121 Iowa 667 | Iowa | 1903
Lead Opinion
Plaintiffs are the children and heirs at law of John'Irwin, who died intestate October 20, 1893. The general outline of the controversy is as follows: Mr. Irwin, who had been a country merchant in Ohio prior to the year 1856, came west about that time, bringing with
About this time there was developed a marked change-in the man’s characteristics. Always saving, he became miserly in small things, but the princely domain which a. keen business instinct had led him to acquire he allowed to slip from his grasp without an intelligent effort to save-it. He denied the power of the state to tax his lands, or to sell them in satisfaction of tax liens. The subject of taxation excited him to frenzy of anger. He gave no clear or consistent idea of the theory upon which his opposition to taxes was based; sometimes declaring taxation to be unconstitutional, but more often that it was a scheme- or conspiracy undertaken to rob him. Sometimes he called himself “Lord Irwin” or “Earl Irwin,” and said his property could not be taken. His property, and the schemes of others by which he was being robbed of it, were ever in his mind, and the slightest touch upon the subject would cause an explosion of his wrath. Indeed, he did not wait for any one to broach the subject, but forced it into every discussion, whether relevant or irrelevant. He gathered crowds about him in public places and delivered harangues upon the subject of his wrongs, and rode up and down the streets shouting his grievances and vituperating his sujjposed enemies. He haunted the courts with great regularity for years, taking his place within the bar, and persistently interrujited proceedings to demand some order or some relief against those whom he believed arrayed against him. At times, when compelled to be a silent spectator of the proceedings, he would compliment a ruling which pleased him by arising and “making a courtly bow” to the presiding judge.
On the other hand, it is shown that in some respects he was not without shrewdness and intelligence. He was close and parsimonious in his purchases, haggling over prices and getting good bargains. Money he clung to with tenacity, and at his death had several thousand dollars in the bank. There was some evidence tending to show that two of his brothers and a grandchild were of unsound mind. Of the witnesses expressing an opinion of his mental condition, we think it must be conceded that a large majority of those who had known him longest and best — some of whom had known him intimately from the time of his arrival from Ohio — testify in unqualified terms that they believe him to have been insane from before the date of the tax sales to the day of his death. Among the witnesses testifying for the defendants, some, show but slight and casual acquaintance with Mr. Irwin in his life time, while many of those who knew' him better speak upon this subject in a guarded and qualified manner, and, while saying in a general way that they regarded him sane, add that he was “peculiar,” “cranky,” “eccentric,” “a little off,” etc. Of the physicians testifying in the case, six, who appear to be men of the learning and ex' perience which give weight and value to their statements, and the only expert witnesses who speak from close acquaintance and observation of Mr. Irwin, say unhesitatingly that he was insane, — 'the victim of monomaTiia upon the subject of taxation and property rights None of these spoke in answer to hypothetical questions, but from personal knowledge and observation of the man. Two med
We think it hardly possible that, applying these rules, any disinterested person can read the evidence in this case, and say that John Irwin was not “thoroughly insane” on the subject of property and taxation, or that he had sufficiently sound mind '“to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and effect” of his conduct in reference to such matter. In view of the long period that h^s elapsed since, the tax sales upon which defendants’ claim of title is based, and the possible hardships resulting to those whose intervening rights have been acquired without notice of the defect in such titles, we have been reluctant to reach this conclusion; but, without a palpable disregard of the clear and satisfactory preponderance of the evidence, we cannot do otherwise than say that the alleged insanity of John Irwin has been fairly established. It is useless, perhaps, to speculate upon the cause of this condition. -It is not an improbable theory that in his' eagerness to acquire land he made the mistake of investing his entire capital in the large purchases made by him, and then, finding himself unable to meet the naturally large aggregate demand for taxes, the worry and anxiety
