HASTINGS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plаintiff-Appellee, v GRANGE INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICHIGAN, Defendant-Appellant. HASTINGS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v GRANGE INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICHIGAN, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 331612; No. 333193
State of Michigan Court of Appeals
May 16, 2017
FOR PUBLICATION; Berrien Circuit Court; LC No. 14-000258-NF
Before: MARKEY, P.J., and MURPHY and METER, JJ.
In Docket No. 331612, defendant Grange Insurance Company of Michigan (Grange) appeals by right the trial court‘s order denying its motion for summary disposition and granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff, Hastings Mutual Insurance Company (Hastings). In Docket No. 333193, Hastings appeals by right the trial court‘s order denying its motion for attorney fees. We affirm.
This case arises out of a fire that occurred on April 15, 2014, in a barn owned by Williams Farms, LLC, a family-operated farm that grows a variety of vegetables. Ryan Keath, a salaried employee of Williams Farms, regularly used the barn and its equipment to provide repairs and maintenance to the farm‘s vehicles, as well as to the vehicles of family members. Keath was repairing his sister‘s motor vehicle when the fire began. The fire ultimately destroyed the barn and all of its contents. Hastings, the insurer of Williams Farms‘s real and personal property, paid Williams Farms $699,134 in insurance benefits to cover the loss. Hastings later filed a claim as subrogee for property protection benefits in the sаme amount from Grange, the no-fault insurer of the vehicle involved in the fire. Grange denied the claim by Hastings in August 2014, and Hastings subsequently filed suit against Grange.
Both parties filed motions for summary disposition under
On appeal, Grange argues that the trial court improperly granted Hastings’ motion for summary disposition because Williams Farms was in the business of repairing, servicing, or maintaining motor vehicles for purposes of
In general,
MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides for summary disposition when there is no genuine issue regarding any materiаl fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law. A motion brought underMCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a party‘s claim. A trial court may grant a motion for summary disposition underMCR 2.116(C)(10) if the pleadings, аffidavits, and other documentary evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the reсord, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. The trial court is not permitted to assess credibility, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes, and if material evidence conflicts, it is not appropriate to grant a motion for summary disposition underMCR 2.116(C)(10) . A court may only consider substantively admissible evidence actually proffered relative to a motion for summary disposition underMCR 2.116(C)(10) . [Citations and quotation marks omitted.]
With respect to the construction of
When interpreting a statute, we follow the established rules of statutory construction, the foremost of which is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. To do so, we begin by examining the most reliable evidence of that intent, the language of the statute itself. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted. Effect should be given to every phrase, clause, and word in the statute and, whenever possible, no word should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory. Only when an ambiguity exists in the language of the statute is it proper for a court to go beyond the statutory text to ascertain legislative intent. [Citations omitted.]
The owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of bеnefits under personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance.
Under property protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental damage to tangible property arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle subject to the provisions of this section and sections 3123, 3125, and 3127. However, accidental damage to tangible property does not include accidental damage to tangible property, other than the insured motor vehicle, that occurs within the course оf a business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles. [Emphasis added.]
In the present case, the parties dispute whether vehicle repairs performed by a
Using these definitions, it becomes clear that
This conclusion is supported by this Court‘s decision in Allied Prop, 272 Mich App 444, wherein this Court held that a no-fault insurer was not liable when property damage resulted from a fire caused by an unlicensed meсhanic operating out of his father‘s home garage. This Court stated that the purpose of
In sum,
Following the trial court‘s grant of summary disposition, Hastings moved for attorney fees in accordance with
On aрpeal, Hastings argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for attorney fees because Grange‘s rejection of the claim was unreasonable.
An attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee for advising аnd representing a claimant in an action for personal or property insurance benefits which are overdue. The attorney‘s fee shall be a charge against the insurer in addition to the benefits recovered, if the court finds that the insurer unreasonably refused to pay the claim or unreasonably delayed in making proper payment.
In Ross v Auto Club Group, 481 Mich 1, 7; 748 NW2d 552 (2008), the Court explained the standards of review associated with a ruling under
The no-fault aсt provides for attorney fees when an insurance carrier unreasonably withholds benefits. The trial court‘s decision about whether the insurer acted reasonably involves a mixed question of law and fact. What constitutеs reasonableness is a question of law, but whether the defendant‘s denial of benefits is reasonable under the particular facts of the case is a question of fact.
Whereas questions of law are reviewed de novo, a trial court‘s findings of fact are reviewed fоr clear error. A decision is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. [Citations and quotation marks omitted.]
In Attard v Citizens Ins Co of America, 237 Mich App 311, 317; 602 NW2d 633 (1999), this Court examined
When determining whether attorney fees are warranted for an insurer‘s delay to make payments under the no-fault act, a delay is not unreasonable if it is based on a legitimate question of statutory construction, constitutional law, or factual uncertainty. Whеn an insurer refuses to make or delays in making payment, a rebuttable presumption arises that places the burden on the insurer to justify the refusal or delay. [Citations omitted.]
A no-fault insurer may have reasonably delayed оr refused to pay a claim even where it is later determined that the insurer is required to pay the benefits. Moore v Secura Ins, 482 Mich 507, 525; 759 NW2d 833 (2008).
Grange, relying on the opinion of its counsel as well as the opinion of outside counsel, believed that it was еxcluded from liability under
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Patrick M. Meter