598 N.E.2d 1302 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1991
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *186 Plaintiff-appellant, Jose Hatlestad, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Appellant's single assignment of error states:
"The Trial Court erred in granting Defendant-Appellee's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; erroneously concluding that the Railway Labor Act,
In his complaint plaintiff alleges that in June 1989, his employer, defendant-appellee, Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail"), recalled plaintiff from a furlough to assume the position of assigned laborer in defendant's Buckeye Yard Diesel Facility; that defendant conducted a medical examination of plaintiff in June 1989 which determined that plaintiff was physically qualified for said position despite a handicap requiring plaintiff to wear a prosthesis below his left knee; that plaintiff thereafter satisfactorily completed two field performance tests conducted to determine whether plaintiff properly and *187 safely could perform the tasks associated with this position under actual job conditions; and that plaintiff complied with defendant's January 1990 and subsequent requests for additional medical information. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant nevertheless failed to approve or reject him for the assigned laborer position, or to submit the question of plaintiff's fitness for the position to a board of doctors for determination under the collective bargaining agreement, and that defendant's failure to act was motivated by plaintiff's handicap.
Plaintiff brought claims against defendant in common pleas court, alleging (1) unlawful discriminatory practices in violation of R.C.
Under his single assignment of error, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the RLA preempts his discrimination and tort claims, as his claims are independent of the collective bargaining agreement and therefore outside of the scope of the RLA. Defendant responds that the trial court correctly determined that the RLA preempts plaintiff's claims, as those claims are based on facts which are inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement.
Preliminarily, we note that preemption under the RLA presents a choice-of-forum rather than a choice-of-law question; preemption of a state-law claim by the RLA extinguishes state court jurisdiction over that claim. Miller v. Norfolk W. Ry.Co. (C.A.6, 1987),
The RLA defines disputes between an employee and a rail carrier that arise "out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions" as minor disputes. Section 153 First (i), Title 45, U.S.Code. The RLA confers exclusive jurisdiction over such minor disputes upon the National Railroad Adjustment Board or a private arbitration panel. Stephens v.Norfolk W. Ry. Co. (C.A.6, *188
1986),
Plaintiff responds that the preemption standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Lingle v. Norge Div. of MagicChef, Inc. (1988),
We first consider plaintiff's claim for unlawful handicap discrimination under R.C.
Unlike the retaliatory discharge claim in Lingle, supra, the discrimination claim herein cannot be resolved by a purely factual inquiry into plaintiff's conduct and defendant's conduct and motive: the determination of the third prong of his discrimination claim under R.C.
Plaintiff's complaint also alleges that defendant is liable for invasion of privacy. Of the causes of action for invasion of privacy recognized in Ohio, see Housh v. Peth (1956),
Within those parameters, plaintiff's claim for invasion of privacy cannot be resolved by a purely factual inquiry into defendant's conduct and the effect of that conduct upon plaintiff. Rather, the wrongfulness of defendant's intrusion depends, in part, upon the collective bargaining agreement, which defines the circumstances under which plaintiff has consented to defendant's inquiry into plaintiff's private activities. Because plaintiff's claim for invasion of *190 privacy necessarily implicates the collective bargaining agreement, such a claim is not independent of the collective bargaining agreement, whether we apply the Lingle standard or the "inextricably intertwined" standard. Consequently, the trial court did not err in determining that the RLA preempted plaintiff's claim for invasion of privacy and dismissing that claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires plaintiff to show that (1) defendant intended to cause emotional distress, or knew or should have known that actions taken would result in serious emotional distress; (2) defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) defendant's actions proximately caused plaintiff's psychic injury; and (4) the mental anguish plaintiff suffered was serious. Pyle v. Pyle
(1983),
Plaintiff's complaint does not allege any infliction of emotional distress outside the context of the employee-employer relationship. Within the context of the employment relationship, plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot be resolved by a purely factual inquiry into defendant's conduct and motive, and the effect of such conduct on plaintiff, as defendant's legal rights, which determine defendant's liability on such a claim, depend in part upon the collective bargaining agreement. See Beard, supra,
Nonetheless, plaintiff argues that, under Farmer v. UnitedBhd. of Carpenters Joiners of Am., Local 25 (1977),
While plaintiff herein arguably has asserted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon the manner of defendant's discrimination, the sole basis asserted for such a claim is defendant's delay in determining whether plaintiff can perform safely and substantially the essential functions of the assigned laborer position. Unlike Farmer,supra, at 304,
In short, regardless of whether plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is based upon defendant's discrimination or the manner in which defendant accomplished that discrimination, such claim necessarily implicates the collective bargaining agreement. As a result, the claim is not independent of the collective bargaining agreement under either the Lingle standard or the "inextricably intertwined" standard. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that the RLA preempted plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and dismissing that claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Finally, as to plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, Ohio courts do not recognize a separate tort for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context. Antalis v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce (1990),
Arguably, a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress could be resolved by a purely factual inquiry without reference to the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore the RLA would not preempt such a claim. However, to the extent that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, such error was *192
not prejudicial. Having failed to allege that his emotional distress resulted from his appreciation of an accident's peril, plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief for negligent infliction of emotional distress. O'Brien v. Univ. CommunityTenants Union (1975),
Given the foregoing, we overrule plaintiff's single assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
BOWMAN, P.J., and REILLY, J., concur.
ARCHER E. REILLY, J., retired, of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting by assignment.