We cannot accept this as the correct construction of the statute. The section quoted provides, in effect, that a judicial finding of insanity, or the certificate of the physician in charge of a defendant confined in a state hospital, shall be taken as conclusive evidence of his mental irresponsibility, and that whenever such evidence is produced the court must require defense to be made by guardian. Bnt suppose there has never been any judicial inquiry into a defendant’s mental condition, and no confinement in hospital, but he is himself personally in the presence of the court, and it is apparent ata glance that he is a hopeless maniac or idiot; can it be that the court would be justified in ignoring the patent fact of such defendant’s helplessness, and that a default and decree so rendered, devesting; him of title in his estate, is not erroneous? If such a decree is open to question, is it less so
A majority of the court adopts the appellees’ contention in this respect, and as it is conceded of record that, in three of the six cases before us (Nos. 497, 2,800, and 2,308), notice was not actually served within one year .after Irwin’s .death, it is held that such proceedings are ibarred. In the other cases, service was obtained within .one year after the death of Irwin. The theory upon which •.this conclusion is reached is as follows: That section •2532, being enacted in connection with the general statute of limitations, is to be held applicable only to causes of action at common law and to statutory rights of action, for which the statute creating them provides no special limitation. Stated in other words, if the statute creating a right of action provides in the same connection that the right shall be exercised within a certain named ■ period, then the limitation inheres in the right, and it is unaffected ■by the rules pertaining to limitations generally. Applying that rule to the present case, it is found that the statute saving to the minor and lunatic their right to redeem, ..and the statute conferring the right to demand a new trial Tor erroneous proceedings against them, provide in each ■¡instance that such right shall be exercised within one year after the disability is removed. It follows, therefore, in obedience to the principle above stated, that the .delivery of the notices to .the sheriff is not to be held a commencement of the action. In support of this rule the
I am unable to agree 'with the majority upon this proposition, and upon this proposition I am authorized to ■say that McClain, J., concurs in the opinion hereinafter -expressed.
That many of the authorities do-lay down the rule that where time is of the essence of the right created, and the limitation is an inherent part of the statute creating it, :some of the principles applicable to general statutes of .limitations do not apply, will be readily conceded. But there has not been cited, nor, with a single exception, have I been able to find, any precedent in the decisions •of this court or elsewhere justifying, even by inference, the doctrine upon which, we here place the stamp of our approval. The solitary exception above referred to is found iii an opinion by Shiras, J., at nisi prius, in Hintrager v. Nightingale, (C. C.) 36 fed. 847, and has been, as we shall hereinafter have occasion to note, expressly disapproved by this court apon the very point here involved. -In my opinion, none of the- authorities to which ■our attention is cited bear out the principles contended for. In Parkyn v. Travis, supra, the note upon which suit was brought was due April 2, 1878. The original notice was placed in the sheriff’s hands á day or two before the note was due, but service was not made until the debt had fully matured; and, it being claimed by the
It was competent for the legislature to adopt this prevailing rule, or to declare what other act or step in the origination of legal proceedings should be deemed a “commencement” within due time. It chose to preserve as nearly as practicable the established practice, and declared in unequivocal terms that, whenever the original notice is delivered to the sheriff for immediate service,'the action is commenced. The language is broad and general, without mention of any exception. The mere fact that the provision is found in connection with the general statute of limitations does not affect its application to every time limitation, general or special, for the com
Under the ruling of the majority, the decrees of the district court in causes numbered 497, 572, 2,800, and 2,308 are affirmed. Other decrees embraced in these appeals are reversed, and cases ordered remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the conclusions above announced. — Aeeibmed in part, and REVERSED in part.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). — lam satisfied with the result as announced in the foregoing opinion of Weaver J. I share, however, in the views entertained by the 'majority of the court upon the question presented in the third sub-division of the opinion, and, as the position of the majority is not clearly set forth therein, it seems to me ■appropriate that a brief statement defining the same should accompany the opinion.
