21 N.Y.S. 362 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1892
Lead Opinion
This action is for the recovery of a broker’s commission upon the sale of certain real estate belonging to defendant. The main question is whether the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale.
It is entirely clear that upon this' state of facts the plaintiff had no cause of action. He did nothing whatever to bring about the sale except to inform Mr. King that the property could be purchased for $400,-000. He was authorized to sell the property for this sum, but he failed to bring the trust company to Platt’s terms,—failed, in brief, to secure a purchaser. He claims, however, that the negotiations between the two companies were simply held in abeyance until the trust company could ascertain whether certain neighboring property was also to be had; there were no continuous negotiations between these companies during these two following years, and the plaintiff never even suggested to Mr. Platt that, in case the trust company ultimately succeeded in securing the neighboring property, it might then offer the defendant $400,000 for the real estate in question. It was really immaterial why or for what reason the trust company failed to come forward in June, 1886, and offer the defendant its price for the property. The price was not offered, and that ended the matter. The parties were never brought together, and the plaintiff was in no sense the procuring cause of the sale which was ultimately made. ' If the plaintiff, upon the facts of this case, is entitled to a commission, it' must be simply upon the ground that his
The suggestion that, during the two years of nonaction, Platt was waiting for the trust company to close its other negotiations, and that in fact both companies were abiding the result of those other negotiations, is entirely without support in the evidence. We have not overlooked the testimony with regard to conversations between the plaintiff and Mr. Wood, the defendant’s treasurer, between June, 1886, and some time in the year 1888. These conversations, however, were clearly inadmissible. Mr.- Wood had no authority to bind the defendant, and the conversations in question w'ere not in the line of the treasurer’s duty. They were simply desultory observations, made at casual meetings outside of the company’s office, and were in no sense admissible as part of the res gestae. But, further, even if admissible, they had no probative value with regard to the real issues. The plaintiff says they “were generally to the effect that a sale would be finally consummated of the United States Company’s property to the Union Trust Company,” and that “Mr. Wood said he hoped that w'ould be the result; that he would be glad to see me [plaintiff] earn so handsome a commission.” Such loose talk did not alter the facts that the plaintiff abandoned all effort in the matter; that he never brought the parties together; that he never procured an offer of $400,000; that he was not, to quote the language used in White v. Twitchings, supra, “the cause of the identical contract of sale;” and that the sale was the result of independent negotiations between the
O’BRIEN, J., concurs.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur. Simply because a broker calls the attention of a particular person to a piece of property as being for sale, it does not give him a lien upon that person in respect to that property for all time to come.