*1 Hathaway, Ray Rody HATHAWAY, the Estate of Adm’r of J. ROBERT MUTUAL Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STANDARD Deceased, al., et (Jason Barton, M. al., Defendants-Appellees et COMPANY INSURANCE Defendants). al., Vaughn Plaintiff; Blake E. et 5 — 95—0255 District No. Fifth 22, 1996. Opinion filed November GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concurring. specially KUEHN Belleville, Rosenstengel, Rosenstengel, Jon of & of Edward E. Bonifield Carbondale, Smith, Kionka, Vernon, appellants. J. of and M. Keith of Mt. for Doerge, Jelliffe, Morris, Harrisburg, appellee Michal & Ferrell for Company. Standard Mutual Insurance Drone, Elliott, Conger P.C., Carmi, appellee
Robert Michael & Country Companies Company. *2 opinion
JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the
of the court:
years
Several times in recent
this court has ruled on the recover-
ability of
multiple
underinsured motorist benefits when
claimants
coverage of
exhaust the
See Golladay
underinsured vehicle.
v. Al-
(1st
Co.,
465,
lied
App.
American Insurance
271 Ill.
3d
"For if are in an auto ac- $XXX, injuries up to your for cident, you compensated will be insurance.” person has no though other even motorist of uninsured the advent 1980, only years after coverage alone motorist that uninsured apparent coverage, it became willing to were drivers who responsible enough protect to not responsible for protection premiums. pay appropriate was not occurrence the other driver when drivers occurred bodily at fault If, example, the driver for completely uninsured. had unin- $20,000 injured person liability limits of could recover $100,000, injured person limits of sured motorist or she would policy. He nothing an uninsured motorist from uninsured completely at fault had been off if the driver been better problem response to this legislative only underinsured. The instead of fact, companies insurance, require insurance to provide Stat., Supp., coverage. Ill. Rev. offer underinsured 1994)). (West (now see 215 ILCS par. ch. 755a—1 5/143a —2 responsible intended to offer coverage was The underinsured only uninsured motor- not from way protect themselves drivers a By paying appropriate from underinsured motorists. ists but also that, they were could be assured premium, responsible drivers up to the accident, be able to recover an auto regard- companies, they purchased from their own limits at fault at fault. The driver status of the driver less of the insurance *3 insurance, responsible in which case completely be without could the amount of their drivers could recover entire course, injuries severe limits, assuming, their were of hand, If, the the other amount. on enough to entitle them to the full injuries insurance, drivers’ responsible at fault had driver amount the entire they be able to recover enough, would were severe from the limits, amount recovered less the their underinsured of situations, responsible driver the at fault. both driver motor- coverage, limits uninsured the whether protected up to the of situations, coverage. In both coverage or underinsured ist to the was limited exposure companies’ maximum the insurance insureds, in the case of and by their of the selected amount by the be reduced coverage, exposure would underinsured The driver. the underinsured received from amount their insureds they by the limits limited exposure was also companies’ insurance point At this per much occurrence. per person, much so imposed of so appropriate the purchase can everything seems covered. Insureds appropriate pay companies will protection, and insurance amounts. in- several accident in which There was an happened
What next? uninsured, injured. sureds If were the driver at fault had been each of up insureds have been able to to the would recover un- limits, assuming insured injuries that their were that serious. What is, underinsured, at fault driver what if the limits of enough compensate the driver fault at were not to all insureds Well, for injuries? say, the full extent of people their most "Since underinsured motorist insurance was extended fill the created ously coverage, underinsured versus uninsured motorist obvi- up the insureds are to the of entitled recover limits their un- coverage, derinsured less whatever amounts can recover from the underinsured driver.”
Most,
all,
might
if not
people
way,
see it that
but
courts
Beginning
Illinois, Inc.,
not.
Sentry
Moriconi
Insurance
of
App.
