LURAY CHARDONNAY HAWKINS, ET AL. v. STATE OF OHIO
Nos. 96080, 96081, 96082, 96083, 96084, 96085, 96086, 96087, 96088, 96089, 96090, 96091 and 96092
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
July 7, 2011
2011-Ohio-3393
BEFORE: Sweeney, P.J., Keough, J., and E. Gallagher, J.
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case Nos. CV-646869, CV-661234, CV-648556, CV-648638, CV-648877, CV-646844, CV-669146, CV-648446, CV-649223, CV-647872, CV-649140, CV-648317 and CV-648405
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
William D. Mason, Esq.
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Daniel T. Van, Esq.
Assistant County Prosecutor
Eighth Floor, Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Robert L. Tobik, Esq.
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
By: Cullen Sweeney, Esq.
Assistant Public Defender
310 lakeside Avenue, Suite 400
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
Michael Baker, Pro Se
472 E. 110th Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44108
Norbert Briggs, Pro Se
19024 Hunser Pointer Road
Strongsville, Ohio 44136
Rafail T. Musalih, Pro Se
822 Alhambra
Cleveland, Ohio 44110
Matthew A.Rankin, Pro Se
17599 Whitney Road, Apartment 120
Strongsville, Ohio 44136
Don M. Williams, Pro Se
Cleveland, Ohio 44112
Lloyd Williams, Pro Se
1761 Wymore Ave., #205
E. Cleveland, Ohio 44126
OPINION
JAMES J. SWEENEY, P.J.:
{¶ 1} The State of Ohio appeals from the trial court‘s decisions in these consolidated matters which granted appellees’ petitions that contested the application of the Adam Walsh Act (“AWA“) to them because they were previously classified under Ohio‘s Megan‘s Law. We affirm.
{¶ 2} The State‘s position is that the Ohio Supreme Court‘s decision in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753 is not applicable to individuals who were classified under Megan‘s Law by operation of law, including individuals who were classified under Megan‘s Law as a result of out of state convictions.
{¶ 3} All of the appellees herein were initially classified and subject to the registration and reporting requirements under Ohio‘s Megan‘s Law as either sexually oriented offenders or habitual sexual offenders by operation of law. Some of the appellees were classified by operation of law as a result of their convictions in Ohio. The other appellees were convicted of offenses in other states, but upon moving to Ohio were subject to Megan‘s Law.
{¶ 5} “I. The trial court erred in applying State v. Bodkye, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, to a petitioner who was not classified under Megan‘s Law by an Ohio Court because under these circumstances there is no violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine.”
{¶ 6} “II. The trial court erred in applying State v. Bodkye, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, to a petitioner who did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they were previously classified by an Ohio court.”
{¶ 7} This court has recently addressed and overruled the same arguments and issues that the State raises in this instant appeal. See, Willie Speight, III v. State, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 96041, 96042, 96043, 96044, and 96405, 2011-Ohio-; see also, Hannah v. State, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 95883, 95884, 95885, 95886, 95887, 95888, and 95889.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
JAMES J. SWEENEY, PRESIDING JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR