34 Ky. 4 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1836
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In 1819, Beal, having, by an unwritten contract., bought from Hawkins five acres of unimproved land adjoining the town of Burlington, in Boone county, for the price °f ^ve hundred dollars, payable at the end of eight years, with legal interest for three years of that term— entered upon it, prepared it for residence, by building a l0g dwelling, and for carrying on the tanning business, by making vats, bark house, &c. and occupied and used it, under the contract, until 1828, when, not agree- . . TT , . , mg with Hawkins as to the consummation oí the agree
Hawkins, in his answer in the nature of a cross bill, denied that he ever agreed to take any thing but five hundred dollars in money; averred that he had always been willing to make a conveyance of the legal title on receiving the consideration; charged that Beal had never been able or willing to pay for the land; reitei'ated the same proposition to the court; insisted that the improvements were of but little, if any, value to him, and alleged that, when Beal rented the property, as before stated, the whole controversy was compromised, and Beal abandoned his claim to compensation for improvements.
In answer to the cross bill, Beal denied the alleged compromise, and insisted that he had never agreed to surrender his claim for improvements.
The depositions sustain Hawkins’ allegations, excepting as to the medium in which the consideration was to be paid and as to the compromise; and respecting these, although nothing certain is proved, we are authorized to infer, that the five hundred dollars were to have been paid in “current bank notes” and that Beal never agreed
This appeal seeks the reversal of that decree.
In the conduct of Hawkins nothing has been perceived which, in the slightest degree, can be deemed inconsistent with the contract, the principles of equity, or the most scrupulous good faith, unless he erred in insisting on payment in specie, or unless five hundred dollars without interest, which he proposed to accept in 1830, exceeded the value to which he was justly entitled; and as to these matters there is nothing like approximation to certainty in the deductions to be made from the facts. Nov does it satisfactorily appear, that Beal was willing or prepared to execute the agreement, even according to his own construction of its terms. Had it clearly appeared that the non-execution of the contract was attributable altogether to his wilful delinquency or fault, we should be indisposed to concede to him any right in equity to any compensation whatever. But, as we are not perfectly satisfied of this, and as Hawkins may be benefitted by ameliorations, made probably in good faith, we are disposed to allow to Beal the value of them on equitable principles—and that is the difference between the value of the land in the condition in which Hawkins received it from Beal, and of that in which it was when Beal received it first from Hawkins, to be estimated at the time of Beal’s eviction, and to be diminished, of course, by the value of the use of the land by Beal, as it was when he first took possession of it. This is the full measure of Beal’s equity in its most favorable
Wherefore the decree must be reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to ascertain the value of amelioration and of use, and then to render a decree according to the principles herein prescribed.