea, 162, 166; Stretch v. Stretch, 2 Tenn. Ch., 140. And a purchaser pendente lite is not entitled to be made a party to the litigation, either by petition or by original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill: American Exchange Bank v. Andrews, 12 Heis., 306. A cross-bill is a bill brought by a defendant in a suit against the complainant and other parties respecting the matters involved in the original bill, and is an inherent part thereof, to be
The object of the several applications of the petitioner, Cook, was to become a party to the attachment suits, and make the defense of Rizer to the attachment sued out by the attaching creditors, upon the suggestion that Rizer had failed to make the defense, either through collusion or from inattention and indifference. But, as has been expressly held by this court, if the petitioner claims under Rizer, pending the suit, he must abide by the case made against Rizer: American Exchange Bank v. Andrews, 12 Heis., 309. “He who purchases during the pendency of a suit is held bound by the decree that may be made against the person from whom, he purchases: Id.
If, indeed, after an assignment, pendente lite, there is collusion between the assignor and the opposing litigant, or if for any other reason it becomes essential to the rights of the assignee that he should intervene in the litigation, the remedy is not by becoming a party to the Original suit, unless the opposing party consent, but by an original bill, which is spoken of in the books as an original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, or in the nature of a cross-bill, according as the complainant claims under the plaintiff or defendant. In either case the complainant in. the new bill would have the benefit of the proceedings in the first suit previous to the assignment, and could assert all the rights. acquired by the assignment, not under the original bill, but under his new bill: Trabue v. Bankhead, 2 Tenn. Ch., 412;
The application of the petitioner, Hook, is refused with costs.