176 Ga. 722 | Ga. | 1933
Lead Opinion
The first instance, so far as we are aware, where this court defined the meaning of the term “bridge” was in Daniels v. Intendant &c. of Athens, 55 Ga. 609. It was there held that a contiguous embankment necessary to make access to a bridge, so as to pass teams and wagons over it, is a part of the bridge, and title to the bridge covers such an embankment. But if the embankment is not a necessary part of the bridge, but a part of the streets of the municipality, the town, and not the county, would be bound to keep it in repair. As to liability for injuries caused by bridges, this court held, in County of Tattnall v. Newton, 112 Ga. 779, 781 (38 S. E. 47), that in the light of the last proviso of the Code section, supra, embracing the positive declaration “that in every case the county shall be primarily liable for all injuries caused by reason of any defective bridges,” the authority vested in ordinaries by Code (1910) § 747, carries with it the correlative duty of seeing to it that all county bridges are properly built and then kept in safe condition. It was plainly the legislative purpose to make counties liable for injuries resulting from a failure on the part of the proper authorities to observe either branch of the duty above indicated. The two duties referred to are: (1) that all county bridges must be properly built; (2) that they are then kept in a safe condition. In the Daniels case this court held: “1. A contiguous embank
Whether the County of Richmond has any duty to keep a light at night, or to remove obstructions placed in an embankment or other approach to a bridge, is one of the questions raised by the present question from the Court of Appeals. In City of Atlanta v. Wilson, 59 Ga. 544 (27 Am. R. 396), the suit was against the city rather than a county; and we do not overlook the fact that a county is not liable except as expressly charged with liability (Political Code, § 384), whereas the liability of a city is not confined by such restrictions. However, on the subject of the maintenance of an embankment which is an approach to a bridge, Judge Bleckley, in the case last cited, said: “The city has neglected to erect any railing or other means of protection along the embankment, for the safety of vehicles. To do this was its duty; the failure was negligence, and such' negligence caused the injury now complained of. It was the duty of the city to keep the street in safe condition. By reason of the city’s negligence and carelessness in erecting the embankment and leaving it in the unprotected condition described, the plaintiff has been damaged the sum of ten thousand dollars, in this: . . It will be observed that the declaration alleges negligence on the part of the defendant, specifies in what it consisted, and avers that it caused the injury. The demurrer admits all this to be true, as well as the nature of the injury, the plaintiff’s freedom from fault, and the fact and extent of his damage. In Georgia, negligence is held to be a question of fact for the jury. We have no doubt that the declaration is sufficient in law, if the jury shall believe it fully proved. It will be for them to decide whether the street, under all the circumstances, was less safe than it should have been, and whether its unsafe condition was the real cause of the injury. The city was bound to ordinary and reasonable diligence, and the plaintiff was entitled to such protection as that diligence would afford— nothing more and nothing less.”
Dissenting Opinion
who dissents from the answer to the question. Moreover, he is of the opinion that the question propounded is not of such character as to confer upon this court the right to entertain, consider, and answer it. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Hood, 149 Ga. 829 (2) (102 S. E. 521); Bryant v. Georgia Railway & Power Co., 162 Ga. 511 (134 S. E. 319); Moreland v. State, 164 Ga. 467, 473 (139 S. E. 77); Herring v. State, 165 Ga. 254, 258 (140 S. E. 491); Southern Exchange Bank v. First National Bank, 165 Ga. 289 (140 S. E. 753).