A jury found Adell Hawks guilty of aggravated assault after hearing evidence that he hit Debra Denise Lee' with a stick. He appeals the judgment entered on that conviction.
1. Hawks asserts the state’s notice of intent to present similar transaction evidence was legally insufficient because it did not specify the legitimate purpose for which the state sought to introduce the evidence. Hawks relies on
Rodriguez v. State,
In
Rodriguez
we identified two reasons why the state should specify the proper purpose for which it intends to introduce similar transaction evidence in the notice: (1) to assist the trial court in making the essential preliminary determination as to whether the state is seeking to introduce the evidence for an appropriate purpose; and (2) to afford the defendant the opportunity to investigate the validity, relevancy, and other aspects of admissibility of the prior offenses. The trial court noted that the purposes for the introduction of the similar transactions in this case were “fairly obvious” from the nature of the evidence, and also that, even though not specifically stated in the notice itself, the state stated its proper purposes for seeking the introduction of the evidence with sufficient specificity prior to trial. Here it was possible for the trial court to make the essential preliminary determination regarding the admissibility of the similar transaction evidence even though the state failed to specifically enumerate those purposes in the notice. Likewise, Hawks does not assert that he was surprised upon learning the state’s purpose in seeking to introduce the similar transactions at the hearing. He did not move for a continuance in order to investigate the validity, relevancy, or other aspects of admissibility of the prior offenses upon
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learning the state’s purposes in seeking the introduction of the evidence. Hawks has failed to show that his defense of the case was harmed as a result of the state’s failure to state its purpose in its notice. See
James v. State,
2. Whether characterized as evidence of similar transactions or as evidence of prior difficulties between the parties, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Hawks’ prior convictions involving violence perpetrated against Lee. See
Freeman v. State,
trial, the state made a sufficient showing: (1) that it sought to introduce evidence of the independent crime, not to raise an improper inference as to Hawks’ character, but for the purpose of showing course of conduct and bent of mind; (2) that Hawks committed the independent crimes; and (3) that a sufficient similarity existed between the independent crime and the crime charged so that the former tended to prove the latter. See Williams v. State, supra at 642 (2) (b).
3. Hawks argues that the trial court erred in admitting photographs depicting Lee’s injuries sustained in one of the similar transactions. He contends that the photographs were offered for the sole purpose of inflaming the jury and arousing their anger against Hawks. We disagree. Physical evidence, like oral testimony, is probative in establishing the similarity between the prior offenses and the current offense to show course of conduct. See
Oliver v. State,
4. Hawks asserts the trial court erred in allowing Brenda Cook to testify as an expert regarding the “cycle of abuse” which characterizes certain relationships in which repeated domestic violence occurs. The officer who responded to the call testified that Lee’s shirt was torn, there was a large swollen area above her left eye when he arrived at their residence, and she appeared to be angry. Lee testified at one point at trial that Hawks did not swing the stick hard and said that it was probably more like a “love tap.” During his cross-examination of Lee, defense counsel elicited testimony that she and Hawks had “broken up” and reconciled five times in the six-year relationship, including one marriage and divorce. Lee also said that she *893 did not want to go forward with the prosecution of this case and that, but for the subpoena, she would not have been in court.
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To suggest an explanation for Lee’s contradictory testimony, the state proffered the testimony of Cook, who has four years of training and experience in working with domestic violence as director of a battered women’s shelter. Cook testified that in the “honeymoon” or “remorse” stage of the cycle of domestic violence, a victim often will go into denial, minimize the violence which has occurred, and become reluctant to prosecute her partner. Unlike the expert in
Prickett v. State,
5. Finally, Hawks claims the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault. On appeal the presumption of innocence no longer prevails, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and we do not speculate which evidence the jury chose to believe or disbelieve.
Gurlaskie v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
