83 So. 158 | Miss. | 1919
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellant was indicted by the circuit court of Rankin county for the murder of Annie Bell Seaney, and at the January, 1919, term was ■ tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. After the adjournment of the court, and in June, 1919, appellant filed an application with the trial judge for a writ of error coram nobis, based on certain alleged errors of fact in the trial of said cause. The petition is lengthy, and contains many averments, which, for the purposes of this opinion, need not here be set forth. The main errors of fact relied upon are the averments that appellant was insane al the time he was placed upon trial and convicted, and still is insane, and because of his mental incapacity was unable to advise with counsel or make his defense;
The petition had lengthy averments to the effect that public sentiment and feeling was so aroused against petitioner and such prejudice existed against petitioner that he Avas denied that fair and impartial trial contemplated by ■ the Constitution. It is further averred that petitioner was placed upon trial and convicted on the 24th day of January, 1919, and that the court
“Comes the state by W. C. Eastland, district attorney, and demurs to the defendant’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis, for the following reasons, to wit:
“(1) Said petition affirmatively shows that each and every ground cited therein for the writ of error coram nobis existed at the time of the trial and conviction of the said defendant.
“(2) Other grounds to be shown on the hearing.
W. C. Eastland, District Attorney.”
This demurrer was by the court-sustained, and from this action of the court appellant appeals.
By elementary rules of pleading the demurrer in this case admits all facts well stated or pleaded in the petition. In Ency. of Pleading & Practice, vol. 5, p. 36, in the chapter on Coram Nobis, it is stated:
“The fact alleged as error may be admitted by demurrer or plea of nullo est erratum, which amounts to the same thing, or by motion to dismiss. ... No plea is necessary unless some error in matter of fact has been alleged upon which the defendant can make up an issue of fact if he is disposed so to do. . . -. Upon the issue of alleged error a trial is had.”
The petition in this ease clearly avers that George Howie was insane at the time he was placed upon
There can be little controversy about the status of an insane person charged with crime. By section 1538, Code of 1906 (section 1300, Hemingway’s Code), it is made the duty of a conservator of the peace to hold a prisoner who appears to have been insane when he committed the offense, and is still insane at the time of the hearing, and to report the case to the chancellor or clerk of the chancery court for the proper inquiry. By section 1539, Code of 1906 (section 1301, Hemingway’s Code), it is made the duty of the grand jury who fails to return an indictment because of insanity to certify the fact to the circuit court, and thereupon the circuit court shall give like notice to the chancellor or clerk of the chancery court. By section 1540, Code of 1906 (section 1302, Hemingway’s Code), provision is made for those cases in which the accused is acquitted on the ground of insanity. But we have no statute which lays down the procedure in case where it is made known to the court that the defendant is insane at the time he is placed upon trial for a felony. But the common law on the subject is clear, and must prevail. Blackstone observes:
“If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and, before arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it, because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defense? If after he be tried and found guilty,*217 he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced, and if, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed; for, peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might iiave. alleged something in stay of. judgment or execution. Indeed, in the bloody reign of Henry VIII, a statute was made which enacted that if a person, being compos mentis, should commit high treason, and after fall into madness, he might be tried in his absence, and should suffer death, as if he were of perfect memory. But this savage and inhuman law was repealed by the Statute 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 10. For, as is observed by Sir Edward Coke, ‘The execution of an offender is, for example, ut pcena ad paucos, metus acl omnes perveniat; but so it is not when a madman is executed, but should fibe a miserable spectacle, both against law, and of extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others. ’ But if there be any doubt whether the party be compos or not, this shall be tried by a jury.” Wendell’s Blackstone’s Commentaries, vol. 4, pp. 24, and 25.
A leading case is Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.), 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216, in which the Supreme Court of New York quoted with approval .the observations of Sir Wtlliam Blackstone and Sir Edward Coke, and observed further:
“The true reason why an insane person should not be tried is that he is disabled by an act of God to make a just defense if he have one. As' is said in 4 Harg. Stat. Tr. 205, ‘There may be circumstances lying in his private knowledge, which would prove his innocency, of which he can have no advantage, because not known to the persons who shall take upon them his defense.’ The most distinguished writers on criminal jurisprudence concur in these humane views, and all agree that no person, in a state of insanity, should ever be put upon his trial for an alleged crime,*218 or be made to suffer the judgment of the law. A madman cannot make a rational defense, and as to punishment, furto sus solo furore punitur. 1 Hale’s P. C. 34, 35; 4 Bl. Com. 395, 396; 1 Chit. Cr. L. Ed. 1841, p. 761; 1 Buss on Crimes, Ed. 1845, p. 14; Shelf, on Lunacy, '467, 468; Stock on Non. Comp. 35, 36.”