(1990),
Ill.
extending through
3d
We conclude that relying Moriconi the other cases on 2(4) the first sentence of section have misconstrued 143a— applied anomaly. multiple-claimant to the Section 143a—2 of the Illinois was in Insurance Code that ef fect at plaintiffs’ the time of accident read: purpose
"For the Act the term 'underinsured motor vehi- ownership, cle’ means a motor vehicle whose maintenance or use bodily insured, has or resulted death as defined in policy, liability which sum the limits under for bodily injury liability all policies or under bonds or security required ap- other to be Illinois maintained under law plicable to person organization legally or to the or driver vehicle, responsible applicable for such vehicle and to the is less coverageprovided than the limits underinsured the insured as defined ability the time accident. limits of li- at of the providing for an insurer coverage, actually
shall limits of such less those amounts *4 policies, applicable bodily under recovered security bonds or other maintained on the underinsured motor ve- par. Ill. hicle.” Rev. Stat. ch. 755a—2. Most of the courts have construed the statute have Consequently, unambiguous. and found it the first sentence focused on in the insurance history and ruled legislative they ignored for a is one reason Although ambiguity in a statute companies’ favor. An only reason. history, it is not the legislative court to examine if the exam- history appropriate is also legislative examination of the Eskridge, Legisla- result. See W. helps prevent an absurd ination (1990). Values, Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 365 History tive construing the underinsured Although most of the cases legislative to examine its neglected or have either refused statute they because they ambiguity it or history found no because words, we its inappropriate to look behind it would be concluded that reasons. share that view for several do not out, although Justice Holmes’ First, Eskridge points as Professor meant; legislature we ask statement, inquire what do not "We 207), (Holmes, Legal Papers Collected only the statute means” what history, legislative by those reluctant to examine quoted is often subject. Holmes also said: his final word on the was not meaning language plain we are not is "It is said that when That is in order to raise doubts. evidence [extrinsic] to resort law, a and does not experience than rule of rather axiom if it exists.” Boston preclude persuasive evidence consideration States, 278 U.S. 73 L. Ed. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United (1928). 49 S. Ct. Eskridge concludes: As Professor dogmatic my exegesis pragmatic historical is
"The lesson history legislative productive are not our positions the use of on History Eskridge, democracy.” Legislative representative W. (1990). Values, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. history
Second, legislative supreme court examined our very Sulser tool; history like a its legislative Finally, it seems to us that not in others. some instances and may appropriate use be some tool, In some cases in others it will. may it be the best cases not purists, that offends some only a crude assistance may it offer form of brings necessary. example may The last but that crude assistance lost their Illinois who had story in southern to mind a of two hunters they only Not Forest. way depths in the of the Shawnee National canteens, guns, their their way, they their had also lost lost had been These two unfortunates everything but a hand axe. days were able through for two when stumbling the woods head, the first turtle’s snapping chopping After off the catch turtle. hunter, pur- The second hunter raised the axe to smash the shell. *5 1st, "Wait, you’re going protested, to ruin that beautiful shell.” shell, replied, "Damn the man!” the first "I’m hunter after the meat!” Holmes, beginning progressing After with and through and after reviewing referring symposium statutory and to the modern on Statutory interpretations (Symposium Interpretation, On 66 Chi.-Kent (1990)), emerging L. Rev. 301 and after from the darkness of the forest, depths of legislative history, the we turn at last to the and what do we find?
First, in response to the courts’ conclusions about the lack am- biguity dealing in statutes coverage, we Bernstein, note that Mr. associate counsel for Farm State Companies, stated: easy concept
"Underinsured motorist is not grasp. an to many people many We if legislators doubt or can difficult, explain doubly therefore, is public it. It for the to 1980, Bernstein, understand J. March A pre- it.” statement hearing Study sented at the before Illinois Insurance Laws regarding Commission Public Act House Bill 81— Laws, New at 3. Second, explains Mr. at Bernstein how to look underinsured motorists: way suggest proper
"We to look at underinsured motor- designed ists is terms of what new An this is to do. high[-]limit insured with is in a bet- position injured by ter if injured by an uninsured than if motorist an carrying bodily at-fault injury liability driver minimum limits. purpose put of underinsured motorist insurance is an position insured the same after an accident with (but responsible financially carrying individual one who is limits) relatively financially low as he she would with a or Bernstein, responsible 21, 1980, J. A motorist.” March statement presented hearing Study at before Illinois Insurance Laws regarding Commission Act Bill Public House 81— Laws, New at 3. Third, question very Mr. is Bernstein addressed close case, question raised in this he and concluded: should, therefore, liability
"The the insurer be the difference bonds, insurance, recoverablelimits between other securi- jfeasor pay ties tort[ available to for the un- by insured words[,] motorist carried insured. In [szc] limits other $100,000/300,000 if an insured uninsured [szc] carries coverage, ac- he or she knows that in the event of an another, protection cident of at least caused fault of $100,000/300,000 regardless at all times re- available jfeasor.” Bernstein, March J. tort[
