*1
case,
however,
contract of
In this
O’Keefe has not
brought
may
suit to enforce
rights
whatever
be his
under his
with
contract
Tabitha. O’Keefe
brought
has
unemployment
action to collect
benefits authorized
statute.
Sorensen,
Neb. 599, 386 N.W.2d
Smith v.
contains
applicable
the rule
disposing
of O’Keefe’s second
assignment of error. Smith v. Sorensen teaches that a “labor
contract is irrelevant to the determination of the existence of
misconduct,
that,
appears
as it
generally, private labor
agreements may
unemployment
not render
law
See, also,
ineffectual.” Id. at
As
error,
his third and
assignment
final
O’Keefe claims it
improper
to consider his work record as such existed before
adopted
Tabitha
its written
policy
attendance
in September
disagree.
1984. We
circumstances,
Under the
we find it is proper
employee’s
consider an
history
work
as a course of conduct
and behavior
necessary
constitute “misconduct”
disqualification
unemployment
from
compensation. See Roll
City Middleton,
105 Idaho
Affirmed. v. A.M. Hayes, appellant. appellee, Cohron, Inc., Joanne 400 N.W.2d January 23, Filed 1987. No. 86-197. *2 Flodman, Johnson, Barlow, DeMars & DeMars of J.
James appellant. Offices, appellee. R. of Friedman Law Robert Moodie C.J., Krivosha, Boslaugh, White, Hastings, Caporale, JJ. and Shanahan, Grant, Per Curiam. Hayes, alleged she sustained appellee employee, Joanne
personal injury in out of and in the course an Cohron, A.M. appellant employer, with the employment her Inc., sudden, pain in her while sharp felt a knee when she with a co-worker.” The “lifting pound a 200 I-beam injury to Hayes found suffered accidental compensation court right leg arising out of and in the course her her being “frequently required to work on virtue of with Cohron knees,” and awarded her certain benefits under her provisions (Reissue 1984) Rev. 48-120 and of Neb. Stat. §§ assigns as Supp. 1986). appeals Cohron (Cum. 48-121 Hayes (1) finding that suffered errors the court’s (2) injury arising employment, her out of and the course of award, (3) support its finding evidence sufficient evidence, basing Hayes’ (4) receiving deposition a certain workweek. weekly upon a 45-hour benefits per work 45 hours by Cohron to was hired Hayes testified she During general crew laborer. a construction week as 3, 1985, Hayes through June April 17 employment, her percent kneel 75 required her to tasks which performed time. work, experienced pain began she
Sometime after near the end worsened swelling knees. The condition in her testified that on however, working. She May; she continued Kenney Richard employee fellow while she and June I-beams, something right in her tear lifting heavy she felt were down, Kenney been she had Hayes put I-beam told leg. Hayes continued to locate her foreman. injured, and went lighter working day, but at duties. Lincoln, Nebraska,
Hayes sought medical attention from a following day. physician This surgeon on the orthopedic Hayes stated she was during the first visit testified that *3 knees, one, right in the and especially in both experiencing pain “quite some time at the pain this experienced that she had Hayes rays that had job working on.” X showed she was physician’s abnormally kneecaps on both sides. It was the tilted “tendency suffering a of the diagnosis Hayes was from that the physician The further stated kneecap to dislocate.” years, symptoms but usually teenage in the present is condition type the person enters occur unless the afflicted do not activity Hayes performing. been had knee drug pain, the a initially prescribed a physician
The given a release on brace, therapy. Hayes was later physical loading 18,1985, went to work work. She then June to return to but, because of the than Cohron employer trucks for an other Surgery knee, days. was quit to after 3 pain right in her had 24,1985. July right the knee on performed on June 3 I-beam Hayes physician had not informed the In 4,1985, filed this suit. after she had September incident until had condition Hayes’ preexisting knee physician’s opinion caused have been aggravated, aggravation “could been repetitive June 3 by an accident such as incident] [the required was to do.” kneeling squatting that she he could not tell “which have physician further stated that caused it.” physician occurred on October last visit to Hayes light able to return to at which time he felt
work. error, assignment finding
Cohron’s first
which attacks
Hayes’ injury
out of and in the course of her
arose
that,
while
employment, rests on the fact
injury
resulted from the cumulative
court found
knees,
Hayes’ frequently working
on her
trauma attendant
pled
injury
specific,
occurred as the result of a
had
incident,
single
lifting
argues
of a beam. Cohron
finding
compensation court’s
is outside the issues of the case.