And, after discussing what disposition the court should make of the defendant Avhose sanity is brought into question at the time of trial, further stated iu the opinion:
“The course at common law was much the same. In Frith’s Case, 22 How. St. Tr. 307, 318, which preceded the act of 39 and 40 George III, to AAdiich reference has been made, the prisoner was arraigned for high treason, and a jury sworn to inquire Avhether he AAras of sound mind and understanding or not. Lord Kenyon, Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench, presided at the trial, assisted by one of the judges of the court of common pleas and one of the barons of the court of exchequer. It was observed by the court to the jury that the inquiry was not whether the prisoner was insane when the alleged crime was committed, nor was it necessary to inquire at all Avhat effect his present state of mind might have [been] when that question came to be discussed; but the humanity of the law of England had prescribed that no man should be called upon to make his defense, at a time when hi.s mind was in such a situation that he appeared incapable of doing so; that however guilty he might be, the trial must be postponed to a time Avhen, by collecting together his intellects, and having them entire, he should be able so to model his defense, if he had one, as to ward off the punishment of the law;' and it was for the jury to determine whether the prisoner was then in that state of mind. Shelf. 468.”
“The evidence strongly indicated, perhaps was conclusive, of the prisoner’s insanity at the time of the trial. Under such circumstances, it was not proper that he should have been put upon his trial. By the humanity of the common law, a party who was insane at the time of the trial could not be arraigned. If he became insane after his conviction, he could not be executed while he remained thus demented. See 1 Hawk. P. C. 3, section 3; 1 Hale, 34, 35; 1 Buss.' 13; 4 Bl. Com. 25.”
To the same effect is Baughn v. State, 100 Ga. 554, 28 S. E. 68, 38 L. r. A. 577, and other cases referred to in the attached case note.
Mr. Bishop says: “If an indicted person is not sane, the court cannot go on with the case; or if he becomes insane after the trial commences, he can neither be sentenced, or, if sentenced, puished, while his insanity continues.” Bishop’s New Criminal Law, vol. 1, par. 396.
Prom these authorities it unquestionably follows that if the defendant in this case was insane, the court was in error in placing him upon trial and in pronouncing the judgment of conviction. The fact of the prisoner’s insanity was not known either by court or counsel. There was an error of fact which led to an unlawful trial. It must be remembered that we are not here dealing with any alleged errors in reference to the indictment, arraignment, or the actual conduct of the trial itself. The rulings of the trial court on the merits of the case are not presented. We are confronted with an error of fact which was unknown to the court and one which, if the court had known, would have prevented any trial whatever. What then is the prisoner’s remedy? The error is one that could not have been availed of during the term of court at which the
“If, however, the proceedings are based upon facts presumed by the court to exist, as when one of the parties is insane, or is an infant, or a feme covert, or has died before verdict, and the court supposing such party to be alive and competent to appear as a litigant, renders judgment, it may be set aside by a writ of*221 coram nobis.” Freeman on Judgments (2 Ed.), par. 94.
The functions of the writ were ably discussed by Chief Justice "Whiteiblb in Fugate v. State, supra, and certain limitations upon the use of the writ in our state indicated, but the court was explicit in stating: “It is perfectly clear, we think, on the authorities, that the writ is applicable to criminal as well as civil proceedings. ” _
Its application to criminal cases is likewise ably discussed in Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. Rep. 29. Justification for the writ is properly founded upon the inherent power of the court over its judgments and proceedings. The opinion of the Indiana court on page 328 of 85 Ind. (44 Am. Rep. 29), contains the following observations that are apposite:
“That courts possess inherent powers not derived from any statute is undeniably true. Among these powers are the right to correct their records so as to make them speak the truth, to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes, to prevent the abuse of their authority or process, and to enforce obedience to their mandates. If it were granted that courts possess only such rights and powers as are conferred by statute, they would be mere creatures of the legislature, and not independent departments of the government. They are not mere creatures of the legislature, but are coordinate branches of the government, and in their sphere not subject to legislative control. Deutschman v. Town of Charlestown, 40 Ind. 449; Cooley, Const. Lim. 114, 116; 2 Story, Const. 377.”
