51 Wis. 160 | Wis. | 1881
The following opinion was filed November 10, 1880:
The appellant predicates his right to the property in controversy upon a common -law assignment executed by one William A. Hogg to him, February 6, 1880, for the benefit of creditors. The respondent claims it by virtue of a bill of sale, absolute in its terms, executed to him by said Hogg, May 7, 1879, but which was intended to operate as a chattel mortgage to secure certain indebtedness of said Hogg
The only question, therefore, is, whether this bill of sale, not having been filed, and considered as in effect a chattel mortgage, is valid as against the claim of the appellant as such assignee. There is considerable c.onflict of authorities upon this question, which has, no doubt, arisen to some extent from the difference in the statutes of various states relating to chattel mortgages, assignments and trusts. The learned counsel on both sides have, with great ability and research, reviewed most of these authorities, in order to educe the doctrine supported by the better authority. It would be but respectful to the learned counsel if we should undertake to follow this investigation, and pass upon the question as an original one in this court. But we deem it especially proper in this case to say that, when the precise point in controversy has been once-decided by this court in a case where it has properly arisen,, and such decision has not been overruled by this court, it will be treated as settled in future cases, except where, conceding-the decision, this court is asked or deems it proper to review or overrule it. And even then it should not be disturbed after-it has long stood at rest as an established principle of law,, affecting the rights of property, which have for a long time been adjusted in accordance with it, without the most cogent,
As we view the effect of the decision in Estabrook v. Messersmith, 18 Wis., 551, it is direct and positive authority upon this point. So viewing it, it would tend to weaken and underrate the authority of former decisions of the court at this time to examine the question as an original one, and the authorities elsewhere upon it. The language of this court in that case upon this point is clear, unambiguous and unequivocal: “The assignor, having himself no property in the goods which he had fraudulently transferred, could pass none to his assignee.” To support this principle, the language of Lord TenteRtojj, in Jones v. Yates, 9 Barn. & Cress., 532, is cited by Chief Justice Dixorr, as follows: “That, with the exception of a compulsory assignment under the bankrupt law, which stands upon peculiar grounds, he knew of no instance, and none had been mentioned at the bar, where the representatives could sue where the party represented could not.” In addition to this unquestionable authority that a voluntary assignee is the representative of the assignor alone, in respect to the title of the property assigned, the learned chief justice predicates the decision upon this reason alone: “The transfer from Roger Bromley to his assignees being voluntary, he could not give them the right of action where none existed in himself, and .that remained as before in his creditors.”
It is too clear to need authority, that in this case the assignor, Hogg, could not himself question the validity of his transfer of the property to the respondent. Then it follows that his voluntary assignee, the appellant, cannot do so. The relations of a voluntary assignee to the property assigned are exclusively as representative of the assignor, and not at all of his
In Nichols v. Kribs, 10 Wis., 76, it is held that an assignee of the judgment defendant is entitled to make the objection to a judgment by confession against the assignor, that no sufficient statement of the cause of action had been made. In Thompson v. Hintgen, 11 Wis., 112, it is held that the judgment creditors of the defendant in the judgment by confession could make the same objection.
In Reiley v. Johnston, Ex’r, 22 Wis., 279, the defendant to a judgment by confession brought suit in equity to vacate the judgment and the levy of an execution upon the same, and to enjoin sale of the property taken under the execution, on the ground of insufficiency of the statement of the facts constituting the defendant’s liability. The decision of this court adverse to the relief asked was rendered upon the grounds that the plaintiff did not positively show that such statement was insufficient, or the particulars in which it was not sufficient, and that there was a sufficient amount due to justify the levy shown, and that no equities were shown. This is all that the court pretended in that case to decide. There are, perhaps, some expressions in the opinion which appear to be in conflict with the decision in Thompson v. Hintgen, supra; but they form no part of the decision in the case, and the above cases were not alluded to in the opinion.
By the Court.— The judgment of the county court is affirmed, «with costs.
A motion for a rehearing was denied February 8, 1881.