Cases exist which have denied a claim for workers’
compensation benefits because of a variance between the
pleadings
proof.
example,
Cearley
Royal
in
For
Co.,
(Tex.App. 1982),
plaintiff’s
Globe Ins.
157 challenged compensation
Other cases have
claims on the
proof
process
basis that the variance in
violated due
giving
adequate
the defendant
notice of what it was to defend
against. For
example, Moore v. Carter
Div. ACF
Carb.
Industries,
(Mo. App. 1982),
plaintiff
Commw.
testified caught got molten solder allege that some petition to the amend thumb, previously which had not bandage the end of his in a at testimony at the injury. The workman’s prior from a recovered allegations in the amended with the rehearing conformed then workman, the to the benefits affirming an award of petition. In expanded workman’s court concluded Faulhaber simply had that he by explaining testimony, justified which he testifying the initial when accident thought of the second of law. him as a matter hearing, did not discredit Hayes in her allegation made between the While the variance may on the issue testimony produced bear she petition and her as a as to discredit credibility, the variance is not such of her allegations variance between law. Neither was the matter of deprive to of such a nature as petition proof of the against by failing to advise it of issue process of due Cohron defend, is, injury that whether sustained which it was to of her of and in the course in out employment with Cohron. error, assignment of being merit to Cohron’s first
There no assignment, the claim we direct our attention to its second support the award. the evidence is insufficient question but that a workers’ There is no injury proving of that an resulted plaintiff has the burden arising out of and in the course of an accident N.W.2d 371 Enterprize, Nelson Neb. v. Laffin Moreover, injury that the was the result of (1986). if is claimed exertion, the evidence must show that employment injury in contributed to the cause of the some Stores, Crosby degree. v. American material and substantial 251, 298 Further, presence of a (1980). N.W.2d 157 degree required preexisting proof condition enhances the of in the injury arose out of and course of establish Platte, City employment. Wilson v. North N.W.2d 134 argument physician
The essence of Cohron’s is that the only frequent testified that either the use of her knees or the injury lifting could have caused beam testify with medical resultant and did not reasonable certainty probability that one of those alternative causes did disability. in bring fact about meaning previously, by
As we have noted of words used presents experts problem interpretation medical at times they resolved the sense which were used. IBP, Inc., Snyder 424 (1986). Neb. A physician’s reading fair entire leaves no doubt opinion reasonably but his it was certain from a medical point of preexisting Hayes’ right view that the abnormal tilt of aggravated lifting knee was either the beam or the *6 frequent of her knees point preexisting use to the that the produced disability. condition What he was uncertain of was which of the possible employment two alternative causes was responsible, Since, however, because either of them could be. as our analysis assignment earlier of Cohron’s first of error demonstrates, would, itself, either qualify cause in and of as an of employment, out and in the course of uncertainty is immaterial.
The cases Cohron
contrary
cites which reach
are
results
State,
195, 352 N.W.2d
applicable. Scott v.
Neb.
(1984),
occupational
was an
disease case in which the medical evidence
interpreted
was
mean
employee experienced only
that the
normal progression
preexisting
of his
condition. In Caradori v.