In Cyc. vol. 23, p. 885, is is said: “But the writ may issue where there is a vital jurisdictional defect not apparent on the face of the record, or on account of the death of a party before judgment, or the infancy, insanity, or coverture of defendant, such disability not having been brought to the notice of the court before
The case of Adler v. State, 35 Ark. 517, 37 Am. Rep. 48, is directly in point, especially upon the proposition.of the insanity of the accused at the time of the trial, paragraph 1 of the headnotes reading:
“A circuit court judge has power, after the expiration of a term, to issue the writ of error coram nobis to reverse a judgment of conviction in.a criminal case, where it appears that the defendant was insane at the time of the trial, and the fact was not made known at the trial; and upon the assignment of such error in fact, if disputed by the state, to cause a jury to be impaneled in term to. try such issue; and the venue for the trial of such issue may be changed to another county, but the change carries the whole case.”
We refer also to Ex parte Gray, 77 Mo. 160; State v. Patton, 10 La. Ann. 299, 63 Am. Dec. 594; State v. Calhoun, 50 Kan. 523, 32 Pac. 38, 18 L. R. A. 838, 34 Am. St. Rep. 141; 2 R. C. L. 308, and authorities cited in footnotes.
It will be observed in the present case that appellant’s mental condition was in no way brought into question during the progress of his trial, and especially was there no' plea of insanity interposed.
There is a decided difference between insanity at the time of the commission of the crime and insanity at the' time of trial. Prom the admitted facts and the authorities referred to, the trial court was in error in sustaining the demurrer to appellant’s petition. In the language of Sir Edward Coke, the execution of a madman would be a “ miserable spectacle, both against law and of extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others.”
Reversed and remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I am unable to concur in the opinion of the majority. In the first place, section 32, Code of 1906 (section 7, Hemingway’s Code), expressly abolishes writs of error, and as a writ of error coram nobis is a writ of error, being a particular writ embraced in the general class of writs, it was intended to be abolished by the legislature, and therefore all cases antedating this change in our law have no bearing on the present suit. In the recent cases, embracing all cases arising since this change in the statute, no reference to the statute was made, either in the briefs of counsel or in the opinion of the court, and it is manifest that the court did not intend to limit this statute to a particular class of writs of error. None of the reported cases arising since said change in the statute has allowed the writ. It has been universally refused, and, while the court in the Fugate Case, 85 Miss. 86, 37 So. 554, 107 Am. St. rep. 268, 3 Ann. Cas. 326, stated that the writ existed, it is clear the statute was not called to the court’s attention, and at most the opinion is obiter dictum on this point. However, I think, independent of whether the writ still exists or not, that no sufficient showing was made in the present case for the issuance of such writ. The petition is filed in the name of George Howie by his attorney, and begins, “Tour petitioner would show,” etc., setting out that he was insane and incapable of in any way advising-his attorneys who represented him at the trial, who were appointed by the court to defend him; that he was insane, or that the plea of insanity was the defense, and
“This day came and personally appeared before me the undersigned officer of the law, in and for the said state and county, L. M. Burch, attorney of record for the petitioner, George Howie, and says that he appears in the stead of the petitioner because the petitioner is insane and incapable of making this affidavit to his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, who, after being first duly sworn by me, states upon oath that the facts set forth in the said petition and the affirmative allegations therein are true and correct as to his best information, knowledge, and belief.”
There is no supporting affidavit by the attorneys- who defended him, nor by the officers having the petitioner in custody, nor is there any expert testimony, nor indeed any testimony of any kind other than this affidavit, and no writ of lunacy or other proceeding showing or tending to show that petitioner is in fact insane. The attorney filing the present petition does not show that he has personally made an examination of the mental.
' It is true that the district attorney in his demurrer challenged the sufficiency of the petition on the ground that the petition shows affirmatively that each and every ground cited therein for the writ of error coram nobis existed at the time of the trial and conviction of the defendant, and on other grounds to be shown at the hearing. Under this demurrer, in my opinion, the sufficiency of the petition is challenged, and if it be necessary to support a petition with some preliminary proof or affidavit to show the trial judge that the granting of the writ would properly be warranted, then the petition is not sufficient to warrant the issuance of the writ.
It seems to me that the essence of the writ .is very analogous to a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Or it is analogous to a proceeding in equity to enjoin a judgment at law or to grant a new trial at law for similar defects existing at the time of the rendition of the judgment, which facts, if established at the time of the trial, would have resulted in all probability in a different judgment being rendered. If the facts now set forth had been discovered before the adjournment of court, manifestly the motion for a new trial would have been the proper remedy, and certainly under the rules applicable to that subject -a greater showing would have been required than is contained in the present petition. In other words, in the present case the judge is asked and required by the majority opinion to grant a stay of execution and a hearing on the application on the unsupported statements of the petitioner and the belief of his attorney; said belief of the attorney being based entirely upon the statements of the petitioner.
