127 P. 340 | Utah | 1912
The determination of the question largely depends upon the meaning to. be given the language of section 825, relating to the provision that, when nominations are made by a group of voters under the provisions of that section, such voters must state in their certificate of nomination that “the name or names of the person or persons nominated in the certificate will not be printed upon the official ballot or upon / any party ticket as the- nominees of any political party,”' etc., and to the provision requiring “the officers malting up; the official ballot to erase” from the certificate of such group, of voters any name or names that will otherwise appear printed on the official ballot. It will be observed that under! section 822 the Democratic Party, casting more than two per cent, of the entire vote in the district at the last preceding election, had the right to nominate Hayes and Hoffman, and to have their names placed upon the official ballot under its party name and emblem, notwithstanding a group of voters had by a certificate of nomination also nominated Hayes and Hoffman. Now, it, in effect, is argued that, since that is true, then the group of voters likewise ought to have the same right to have such names placed on the official ballot under their designated party name and emblem, especially since they made their nominations before the Democratic Party made its. It substantially is conceded that, by giving the language of section 8.25 its ordinary and apparent or literal meaning, neither the petitioners nor such group of voters have such right; but it is argued that the language should be so construed as to confer such right upon them.
It, however, is argued that the statute made it the duty of the Secretary of State, upon objections filed with him, to pass upon them, and that, when he certified to the county clerk the names and descriptions of the candidates, the clerk had no discretion and no duty to perform, except to place such names on the official ballot. But the statute requires the Secretary of State also to certify to the county clerk “ the details mentioned in the certificate of nominations filed with” him. And the statute in no uncertairu language makes it the duty, not of the Secretary of State, but of “the officers making up the official ballot,” here the county clerk, “to erase from the certificate any name or names of nominees”
It, however, is suggested that such a holding leads to the conclusion that the county clerk of one county of a district might determine one set of names of nominees to be voted1 for by the electors of the district and a clerk of another •county of the district, a different set of names. And, to avoid that, it is argued that the Secretary of State, and not the clerk, should determine what names shall appear on the official ballot to be furnished to the electors of a district. Such an argument might with propriety be addressed to the legislative body, but it is of no avail here. We have quite enough to do in ascertaining what, the legislature has done without also legislating for it. Further, the result supposed is more fancied than real. The statute, while imposing the duty on the clerk to ascertain and determine the names of tnominees to be printed on the official ballot, nevertheless does not give him any discretion in such particular, so that one clerk of a county in a district on a given state of facts might •exercise his discretion one way and a clerk of another county on the same facts another way. The statute itself prescribes
Much is said on the question that the language referred to in section 825 is unintelligible. It is stated by the plaintiffs in their brief that the section “is filled with typographical and verbal errors.” Just what is meant by this is not clear. No such errors appear on the face of the statute “published, by authority,” nor is it shown or claimed that the published statute is in any particular different from the original act as filed with the Secretary of State. The validity of the statute is not questioned. It is claimed that it is unintelligible; but it is not urged that it for that or any other reason is void or unenforceable or that it cannot be given effect. To the contrary, it is urged' that it be given effect, not in accordance with the ordinary and apparent or literal meaning of the language employed, but that it, in connection with all other provisions of the general election laws, be so construed as to accomplish a particular desired purpose or object. To give the statute the meaning contended for requires us to eliminate words from the statute and to substitute others in their place, to strike from the statute the phrase “the ofiicers making up the official ballot,” and to substitute in place of it the words “the Secretary of State,” and in other particulars to either strike words and to substitute others or to ignore them and read something into the statute not found there, and to take a specific duty from a particular officer imposed upon him by the statute and to confer it upon another.
We therefore are of the opinion that it is the duty of the clerk not to place the name of either Hayes or Hoffmam on the official printed ballot under the political name and emblem of the group of voters who designated themselves the Progressive Party and their emblem the head of a bull moose.
The writ is denied.