98 Mo. App. 707 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1903
This action is for contribution. The trial court made a finding of facts and thereupon declared the law thereon to be that plaintiffs could not recover. The action arises on a contract of guaranty whereby a partnership, of which defendant’s ancestor is alleged to have been a member, guaranteed the payment of two- certain promissory notes made by one Ketchum, and assigned by the partnership. The facts-, necessary to state appear to be as follows:
On the 27th of June, 1883, Louis Hax (whose administrators are the plaintiffs), James N. Burnes (whose heirs, including the administrator of one of them who is dead, are the defendants),°S. A. Walker and John Calhoun by written agreement of that date formed á partnership for a period of five years for the purpose of doing business as a private bank under the name of Schuster, Hax & Co-. Of this partnership, James N. Burnes owned twenty-three per cent. The contract of partnership contained this provision: “In case of the death of any one of the partners during the continuance of this contract, the business shall not on account thereof be discontinued, but the interest of said partner shall be kept in the business and the same shall be continued by the surviving partners, and the administrator or executor of such deceased until the expiration of the time agreed upon. ’ ’ On the 12th of June, 1888, shortly before such contract expired, it was extended in writing for another period of . five years, which extension contained a provision that a majority of the stockholders
The partnership received of the national bank for this transfer of its business and assets, $50,000, representing its capital; $60,000 for its surplus, and $50,000 for its good will; making a total of $160,000. Ketchum died and his estate proving to be insolvent, plaintiffs’ intestate, Louis Hax, was compelled to pay the note under the guaranty aforesaid and they' thereafter instituted this action. Defendant Mary S. Burnes, as administratrix of the Burnes estate, never took active or affirmative part in the management or direction of the partnership. Her passive conduct probably resulting from the fact that the Burnes estate organized itself into a corporation (theheirs being the stockholders) and was managed as such. The administration was closed long prior to the institution of this action.
On the foregoing facts we conclude that the trial court should have found for the plaintiffs instead of defendants. Ordinarily, the death of á partner puts an
The extension of this contract contained an addition to the contract itself, wherein it was provided that the partnership might be converted into a corporation (state or national), whenever a majority of the stockholders so decided. The partnership merged itself into a corporation bank at great profit to the partners on the amounts originally put in by them. In making the transfer of its assets, the partnership guaranteed the payment of the Ketchum notes, as stated. We believe it to be clear that it had the power, in view of the facts stated, to make this guaranty. But in addition to the original power, under the facts it appears that neither the Burnes estate nor any of the heirs ever objected to the transfer. They received ’the benefits and profits of the transaction and joined in the association which made up the corporation bank, taking a large portion of its stock.
The briefs and arguments of counsel would indicate that the court considered that the surviving partners ■could not, under the terms of the contract of partnership and its provisions of extension, enter into', or merge into the national bank corporation. Suppose this should be conceded, it would not affect the result which we think should have been reached in the trial court. The fact remains that the partnership survived the death of Burnes. It had the power to transact partnership bus
But it is said by defendants that the evidence failed to show that Burnes signed the extension. The court found that he did, and we believe there was ample evidence admitted to support the finding.
Our conclusion is that the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs.