Lead Opinion
In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant argues that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in denying her request for a $2,000 advance. We agree that the JCC erred in denying the advance.
Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes (2011), permits advances of up to $2,000 on the following proof:
(c) In the event the claimant has not returned to the same or equivalent employment with no substantial reduction in wages or has suffered a substantial loss of earning capacity or a physical impairment, actual or apparent:
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2. An advance payment of compensation not in excess of $2,000 may be ordered by any [JCC] ... after giving due consideration to the interests of the person entitled thereto.
The advance must, of course, “have some plausible nexus to” “medical and related financial needs arising from workplace injuries.” ESIS/ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Kuhn,
Claimant’s uncontroverted testimony was that she was off work for “more than 18 months on sick leave,” that she returned to work at a reduction in total pay, and that an advance “would put me up to date ... so that I could put food in my refrigerator, for one thing, gas in my car, and to pay my bills.” By this testimony, which the JCC did not reject, Claimant has met her burden of proof.
The JCC’s conclusion that Claimant’s difficulty in managing her finances is unrelated to her injury is seemingly based on his categorization of some of Claimant’s monthly bills as “luxury expenses.” But whether an item is classified as a “luxury” is not a proper factor for consideration under section 440.20(12)(c)2. These small advances are merely a stopgap to help a claimant avoid defaulting with creditors while awaiting the potential distribution of workers’ compensation benefits, when the reduction in income is caused by the injury. A claimant is not required to live a pauper’s life to be eligible for an advance of up to $2,000 under section 440.20(12)(c)2.
Advances in excess of $2,000 are permitted under subsections 440.20(12)(c)3. and (12)(d), and those subsections mandate that a JCC inquire into the reasonableness of those larger advances. In contradis
As we made clear in Lopez v. Allied Aerofoam,
Accordingly, we REVERSE the order denying the advance and REMAND this matter for entry of an order awarding the requested $2,000 advance.
Dissenting Opinion
dissents.
I dissent. This case presents nothing more than a failure of proof on Claimant’s part, who bore the burden of persuasion. See Fitzgerald v. Osceola Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
