278 F. 329 | D.C. Cir. | 1922
The Filippones filed a complaint in the municipal court, in which they alleged that their grantors had rented the described premises to Hayden as a tenant at sufferance, that they had served 30 days’ notice on him to vacate the property, and that he had refused to do so. The municipal court gave them judgment, and Hayden appealed to the Supreme Court of the District. As provided by the nineteenth rule of that court, the Filippones filed an affidavit of merit, which set up the facts on which they based their action. A copy of the notice served on Hayden was attached to the affidavit as an exhibit. The affidavit recited that the building occupied by Hayden was badly in need of repairs, that they desired to remodel it, and that Hayden was notified to quit “at the end of 30 days from” the service of the notice upon him.
“A tenancy by sufferance may be terminated at any time by a notice in writing from tbe landlord to tbe tenant to quit tbe premises leased * * * on tbe thirtieth day after tbe day of tbe service of tbe notice.”
Whether the Filippones needed the premises for any of the purposes named in the Ball Act is immaterial. The notice which was served upon Hayden said that he should quit “at the end of 30 days from the date of the service” upon him, instead of on the thirtieth day thereafter. Because of this it is urged that the notice is defective. This is hypercritical. The notice gave him full 30 days, and this complied with the Code. But, if it could be construed as giving more than 30 days, that would not affect its validity. Bliss v. Duncan, 44 App. D. C. 93; Boss v. Hagan, 49 App. D. C. 106, 261 Fed. 254, 8 A. L. R. 1508.
For these reasons, the judgment of the lower court must be, and it is, affirmed, with costs.
Affirmed.,