We must remember that the trial judge, the officers of the court, including the attorneys for the petitioner,
It appears from the record of that case that the petitioner testified in his own behalf, giving a full account of his version of the facts leading up to and at the time of the alleged crime, and it seems to me it would certainly appear from his. testimony ' and conduct and demeanor if he was insane that there was something that would indicate it, but, reading the record in the light of the trial and conviction, it is impossible to find anything to suggest the insanity of the petitioner.
It was certainly the duty of the attorneys representing him at that time to confer with him and to use such other available information, as was obtainable before going into trial, and, if there was any truth in the allegations of the present petition, they would be the best witnesses by whom to establish those facts, and that the application ought to be fortified by the evidence of some persons other than the petitioner, and especially of his attorneys who represented him through the trial, and who would have every opportunity of knowing the facts. If a man sentenced to death for murder or other capital offense can postpone the execution of such sentence by a mere ex parte affidavit, unfortified by any other affidavit, it would be a vain and useless thing to sen
I think that a proceeding of this kind requires a strong showing before the writ may issue at all. Ordinarily a judgment cannot ' be averred against. It usually imports absolute verity as between the parties to it, and before it is set aside or suspended the strongest possible shoAving should be made on the justness of the proceeding to invalidate or postpone it.
I think my position is supported bv the decision of this court in Holt v. State, 78 Miss. 631, 29 So. 527. In that case Holt was convicted of murder, and the death penalty had been pronounced. The court had adjourned, and application was presented to the circuit judge in vacation for a writ of error coram nobis on the ground that some of the jurors were not qualified electors, and on the ground that it had been communicated to the jury before the trial of petitioner that the petitioner had previously killed two men and shot a third before the homicide for which he was tried, which statements were untrue and to his. prejudice, depriving him of a fair trial; and because a state’s Avitness had stated to divers persons before the trial that he was not present and knew nothing about the killing, and but for the testimony of this
The rule as to what is required on a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence or absent witnesses is laid down in Lamar v. State, 63 Miss. 265, and. approved in Lea v. State, 63 Miss. 295, 1 So. 244; Hill v. State, 72 Miss. 531, 17 So, 375; Borroum v. State, 22 So. 68; Donald v. State, 41 So. 4 — in which it is announced that to entitle the defendant to a continuance because of the absence of a witness, or on the motion for a new trial, he must show that he used all diligence, and sIioav what steps had been taken to secure the attendance of a witness and produce the witness or his affidavit on the hearing of the motion for a new trial. Also Hare v. Sproul, 2 How. 772; Rulon v. Lintol’s Heirs, 2 How. 891; Garnett v. Kirkman, 44 Miss. 94; Bledsoe v. Little, 4 How. 13; Wright v. Alevander, 11 Smedes & M. 411; Dean v. Young, 13 Smedes & M. 118.
As to a showing for a new trial in chancery or relief against judgment: Buckingham v. Wessen, 54 Miss. 526; Miller v. Palmer, 55 Miss. 323; Ross v. Holloway, 60 Miss. 553; Cotton v. Hiller, 52 Miss. 7; Stewart v. Brooks, 62 Miss. 492; Greene v. Bank, 73 Miss. 542, 19 So. 350.
In the Fugate Case, 85 Miss. 94, 37 So. 554, 107 Am. St. Rep. 268, 3 Ann. Cas. 436, the petition alleged
It is difficult for me to see why the writ should not issue in the Fugate Case, if the writ would lie, as well as in the present case. If the jurors were hostile to the defendant and concealed their hostility by false statements on their examination for jury service, it would seem that defendant had not had constitutionally a fair trial. There are methods by which insanity may be established provided by statute, and before the solemn judgment of conviction is suspended or set aside some preliminary proceeding to establish insanity should have preceded the filing of this petition, and at all events, if not filed before, satisfactory sustaining evidence should accompany the petition.
Section 3219, Code of 1906 (section 5561, Hemingway’s Code), provided that the chancery court has jurisdiction of writs of lunacy, and provides a proceeding to determine whether or not a person is a lunatic.
For the foregoing reasons, I think the judgment ■of the circuit judge in denying the application and dismissing the petition should he affirmed.
' Mrmed.