It will be observed that the propositions involved are •what shall be considered the commencement ot' an equitable action, within the meaning of section 893, of the Code of 1873, and what shall be deemed the commencement of proceedings, within the meaning of section 3157 of the same Code. If section 893 and section 892, preceding it, are to be taken as statutes of limitation, simply, then, unquestionably, section 2532, Code 1873, has application, and the equitable action provided for must be held toi be commenced when the original notice is placed in the ■hands of the sheriff with Intent that the same be served immediately. On the other hand, if not statutes of lim-tation, simply, then section 2532 has no application, and ■the action must be regarded as commenced only when the
Under the provisions of the statutes in question, a right-of redemption from tax sale is conferred upon minors and lunatics, conditioned upon the exercise of such right within a prescribed period of time after the disability of minority or lunacy, as the case may be, has been removed. Here the limitation of time is an inherent jmrt óf fhe right created, and the statute was in no sense designed as a-statute of limitation, going to the remedy only, or having for its sole object the fixing of a period within which an action might be brought. The right granted by the statute-is to redeem within a certain period of time, and the power and its exercise within the time limited are each essential parts of the right conferred, so that there is no right of action independent of the limitation. Proska v.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur with Judge Bishop in the views above expressed.
Supplemental Opinion, October 31, 1903.
Supplemental opinion on reheañug. — Denied.
Plaintiffs’ counsel, in an able and exhaustive petition for a rehearing, challenge the positions taken by the majority of the court on a former hearing, and ask for a modification of the conclusions reached on that hearing, in any event, because of an alleged misapprehension of the facts.
Turning again to the abstracts, which are very voluminous, we find that case JSTo. 2,300 was an action brought by plaintiffs, Hawley et al., against Griffin et al, to redeem from tax sales; and that Eo. 572 was originally an action brought by Griffin etal. against John Irwin etal., to quiet title to certain of the lands in controversy, in which plaintiffs herein filed petitions to vacate the-decree rendered therein, and for a new trial, under section 3154 et seq. of the Oode of 1873. In this last case notice was actually served upon defendants within one year from the death of Irwin, and under the doctrine announced by the majority the holding of the trial court in that case should have been reversed. But the question as to the effect of the reversal of that case remains to be considered. Counsel concede that the application therein was to vacate the decree quieting title in the Griffins, and for a new trial of that-action; and the claims heretofore; made have..been,
But let us assume that- they could have interposed hheir independent right of redemption because of the in-:,sanitv of John Irwin. This could only be done by counterclaim in the main suit of Griffin v. John Irwin, after -the substitution of some parties and the introduction of others. Such relief would not have been a defense to Griffin’s cause of action to quiet title. It would be purely affirmative, and could only be granted on cross-petition. Until the original decree was vacated, and necessary parties brought into the original suit-, this counterclaim had no place in the litigation. It was not defensive. Hence this counterclaim could not be considered until after the decree was vacated under section 3154 of the Code. At that time lapse of time had extinguished their ¡right to redeem, and the counterclaim could not have been considered. No matter what the aspect of the case, ■it is manifest that plaintiffs herein cannot claim any benefit from their proceeding to vacate and modify the decrees quieting title, except in those cases where they brought their actions to redeem within the time limit prescribed in section 892 of the Code. The order on the petition to vacate the decree in No. 572 will be reversed, bqt the decree in No. 2,300 must stand affirmed.
Plaintiffs, recognizing the force of Proska v. McCormack, 56 Iowa, 318, and Parkyn v. Travis, 50 Iowa, 436, and other like cases, contend, however, that, while the majority might have been right had the limitation been a contract one, vigorously contend that they are all wrong in applying the rules there announced to a statutory limitation. If this were a pure' statute of limitations, there would be no doubt of their position. But it is not. We have attempted to show that time is expressly made of the essence of the right created, and it is just as binding and effective as if there had been a contract between the parties embodying the same terms. The difficulty lies in failing to distinguish between the two.
The majority have already distinguished the Snyder-Ives Gase, and we need only add that a re-examination of that case shows that it was not a proceeding under section 3154 et seq., but an independent action in equity. Indeed,, the court, in its opinion, expressly says that it does not decide whether section 8156 was applicable to the case in any respect. Hence all that was said about proceedings under that section is pure dictum. The facts recited show beyond all question that it was not an application under section 3154. Moreover, section 3156 expressly provides that proceedings to correct mistakes of the clerk — which was the cause of action in that case — shall be by motion served on the adverse party, and within one year. See Bond v. Epley, 48 Iowa, 600. Even should we hold that Snyder v. Ives is an authority for plaintiff’s contention, it would not avail them,for, as%e have seen,their proceedings to vacate will not give them the right to redeem in virtue of an entirely independent statute conferring that privilege.