Airlines,
Frontier
(1983),
The second bringing of error thus us to compensation assignment, which claims third Cohron’s deposition of receiving evidence into erred in Kenney. coworker hour after that about an Kenney testified deposition
In that I-beams, Hayes that she said some had moved he and given any right knee had out. longer, her could not stand appear at Kenney had failed to is that since contention Cohron’s had not been deposition, to take his scheduled times several times, had not been appear of those subpoenaed to rehearing, it was abuse appear at the subpoenaed to and submitted deposition to be taken permit his discretion to testimony had concluded. presentation live been after However, that it was determination court’s Hayes’ injury and which caused repeated use of knees Kenney’s deposition disability renders resultant Thus, this case. disposition to the irrelevant and immaterial not, not, do decide the issue this and therefore we need presents. error assignment of argues assignment of error fourth last
Cohron’s permanent basing Hayes’ partial compensation court erred in upon benefit a 45-hour workweek. part: provides in relevant 48-121(4) Section disability resulting disability, if permanent For wages immediately prior to the accident rate weekly hour,... wages . . . shall taken fixed *7 of a work week of ... a computed upon to be basis hours, forty wages if hour paid of are minimum provides (Reissue 1984) in relevant Neb. Rev. Stat. 48-126 § part: used, wages ... the term is shall be
Wherever at money rate which service construed to mean the hiring of recompensed under the contract rendered is the accident. ... In continuous force at the time of immediately employments, prior if to the accident the rate weekly wages wages the . . hour ... of was fixed . his average weekly income shall be taken be his constituting work, ordinarily his period of time week’s earnings during his using of calculation as as basis
[587] preceding much of six he months as worked employer same .... The shall also be calculation made day average earnings working with reference to the for a ordinary length earnings exclusive of overtime; Provided, if company’s the insurance policy provides of insurance for the collection of a premium overtime, upon based such then such overtime part shall determining become basis compensation benefits. Hayes’ expectation
The evidence contradicts stated that she per would work 45 hours week. It paid establishes that she was $5.25 per hour per day for the first 8 hours of work and one and a half times performed that amount for work after the first 8 per day. hours of work The evidence also establishes that of the Cohron, 7 full weeks only worked for there were 3 weeks during days. which she worked 5 full It is clear that in each of weeks, 3 those she earned somewhat more than she would have by working earned per day, no more than hours but there nois way to determine many from the record how hours she worked any day many one how hours she worked in one of demonstrates, however, those weeks. The record that she did average 45, 40, or for that matter per hours week throughout While the record suggests insured, that Cohron was it does not reflect whether premium insurer collected a Hayes’ based on overtime work. question
There is no wage but that the computed rate is according to the contract of hire in force the time of the Stickelman, accident. Gruber v. 149 Neb.
(1948); Center, Johnsen v. Benson Food N.W.2d 749 controlling 48-126. The inquiry is what Irrespective contract was. stated expectation, the of employment performed contract with a workweek of less than 40 parties hours. The acts of practical their interpretation of a engaged contract while performance in its any controversy before is one of the best indications of their true meaning, intent and and courts ordinarily should enforce such Skinner, DeFilipps construction. See, also,
N.W.2d Daub, 698, 365 Smith v. *8 Davis, v. N.W.2d Lauritzen why explain If exist facts which N.W.2d 520 there actually longer than the hours for a workweek contract was worked, Hayes, upon party with the it was incumbent as proof, Enterprize, v. Nelson burden of Laffin upon explanation, to offer that why appears support which to its to show evidence Cohron circumstances, not do so. Under position fact does Hayes’ permanent partial 48-121(4) requires that week. computed be on the basis of a 40-hour benefit the record does not establish that overtime is Since considered, hourly $5.25 the rate to be used for appropriate is each of the 40 hours. modify
We therefore affirm but the award of compensation court and remand the cause to that court with the it enter an consistent with this direction that award is opinion. modified,
Affirmed as and cause REMANDED WITH DIRECTION. J., part. dissenting in Caporale, analysis and resolution of majority’s agree I with While issue, dissent. I must nonetheless wage my in Sandel expressed in dissent me the fear It seems America, Packaging Co. majority’s by the resolution of this pass (1982), has come to . . out has an “accident. hard work become case. Mere meaning of employment” within the course of... of and in the According to the 1984). (Reissue 48-101 Neb. Rev. Stat. § plaintiff used her knees accident because majority, was an there work, arose out of the doing and the accident her was work. Such a pain while she she felt because meaning “accident” the word process fleeces of thought “arising out of.” phrase Packaging Co. expressed in Sandel v. the reasons For America, plaintiff failed to sustain the I would find supra, injury resulting suffered an proving she burden I in the course of arising out of and compensation judgment reverse the thus would *9 action. direct dismissal
Boslaugh JJ., this dissent. join in Hastings, Wilson, appellee, Wilson, Alan v.Richard Jean Sandra appellant. 23, 1987. January 86-251. No. Filed Johnston, Knight, for Jr., Wherry & Johnston, W. Miles appellant. Office, P.C., appellee. The Law Reisdorff of
Steven J. Hastings, Caporale, White, Krivosha, C.J., Boslaugh, Grant, Shanahan, JJ.
White, J. County. for Saline
This appeal from the district is an Alan Richard case, Wilson and Jean parties to this Sandra The part of the As Wilson, 1982. divorced on October were agreement. settlement approved property decree the court joint agreement provided property settlement Sandra appellee, Specifically, custody children. of their four during the school custody the children Wilson, was awarded every during visitation rights of year, appellant had custody and visitation holiday. The other weekend months. summer during the reversed arrangements were per child $50 month per pay also ordered Richard Wilson was