sources of the hearing presented at the before the Illinois A statement Study regarding Public Act 81— Commission Insurance Laws Laws, at 2-3. Bill 1979 New House coverage is once you underinsured motorists "The reason uninsured, you ought high[-]limit or you agree to be there injured by than we are being an uninsured driver are better off up so that And so we have to make an insured driver. po- injury by an at-fault driver we are in the event of any minimum regardless carries insurance or sition of whether he limits. *** *** talking difference in And what we are about is the difference, you will, recovery, the in recoverable limits between purchased by what is available and what is our insured. talking coverage, talking We are not about an excess we are *6 jholder putting policy[ position about our in the same if he is by by an struck insured low-limit driver as he is uninsured coverage.” purpose motorist. That is the of underinsured motorist Bernstein, hearing J. March before Commission, Study the Illinois Insurance Laws House Bill Laws, at 1979 New 39-40. quoted legislative history quite makes it clear that the stat- provide protection
ute intended to insureds with for the differ- bodily injury liability ence between the recoverable limits from the therefore, policy We, and policy. the underinsured motorist conclude the definition of in underinsured motor vehicle the first sentence legisla- of section 143a —2 should not be allowed to subvert this clear purpose placing position tive insured in the same regardless culpable of whether of the is driver vehicle uninsured or underinsured. The first sentence cannot be read in isolation. This by Heiple situation is similar to the one in Hoglund described Justice v. State Farm Mutual Automobile (1992): exculpatory language believe that the on which State Farm
"We Rather, in relies cannot be read in isolation. it must be read conjunction policyholder’s expectations it with the reasonable conjunction public policy in must also be read with the behind by coverage and the intended the in policy Moreover, provision read surance itself. the setoff must be at hand. with reference to the facts of the case When viewed way, ambiguity policy language a latent in the is disclosed. *** *** public policy Such a result would violate the behind the un- injured party placed in the insured motorist statute that position as if the uninsured driver had been insured. Ad- ditionally, polices the insurance provide at issue were intended to coverage damages by caused uninsured motorists. To allow a interpretation literal policy language nullify would policies. Further, intended to endorse State interpretation Farm’s provision of the setoff deny policyholder substantial economic pay- value in return for the premiums. say, ment of That is to the insured would be denied the very protection against uninsured motorists for which paid premiums.” Hoglund, 279-80, he had 148 Ill. 2d at at 1034-35. summary, we reverse the trial First, court for two reasons. statutory definitions, when conjunction considered in with their
legislative history, coverage. Second, mandate the reading of both policies and the statute policyholder’s with the reasonable expectations public policy behind the underinsured motorist requires in mind this court to reach the same conclusion supreme that the court in Hoglund. reached agree Maag We with Justice ought that "the law to make sense” and feel that his recent illustration repeating: bears
"Assume that an automobile accident occurs. Assume further that the negligent driver of vehicle 'A’ is and is the cause of the $25,000 accident. The driver of vehicle 'A’ liability carries cover- age. $25,000 The driver of vehicle 'B’ carries in underinsured coverage. Finally, assume that in ’B’ vehicle there is one passenger along with the passenger driver of vehicle If 'B.’ immediately vehicle 'B’ $25,000, files suit and is awarded judgment paid liability full driver 'A’ policy, ’s then there would be no left under pay driver 'A’’s judgment later rendered in favor of the driver of vehicle 'B.’ The 'B,’ despite having driver of vehicle paid premium his insurance dutifully, would not be anything entitled to recover under his own *7 position underinsured motorist Country the Mutual omitted.) in adopted.” the instant case Cummins v. Country Co., 281 App. Ill. 3d (1996) (Maag, J., specially 915 concurring). We now turn from our review of the underinsured motorist stat- legislative history ute and its to the facts of this case. Hathaway,
Robert Rody Hathaway, on behalf of and Eric Van Zant and Jason Barton filed a complaint damages five-count aris- ing out of a motor Rody Hathaway vehicle accident in which killed and Jason injured. Only Barton and Eric Van Zant were counts subject III and are appeal. IV the of this The other counts have ei- settlements, ther been settled or dismissed. As result of the $36,523.77, following sums: Karen Knuist plaintiffs received the $15,653.04, Paige Borst $20,870.73, Zant Jason Barton Eric Van $5,217.68, $10,435.36, Lodewyk $10,435.36, Borst Robert Knuist $5,217.69. Rody Hathaway estate III, motorist benefits sought In count Van Zant underinsured Country policy which had underinsured from his Mutual $50,000 Hatha- per person. plaintiff In count IV benefits way sought policy underinsured benefits from his Standard Mutual $25,000 Each of the per person. which had underinsured benefits of claimed plaintiffs the underinsured motorist the difference between actually policies limits on their and what received own bodily injury/death from the limits of the other vehicles. The trial granted Country court Mutual’s motion to dismiss count III on the pleadings summary judgment and Standard Mutual’s motion for estate, Hathaway, Rody Hathaway’s to count IV. Robert on behalf of appeal and Eric III Van Zant from dismissal of counts and IV. The definitions of underinsured motorist vehicle contained Hathaway policies statutory language and Van Zant mirror definitions, section 143a—2. We conclude those like statute, deprive cannot be used to the insureds of the they clearly purchase. intended to
Therefore, reversed, judgment of the circuit court is and this case is proceedings opinion. remanded for further consistent this
Reversed and remanded. KUEHN, specially concurring:
JUSTICE opinion today Our differs from views taken other members of inexorably Their paramount court. views flowed from a rule of statutory'construction prevents meaning beyond a search for unambiguous statutory language. Chap- While concur with Justice opinion, origins approach man’s I wish to underscore that of our court, can be supreme found the words of our first noted in Cum- Country mins v. Mutual Insurance N.E.2d approach pioneer Our an does not uncharted course looking beyond language contained in the underinsured motorist statute.