We have gone over the entire record again with care, and the majority reach the conclusion that case No. 572 should be reversed, instead of affirmed, and that No. 2,300 should be affirmed, as originally announced, and the original opinion will be modified to this extent and otherwise adhered to.
The petitions for rehearing will therefore be overruled. —Overruled.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — We have heretofore determined that John Irwin was insane from a date prior to the sale of the land for taxes to the time of his death, and that the decree quieting the tax title in Griffin was irregular and voidable. The supplementary opinion concedes that Irwin’s representatives had the right to appear within one year after his death, and have the decree set aside, and make defense against Griffin’s claim, and that such appearance was in fact made in due time. Notwithstanding all these findings, and notwithstanding it declares for a reversal of the order of the district court denying a new trial, the opinion proceeds to announce that the reversal is merely an idle form, which “can do the appellants no good.” This anomalous result is sought to be justified upon the theory that the only right which Irwin or his
I. The proposition that the right to defend against Griffin’s assertion of title does not include the right to demand and enforce a redemption from the tax lien is, in my judgment, untenable. Griffin’s action to quiet his title is brought in a court of equity. A “defense” in equity is not limited to the narrow sense in which that word is used in tendering an issue at law. It is not restricted to a mere denial, which puts plaintiff upon his proof, or to the pleading of new matter, which merely negatives his right of recovery. It includes as well the right to set forth by way of cross-bili or answer any fact
Unless we are to abandon this rule, and put ourselves out of harmony with all the precedents, we must hold that Irwin’s heirs, having appeared within the year prescribed by statute, thereby acquired the right to present and urge every defense they had, whether legal or equitable, to Griffin’s claim, and to receive such affirmative relief as the facts constituting their defense entitle them to in a court of equity.
II. Thus far I have dwelt upon the general rule applicable alike to all equitable actions, and now call attention to the peculiar force with which it applies to actions to quiet title. The very object and purpose of an action of this kind under our statute is to bring into court for final adjudication and settlement all the conflicting claims of the parties plaintiff and defendant to the title to the property in question. It is a necessary allegation imevery bill or petition for such relief that the defendant makes claim to the property adverse'to the plaintiff, and when once brought into court he is imperatively required to plead any and all his claims thereto, or forever after to hold his peace. The action does not permit him to defend by pointing out the defects in plaintiff’s title and withhold his own equities for litigation in some other proceeding. • He, as well as plaintiff, must disclose all his claims, and, the court having the entire case before it, will declare the title according to the very right, attaching such conditions concerning the discharge of liens and incumbrances,’
III. JBy our Code, a defendant may set up as many defenses, legal and equitable, as he may have to the plaintiff’s claim. Code 1897, section 3457. By the Code even a counterclaim is classed as a defense. See section 3457. The right to defend "is certainly broad enough to-admit the pleading of everything which is admissible in an answer, and we have held that a counterclaim is an answer, and, “in a sense, a defense.” Town v. Bringolf, 47 Iowa, 133; Yarger v. R. R., 78 Iowa, 652. If the claim affect the subject-matter of the original bill, the “test of an equitable defense is whether, upon the same facts presented by a bill in chancery, the court would have entertained the cause and grant the relief sought.” Gates v. Smith, 2 Minn. 30 (Gil. 21). Surely, under this rule, the pleading by the heirs of Irwin of the invalidity of the tax. title, and their demand to be allowed to redeem from the tax sale, constitutes an equitable defense, and as such their right to plead and rely upon it is guaranteed by the statute as well as by the established principles of pleading and practice in courts of equity. It was not necessary for them to plead by way of formal cross-bill, for under our statute all matters formerly pleaded only by cross-bill of defendant against plaintiff may now be alleged by way of answer, while the term “cross-bill” has come in ordinary use to signify a pleading filed by a defendant against a co-defendant. Treiver v. Shaffer, supra. The right to answer being once granted, it is not within the province of the court to say it shall not be exercised to the full liberal limit fixed by the statute.
IV. The rights of the'parties are to be considered and preserved as of the date of the service of the notice upon Griffin. It was, to be sure, the last day of the year of grace allowed by the statute-, but that fact in no manner detracts from the strength of their position. They