116 N.Y. 487 | NY | 1889
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A sole surviving partner can, without the assent of the representatives of the deceased partner, make a valid general preferential assignment of the property which belonged to the firm for the benefit of its creditors. (Williams v. Whedon,
The plaintiffs assert that the assignment devotes property which belonged to the firm to the payment of the individual debts of John I. Brooks, and is, for that reason, void. Assuming *491
the rule laid down in Wilson v. Robertson (
A judgment setting aside the assignment, as to these plaintiffs, would afford them no remedy against the firm property, and they cannot prosecute this action for the sole benefit of the creditors of the firm who do not complain. (Bostwick v. Menck,
The plaintiff's debt was contracted by John I. Brooks as surviving partner of the firm, though in law it is his individual debt, and it is very clear that their claim was intended to be, and is, embraced within the debts directed by the fourth clause to be paid by the assignees.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed. *492