34 Fla. 405 | Fla. | 1894
The question involved in this appeal is whether or not the Internal Improvement Fund of the State, as set apart and declared by the act of the General Assembly of January 6th, 1855, Chapter 610, known as the Internal Improvement Act, is chargeable with interest on bonds issued under the authority of said act in aid of railroads, and accruing after the maturity of the bonds. A decision of the question necessitates an examination of some of the provisions of the act under which the bonds were- issued. In view of the fact that the State had become the grantee of a large landed interest situated within her borders, donated to
The purpose of the act, as disclosed by its title, was to provide for and encourage a liberal system of internal improvements in the State. The lands unsold at the date of the act and the unappropriated proceeds arising from their sales were, by the first section, set apart and declared to be a distinct and separate fund, to be called the Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida, and to be strictly applied according to the provisions of the act. For the purpose of assuring a proper application of the funds for the purposes declared, the entire fund was, by the second section, vested in the Governor, Comptroller, State Treasurer, the Attorney-General, and Register of State Lands, and their successors in office, as trustees, with power to sell the lands to purchasers, receive pay for the same and invest the proceeds and surplus interest, after paying certain expenses, in stocks of the United States, stocks of the several States, or the Internal Improvement bonds issued under the provisions of the act, drawing not less than six per cent, annual interest. Authority was also given the trustees to pay out of said fund agreeably to the provisions of the act the interest from time to time as it might become due on
In addition to the provisions just referred to relating to the payment of interest on the bonds to be issued by railroad companies under the provisions of the act,, others are found conferring substantial aid and benefits upon the railroad corporations willing to inaugarate and undertake the desired improvements by means of railroad construction.. They will be found in sections 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28 and 29. The sinking fund feature to provide a fund to meet the principal of the bond at maturity, to which allusion has been made, should be noticed in so far as it has any bearing upon a legislative purpose, as expressed in the act, to charge the Internal Improvement Fund with interest on the bonds after maturity. Authority was given the trustees by section two to demand and receive, semi-annually, the sum of one-half of one per cent., after each separate line of railroad was completed on the entire amount of the bonds issued by the company and invest the same in stocks of the United States, or State securities, or the bonds authorized by the act to be issued by the company; and it was made the duty of the railroad company, by the twelfth section, after the completion of the road to pay to the trustees at.
Sufficient reference to the act has been made to indicate its purpose as to the payment of interest on the bonds issued under its authority by railroad companies. It is not contended that the Internal Improvement Fund is liable for the redemption of the principal of
A consideration of the entire Internal Improvement Act has impressed us with the view that the real relation sustained by the Internal Improvement Fund to the bonded debt of railroads created under the act, in so
For appellant it is insisted that considering the Internal Improvement Fund as guarantor of interest on the bonds issued in compliance with the act, it should, be bound to the full extent of what appears to have-been the engagement entered into, and in ascertaining-this the words of the guarantee must be taken as strongly in favor of liability as their sense will admit. Drummond vs. Prestman, 12 Wheat., 515; Lawrence vs. McCalmont, 2 How., 426; Douglas vs. Reynolds, 7 Pet., 113; Fell on Guarantees, 129; Pothier on Obligations, 285, 286, are cited in support of this view. The-authorities cited have reference to obligations of guarantee between individuals generally. In the matter of guaranteeing the payment of interest on the bonds in the suit before us the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund were the agents of the State, acting-under a grant of authority from the Legislature, and dealing with property of the State devoted to specified purposes. The fact that the Internal Improvement Fund was irrevocably vested in the trustees named for purposes designated,, does not relieve them of the-character of State agents in carrying out the-purposes of the act, or divest the State of interest in the fund and the action of her trustees in dealing with it. State of Florida vs. Anderson et al., 1 Otto, 667. It was clearly competent for the Legislature to prescribe the limits to which the trustees might go in binding the-fund which was vested in them by the State for specified purposes beneficial to the public, and in the cer
For the appellees a strict construction of the act as against the beneficiaries under it is invoked on the well-established rule that grants from the sovereign are strictly construed as against the grantees, and that it will not be presumed that anything was intended to be granted that is not clearly specified by the terms used. State vs. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla., 82, 13 South. Rep., 640; Endlich on Statutory Construction, 354-356. Whatever may be the rule of construction as applied to contracts between the State, or her authorized agents acting for her, and private individuals, considered with reference to the character and subject matter of the contract, the general principle prevails, as contended for by counsel for appellees, that the obligation of the State to pay interest, whether as interest or damages, on debts over due, can not arise unless by the consent and express contract of the State manifested by statute, or in a form authorized by statute. State vs. Thompson, 5 English (10 Ark.), 61; Attorney-General vs. Cape Fear Navigation Co., 2 Ired. (Eq.) 444; Bledsoe vs. State, 64 N. C., 392; United States vs. Sherman, 98 U. S., 565; Angarica vs. Bayard, 127 U. S., 251; United States vs. North Carolina, 136 U. S., 211; Auditorial Board vs. Arles, 15 Texas, 72; State exrel. vs. Board of Public Works, 36 Ohio St., 409. Applying this rule to the statute under consideration we fail to find any engagement on the part of the Internal Improvement Fund to pay interest on the bonds after maturity. It is apparent that the Internal Improvement Fund was to be chargeable only with