Hauck v. MillsHauck v. Mills
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Wiseman
MEMORANDUM
WISEMAN, Senior District Judge.Pending before the Court are respondent David G. Mills’ and petitioner Ralph C. Hauck’s motions for summary judgment in the above-entitled matter. For the reasons discussed in the following memorandum, respondent’s motion is GRANTED and petitioner Hauek’s DENIED.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Ralph C. Hauck (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, has petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
A petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to
Petitioner filed the instant petition for federal habeas corpus relief from state custody on March 22, 1996. The petition raises two constitutional claims attacking the legality of Petitioner’s murder and aggravated kidnapping convictions. First, Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Second, Petitioner argues that he was denied a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
After examining the petition and concluding that Petitioner was not then entitled to issuance of the writ, this Court ordered the respondent David G. Mills, Warden of Turney Center Prison (“Respondent”), to file an answer, plead or otherwise respond to the petition in conformance with Rule 5, Rules—
Presently before the Court is Respondent’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to
II. Applicable Law
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is essentially a civil action in federal court.
See, e.g., Fisher v. Baker,
203 U.S. 174, 181, 27 S.Ct. 135, 136, 51 L.Ed. 142 (1906). As such, it is subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where the application of the federal rules would not be inconsistent with established habeas practice and procedure. Rule 11, Rules—
The summary judgment procedure permits this Court to dispose of actions wherein there are no genuine issues of material fact. Under
To contest a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must do more than merely refer to and rely upon the allegations of his pleadings. Rather, he must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. While the nonmovant’s burden is merely to demonstrate that there should be a hearing as to the merits of a claim, the opposing party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as- to the material facts.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
The substantive law of federal habeas corpus actions defines those facts which are material to the issuance of the writ. Under
The statutory presumption of factual correctness does not attach, however, if one of the eight exceptions listed in
The foregoing discussion concerns application of the statutory presumption in favor of state court factual determinations. In the instant application, Petitioner has challenged the constitutionality of his convictions on two Sixth Amendment grounds. With respect to ground one—the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel—the U.S. Supreme Court has instructed that this issue is a mixed question of law and fact.
Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2070, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Although the state findings of historical fact underlying an ineffectiveness claim are entitled to deference, conclusions as to the ultimate issues of attorney competence and prejudice to the petitioner are legal in nature and therefore beyond the scope of
Federal habeas law thus provides that, with respect to Petitioner’s constitutional grounds, the historical facts reached by the Tennessee courts and underlying Petitioner’s claims must be’ presumed to be correct unless the Petitioner establishes (or indicates ah intent to establish) by convincing evidence that one of the
III. Analysis
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In ground one of his petition, Petitioner alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Petitioner was represented by appointed counsel at both the trial and appellate stages of the criminal proceedings against him. The issue of attorney competence and assistance was briefed and decided by the Tennessee courts in conjunction with consideration of Petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief. Petitioner claims that his lawyers failed to interview potential fact and alibi witnesses, that they failed to petition for funds with which to purchase investigative and expert services, that appellate counsel failed.to present issues on appeal that were raised in Petitioner’s motion for a new trial, and that appellate counsel failed to timely file for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. These claims have been reiterated in the instant petition.
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, the highest state court to consider Petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief, found that, even assuming Petitioner’s allegations to be true, he was not prejudiced because the evidence against him was “so overwhelming.” Moreover, Petitioner could not present any witnesses at his post-conviction evidentiary hearing “whose testimony could have possibly been helpful to him at trial.” In short, the Tennessee appellate court concluded that, assuming Petitioner’s factual allegations to be true, as a matter of law he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.
At the federal level, the competence of counsel is a question of law subject to a two-tiered analysis as set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington:
First, the defendant must show, that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errorsso serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Strickland establishes that the performance prong of the effectiveness standard requires the attorney to act in a reasonably competent manner under the circumstances and in accordance with prevailing norms of practice. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, In addition, the reviewing court must begin with a strong presumption in favor of attorney competence. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
Like the Tennessee appellate court, this Court may assume the truth of Petitioner’s factual allegations and still find that his trial and appellate counsel performed in a competent manner. First, trial counsel’s strategic decisions concerning the presentation and examination of witnesses are not subject to challenge if it is apparent that a defense lawyer‘has made a thorough investigation of relevant facts and law or reasonable professional judgments support limiting such an investigation. Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1579-80 (6th Cir.1992). Petitioner does not attack his lawyers’ knowledge of the law (the record indicates that Petitioner was represented by several successive court-appointed lawyers during the course of his trial; his primary defense attorney is now deceased), but rather their election not to pursue certain trial and alibi witnesses. Significantly, when given the opportunity to present testimony at his post-conviction hearing, Petitioner failed to produce any witnesses who could call his conviction into question. Although Petitioner’s post-conviction brief to the Tennessee Criminal Court of Appeals names several potential witnesses subsequently interviewed by the Public Defender’s office, the brief never explains how or why these witnesses are material. Due to the dangers of post-verdict secondguessing, this Court is bound by the presumption that counsel’s performance “falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon failure to investigate certain trial and alibi witnesses lacks merit.
Second, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed to secure funds for investigative and expert services after moving the trial court for same. Apparently, one of Petitioner’s appointed attorneys filed a motion for expert and investigative funds in 1988. When this attorney withdrew from the ease, his replacement failed to argue or otherwise proceed with the motion. While the attorney who initially filed the motion certified a need for funds based upon lack of time and expertise, Petitioner does not contend nor does the record indicate that the three court-appointed lawyers subsequently assigned to Petitioner’s defense had similar need for funding. Moreover, because Petitioner fails to state even generally how investigative and expert services would have assisted in his defense, he cannot establish prejudice—the second prong of the Strickland test. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
Third, Petitioner asserts that his appointed appellate counsel presented only one issue, spousal privilege, on appeal when his trial counsel had raised multiple grounds in support of a motion for a new trial. The fact that appellate counsel avoided trial counsel’s assignments of error is not in dispute. The issue is whether, as a matter of federal law, appellate counsel breached his duty of competence and whether this breach prejudiced Petitioner’s defense. The stringent, deferential standard applicable to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel set out in
Strickland
also applies to the work of appellate counsel.
Bowen v. Foltz,
763 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1985). Again, this Court is obligated to assess attorney competence “from counsel’s perspective at the time [of the] . . . challenged conduct.”
Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. As with the decisions of trial counsel, the strategic considerations of appellate counsel are insulated from review if reasonably competent. In addition, even if a defendant has suggested certain issues and avenues of argument, his lawyer is
Petitioner’s appointed counsel elected to focus on spousal privilege because Petitioner’s wife had been’ an eyewitness to his crimes and had given the most damaging testimony against him at trial. The choice not to proliferate issues on appeal, but rather to concentrate upon particularly important errors has been recognized and endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court: “[The] process of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy.” Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2667, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Petitioner was unable to show during the state post-conviction process how he was prejudiced by the failure to raise multiple issues on appeal. In fact, in his brief, post-conviction counsel merely reiterates trial counsel’s assignments of error without establishing their relevance to Petitioner’s defense. Appellate counsel’s decision to raise only spousal privilege on appeal, aimed at the heart of the state’s case against Petitioner, was a strategic choice that does not constitute the ineffective assistance of counsel under the rigorous Strickland standard.
Finally, Petitioner argues that his last court-appointed lawyer failed to timely file an Application for Permission to Appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court thereby denying him final direct review of his convictions. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the effective assistance of appellate counsel includes proper and timely filing of requests for appellate review. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 742-44, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1399-400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 751-52, 87 S.Ct. 1402, 1403-04, 18 L.Ed.2d 501 (1967); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397, 105 S.Ct. 830, 836, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). In Evitts v. Lucey, defendant’s counsel failed to comply with á procedural rule of the Kentucky- Court of Appeals allowing the state to move for dismissal of defendant’s first appeal as of right. 469 U.S. at 389-90, 105 S.Ct. at 832-33. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the state could not extinguish the defendant’s right to an appeal based upon the procedural errors of counsel when such errors deny the defendant the right to effective assistance‘of counsel. Id. at 399-400, 105 S.Ct. at 837-38.
In Evitts, the procedural default of counsel was traceable solely to counsel’s own conduct. In Petitioner’s case, it is unclear that the late filing of the application to appeal was a unilateral error. In its opinion denying post-conviction relief to Petitioner, the Tennessee Criminal Court of Appeals found that Petitioner had become “mistrustful” of his appellate counsel and had filed a pro se motion to have his attorney dismissed before perfection of appeal. In addition, Petitioner testified that he refused to cooperate with appellate counsel and to communicate with them regarding his defense. Petitioner was appointed counsel to perfect his appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, but the Tennessee appellate court found that it is questionable whether Petitioner spoke with counsel about his appeal or indicated a willingness even to pursue an appeal.
Under
B. Speedy Trial
Petitioner alleges as his second Sixth Amendment ground that he was denied a speedy trial. Petitioner was arrested on November 11, 1987 and brought to trial on July 24, 1989, a period of approximately twenty-one months. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a four factor balancing test for determining whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. These factors include: (1) length of delay, (2) the reason for delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a’ speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. None of the four factors alone is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of unconstitutional delay; “[r]ather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” Id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. Application of the balancing test, although dependent upon the development of historical facts, ultimately presents a legal question that is freely reviewable by the federal- court in a habeas action. Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 380 (6th Cir.1982).
It is undisputed that the Petitioner asserted his right to speedy trial by motion, and that his case was pending for twenty-one months. This Court’s analysis will therefore focus upon the second and fourth factors—reason for delay and prejudice—of the Barker balancing test. Whether the delay is presumptively prejudicial depends upon the nature and complexity of the underlying crime or crimes. Id. at 381. The Supreme Court has instructed that “the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. Petitioner was charged with murder and aggravated kidnapping, crimes somewhere between these two extremes. Various federal courts have held, however, that even in complex cases a delay of less than one year is presumptively prejudicial. See, e.g., United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1111 n. 19 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970, 97 S.Ct. 1656, 52 L.Ed.2d 363 (1977) (“We have in the past routinely applied the Barker balancing test even in complex conspiracy eases in which the speedy trial period was thought to be nine or ten months.”).
Although a delay of’ twenty-one months would appear to be unconstitutionally excessive given the severity and complexity of Petitioner’s crimes, considerations of prejudice must be tempered by examination of the reasons for such delay. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals concluded, and Petitioner does not dispute, that a total of five different trial lawyers were appointed to handle Petitioner’s defense. (The record reveals that Petitioner was represented by seven different attorneys during the course of his trial and appeal.) As Petitioner became dissatisfied with the performance of appointed counsel, he requested their withdrawal or dismissal. He filed numerous and voluminous pro se motions and briefs even while represented by counsel, forcing the trial court to delay proceedings in order to respond or to appoint substitute counsel. Over time, Petitioner refused to communicate or cooperate with counsel and refused the assignment of several court-appointed attorneys. These factual findings of the Tennessee appellate court are given deference under
WTile most causes of delay are weighed against the government,
Cain,
686 F.2d at 382-83, the reasons for delay in this case are almost solely attributable to Peti
IY. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, and because there are no genuine issues of material fact and because Respondent is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, Respondent’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to
This Court has reviewed the habeas reform provisions found in Title I of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (“Act”). The Act, .signed into law on April 24,1996, amends
An appropriate order will enter.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, Respondent’s motion for summary judgment in this matter is GRANTED. Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and his petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.
It is so ORDERED.