136 Ga. 727 | Ga. | 1911
This is the second appearance of this ease before the Supreme Court. See 132 Ga. 265, where a statement of the facts is given. Hawkins contracted to sell to Studdard a described parcel of land, and executed the following receipt: “Rutledge, Ga., Apr. 15, 1905. Received of John F. Studdard, twenty-five dollars closing purchase of the Hanleiter place containing 187.6 acres one tract, and one 4 acres more or less, at $15.00 per aereN When the c^e was formerly here it was ruled that this receipt con
As the balance of the purchase-money was to be paid “presently,” the doctrine of reasonable time for making such payment Avas not applicable to the case. The same rule which prevails in a cash transaction, applies, in this respect, to this case. “Time is not generally of the essence of a contract; but by express stipulation or reasonable construction, it may become so.” Civil Code (1895), § 3675 (8); lb. (1910), § 4268 (8). There was no contemplation of credit by the parties to the contract in the present case, the payment of the balance was a condition precedent to the sale, and the time of payment being “presently” was necessarily of the essence of the contract; and as Studdard failed to comply Avith this condition precedent in accordance with the contract, Hawkins Avas not bound to carry out his part of the contract, and Studdard was not entitled to specific performance. In 1 Addison on Contracts (Morgan’s ed.), § 320, it is said, “A contract to do a particular thing ‘directly,’ or ‘as soon as possible,’ or ‘forthwith,’ does not mean that it is to be done instanter; but there must be
In what has been said, we have in effect passed on all the grounds of the motion for a new trial of a controlling nature. Under the facts of the ease and the law applicable thereto, Studdard was not entitled to specific performance of the contract, and the court erred in overruling the motion made for a new trial by Hawkins.
Judgment reversed.