ADRIENNE HAUCK v. PUTNAM CITY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT I001, a.k.a. PUTNAM CITY SCHOOLS
Case No. CIV-20-390-G
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
August 24, 2022
CHARLES B. GOODWIN, United States District Judge
Now before the Court is the Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 5) filed by Defendant Putnam City Independent School District I001, a/k/a Putnam City Schools. Plaintiff Adrienne Hauck has responded in opposition (Doc. No. 12) and Defendant has replied (Doc. No. 13). Additionally, Plaintiff has submitted a notice of a recent United States Supreme Court decision pertinent to this matter (Doc. No. 14). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the relevant record, the Court makes its determination.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an assistant principal for a public school in Oklahoma, brings this action against her employer, alleging discriminatory and retaliatory conduct. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant failed to promote her to the position of principal on four separate occasions between 2017 and 2019, due to her gender, her sexual orientation, and her failure to conform to Defendant‘s gender stereotypes. See Pet. (Doc. No. 1-1) ¶¶ 7, 14, 27-32. Plaintiff brings claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights
STANDARD OF DECISION
In analyzing a motion to dismiss under
Further, when a motion to dismiss makes “[a] facial attack on the complaint‘s allegations regarding subject matter jurisdiction,” the Court must “accept the allegations as true.” Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1097 (10th Cir. 2009); see also E.F.W. v. St. Stephen‘s Indian High Sch., 264 F.3d 1297, 1302-03 (10th Cir. 2001).
DISCUSSION
In its Motion, Defendant argues that the applicable statute of limitations bars certain
I. Title VII Claims Arising in 2017 and 2018
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant declined to promote her to the position of principal in May 2017, March 2018, April 2019, and May 2019. See Pet. ¶¶ 14-21. In its Motion, Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff‘s Title VII claim insofar as it is predicated on the promotion decisions in 2017 and 2018, arguing that Plaintiff failed to timely file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission relating to the 2017 and 2018 decisions and that any claim arising from such decisions is now time barred. See Def.‘s Mot. (Doc. No. 5) at 3-6.
Plaintiff states in her Response that her claims are limited to the promotion decisions of April 2019 and May 2019 and that the factual allegations concerning the earlier decisions were provided solely as background. See Pl.‘s Resp. (Doc. No. 12) at 1-2. In view of Plaintiff‘s declaration that she is not asserting claims based upon the 2017 and 2018 promotion decisions, Defendant‘s request for dismissal is moot and shall be denied on that basis.
II. Title VII Claims of Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation
Citing Medina v. Income Support Division, 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005), Defendant contends that Plaintiff‘s Title VII claim based upon sexual orientation must be dismissed because sexual orientation is not a protected class under Title VII. See Def.‘s
III. OADA Claim and the GTCA Notice Requirements
Defendant urges the Court to dismiss Plaintiff‘s OADA claim due to Plaintiff‘s failure to comply with the notice requirements of the GTCA. See Def.‘s Mot. at 7-11. Plaintiff responds that she did file a timely notice in compliance with the GTCA and could demonstrate such compliance if permitted to amend her pleading. See Pl.‘s Resp. at 7. Plaintiff also argues, however, that OADA claims are not torts for purposes of the GTCA and are therefore not subject to its notice requirements. See id. at 3-6.
In the GTCA, Oklahoma invokes sovereign immunity as to all tort claims against “[t]he state, its political subdivisions, and all of their employees acting within the scope of their employment” but then waives that immunity “to the extent and in the manner provided in [that] Act.”
The OADA, which prohibits unlawful discrimination in employment, contains its own pre-suit notice requirements. In Duncan v. City of Nichols Hills, 913 P.2d 1303, 1309-10 (Okla. 1996), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that when a discrimination claim is brought under the OADA against the State or a political subdivision of the State, the specific notice requirements in the OADA apply rather than the general notice requirements in the GTCA. That court explained that “state legislatures [must] provide civil rights protection equal to or greater than protection prescribed by federal law,” and,
The decision in Duncan has been interpreted to mean that “an OADA claim is not a tort claim within the meaning of the GTCA.” Bruehl v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Indigent Def. Sys., No. CIV-13-1247-HE, 2014 WL 2879744, at *3-4 (W.D. Okla. June 24, 2014); see also Wright v. KIPP Reach Acad. Charter Sch., No. CIV-10-989-D, 2011 WL 1752248, at *6 (W.D. Okla. May 6, 2011) (interpreting Duncan in dicta as having held that “the OADA‘s prohibition against handicap discrimination is not a tort claim subject to the GTCA, but is a statutory claim“). On this basis, judges of this court—including the undersigned—have held that OADA claims are not subject to the provisions of the GTCA. See Ramirez v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Reg‘l Univ. Sys. of Okla., No. CIV-20-845-G, 2021 WL 77471, at *3-4 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 8, 2021) (citing Bruehl with approval); Cooper v. City of Alva, No. CIV-19-148-G, 2019 WL 5653217, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 31, 2019) (same); Hall v. Okla. Dep‘t of Rehab. Servs., No. CIV-17-497-D, 2018 WL 991543, at *7 n.8 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 20, 2018) (same).
Since Duncan was decided, the disability-discrimination provision of the OADA that was at issue in that case has been repealed, a cause of action for employment-based discrimination has been created under a separate section, and the stated purpose of the OADA has been amended such that it no longer expressly references federal civil rights
Despite its prior decisions in Ramirez and Cooper, the Court is persuaded of the correctness of this later approach. Because the Complaint does not plead facts that establish compliance with the GTCA‘s notice requirements, Plaintiff‘s OADA claims are
CONCLUSION
As set forth above, Defendant‘s Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 5) is DENIED AS MOOT IN PART, DENIED IN PART, and GRANTED IN PART.
Plaintiff, within ten days of the date of this Order, shall file an amended complaint demonstrating the compliance of her claims under the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act with the notice requirements of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act. Absent such a showing, the relevant claims will be dismissed without prejudice. The amended complaint should not otherwise vary from the current pleading.
Plaintiff‘s associated Motions (Doc. Nos. 21, 30) are DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of August, 2022.
CHARLES B. GOODWIN
United States District Judge