69 Me. 326 | Me. | 1879
The intention of the parties has been called the
polar star in the construction of writings. This rule controls all others. Of course it must be such an intention as is effectually expressed in the writing. Then there are certain rules or guides that are considered valuable to aid in getting at the intention. Among them are these: Erroneous or defective references to the sources of title are not to vary a prior description clearly and definitely given. Crosby v. Bradbury, 20 Maine, 61. A precedent particular description is not to be impaired by a subsequent general description or reference. Melvin v. Proprietors, &c., 5 Metc. 15, 29. Parties are supposed to rely more on a first description, than on an attempted re-description, other things equal. A reference is more important where the description is imperfect without the reference, and where the description is aided rather than controlled by it. Weller v. Barber, 110 Mass. 44, 47. Definite boundaries subsequently used will limit the generality of a term previously used, nothing else controlling. Haynes v. Young, 36 Maine, 557. Stewart v. Davis, 63 Maine, 537, and cases there
The deed in question describes the land conveyed as “ a tract of land in Pittsfield in said county of Somerset, beginning at the north-west corner of lot number six in Pittsfield, thence running easterly on said town line to the north-east corner of said lot; thence southerly on the east line of said lot to the south-east corner of said lot; thence westerly on the south line of said lot to land formerly owned by John Dutton ; thence north on the west line of said lot to the first mentioned bounds, being the same lot of land conveyed to us by Jeremiah Bragg, and formerly in possession of Warren Spearin, to contain one hundred acres more or less.”
The plaintiff’s position is, that this description includes the east half of lot number five, which lot adjoins lot number six and is immediately west of it. He contends that John Dutton did not own lot number five, but that he owned the westerly half of it only, and that the call in the deed “ to land formerly owned by John Dutton” must extend, not to the south-east corner of lot five, but to the middle of the southerly line thereof. This deed was made in 1849. The case discloses the fact that one of the grantors received a deed of warranty from John Dutton in 1845 of lots four and five, and that he conveyed the same lots to the plaintiff in 1851. It may well have been supposed by the parties that John Dutton formerly owned the whole of lot five, whether he did in fact own it or not. But the case does not show that he did not own it, and at most throws perhaps some doubt upon that question. It seems that, when John Dutton conveyed the lots four and five in 1845, by a full and definite descrip
The plaintiff', secondly, relies upon a further part of the description to prove that the parties to the deed of 1849 intended to include the easterly half of lot number five. The grantors say, “ being the same lot of land conveyed to us by Jeremiah Bragg.” Here the before named rules of construction have a more direct
Exceptions overruled.