In Sulser v. Mutual supreme court stated: that, statute, enacting "The court must assume legislature did not In enact- [Citations.] intend absurd result. ing legislature provision] avoided [the absurdity policyholder of a situation where a would receive *8 being injured by fewer benefits in the fortuitous event of an un- Sulser, derinsured rather than an uninsured motorist.” 147 Ill. 2d at at N.E.2d 430. legislative The court instructed consideration of intent upon based sponsor, Telcser, the words of the House Representative bill’s who " *** said, 'we wanted to be sure that the difference between the claim and the by your underinsured would be taken care of own in- gap surance to fill the between the claim and the amount ” Sulser, available from the underinsured ***.’ Ill. 2d at quoting Assem., 591 N.E.2d at 81st Gen. House Proceedings, June at 44-45. plaintiffs
Had the injured by our case been an uninsured motorist, any each could up have recovered amount to the full limits of his or her own uninsured coverage. Since amount available from the exhausted, underinsured motorist has been plaintiffs are entitled to "fill gap” between the available amount received and their coverage. own underinsured motorist To otherwise construe the provision ignore its draft- ers’ intent in produces favor of one which absurd results.
I, therefore, specially concur. GOLDENHERSH, specially JUSTICE concurring: agreeing While by with the result reached Chapman, Justice special concur in the by concurrence filed Justice Kuehn and add my some comments of own. new,
One should not conclude that this court has embarked on a statutory uncharted route of interpretation legislative and use of his- tory. by The majority result reached opinion product is the statutory substantive and interpretation precedents by set forth supreme our court.
We noted in Cummins v. 281 Ill. (1996), analysis statutory that an inter- pretation selectively must include an entire statute and not concentrate on one sentence or another of multisentence section. concurrence, special legislative As Justice Kuehn notes in his question clearly intent of the statute in by set forth the bill’s sponsor in Representatives, Representative the House of Telcser. ambiguity, supreme When faced with an Hoglund our court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance explained proper analysis method of and res- ambiguity. 278-79, olution Hoglund, of that 148 Ill. 2d at method, at Applying 1034-35. the Cummins court concluded that question ambiguous. statute in follows case also in the instant by this court reached The result ambi- circumstances. cases in similar supreme court the lead of history the statute statute, legislative guity of not House, practical effect sponsor in the articulated its recovery and actual purchased insurance filling between Country Mutual in Sulser v. supreme court noted our have been *9 Hoglund. 147 Ill. 2d Assembly’s public that the General court also indicated Hoglund the under- applicable to statute the uninsured motorist policy behind would be frustrated well insured motorist case, were position in this to defendants’ company’s position, similar considerations, (For see importance public adopted. State, Municipal Employees & County American Federation of (1996).) Services, Management Central Department of provisions embodied As the uninsured and underinsured achieving simi- aimed at policy considerations and were public justify our conclu- results, more than the authorities noted above lar sion in the instant case. majority reasons, specially concur in the
For the above-stated Kuehn. special in the concurrence Justice opinion and concur CALDWELL, al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. et S.C. VAUGHAN OIL COMPANY (Paul Caldwell, TROUTT, ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant AND Defendant). No. 5 — 95—0336
Fifth District 4, 1996. Opinion filed December