24 Wis. 235 | Wis. | 1869
This case would come within the decision of Shove v. Larsen (22 Wis. 142) if the evidence had shown that the entry in the old index book had been made before the purchase by the defendant HUI, so as to affect him with constructive notice thereof. But it does not. Indeed, it seems impossible' to say, in the absence of all proof upon the point, when the entry was made. It clearly appears upon the face of the book not to have been made when it bears date. For if it had been entered when the mortgage was left for record, then it is obvious it would have been written upon the next ruled line in its order. Besides, the entry immediately below was of a subsequent date, thus showing, beyond all question, that it was there when this-interlineation was made. For it is conceded in the printed case — and the inspection of the original minute book, which was produced on the argument, showed that this concession was according to the fact — that this entry in that book ‘ ‘ was written with a different ink from the entry immediately before and after, and was interlined between the ruling, and was written in after the entry of the minutes immediately below it,” which, as we have said, was of a subsequent date. Now, the difference in the color of the ink and the character of the handwriting, but, above all, the fact that the subsequent entry was of a later date, shows, as clearly as any thing could, upon the very face of the record, that it was not made when the
The counsel for the appellant claimed, that, as this is a public record —■ one over which the plaintiff had no control — he cannot be called upon, in the first instance, to explain it, the presumption being, that the officer whose duty it was to make the entry actually did make it at the time. * But how can such a presumption be indulged in, when, upon the face of the record itself, it satisfactorily appears that it was not made when it bears date 1 It seems to us that we cannot presume that the officer did his duty, and made the entry when the mortgage was left in his office, for the simple reason that such a presumption is effectually repelled by the record. And as the .time when .this entry was made is the very essence of the inquiry, so far as affecting a party with notice is concerned, it ought to appear that it was in existence when the defendant purchased the premises. Otherwise there was nothing to charge him with notice of the misdescription of the land in recording the mortgage at length.
Upon this point we were referred to quite a number of cases by the counsel for the appellant, which say that where material alterations and interlineations have been
We think the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the defendant Hill was a tona fide purchaser of the premises for value, without notice of the plaintiff’s mortgage, must be affirmed.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.