119 Misc. 326 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1922
On the 12th day of November, 1920, the parties to this action entered into a contract by which the defendant was engaged to render professional services as an actor for a period of four seasons, with an option to plaintiff to renew for a further period of two seasons. The defendant has left the employ of the plaintiff and has entered the service of another. It is to enjoin defendant from continuing in the service of another that this action is brought. The defendant resists the granting of an injunction upon various grounds: (1) That the contract has expired and that the plaintiff did not exercise its option to renew; (2) that the contract was terminated by mutual consent; (3) that there is an adequate remedy at law; (4) that the services of the defendant are not unique, special and extraordinary.
The contract in the 1st paragraph specifically provides that defendant is engaged for the theatrical seasons “ 1921 & 1922, 1922 & 1923, 1923 & 1924; ” and in paragraph 9 the contract provides that “ It is further agreed that the Manager shall have and it is hereby given the right and option to renew or extend this agreement, after the conclusion of the engagement of the season of ‘ 1922 ’ as aforesaid, frem season to season, for a period of two successive seasons, upon the same terms and conditions as herein set forth, season 1923 and ’24, at two hundred dollars, such right and option to be exercised by the Manager giving to the Artist written notice,” etc. It is perfectly apparent upon a reading of the two paragraphs that the insertion “ 1922 ” in a blank space in the contract was an inadvertence and that the parties intended that the option to renew was to extend from the close of the season of 1924, which is the time when the contract between the parties would terminate in the absence of an enlarging clause. Incidentally, the contract in the possession of the plaintiff has been changed apparently by the same scrivener at the same time the contract was made, so as to read “ 1924.”
I am not impressed by the defendant’s contention that the contract was terminated by mutual consent. Such is the assertion of the defendant and it is denied by the plaintiff. The truth can best be determined from the probabilities. There seems to be no reason whatever why plaintiff should terminate the contract. The defendant had proved to be a success in the attraction staged by this plaintiff. He had received favorable comment in the press
It is not unusual in actions of this character for defendants to assert as a means of defeating an injunction that plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law and should be relegated to an action for damages for breach of contract. The contract provides that the defendant should receive employment not less than thirty weeks each season during the life of the contract and that, in the event of his inability to appear, “a pro rata deduction may be made from the salary based upon the total number of performances given ” in any week when defendant was unable to appear; and, further, “ on the breach by the artist of this agreement the artist agrees to pay to the manager the amount specified in Paragraph VII hereof, and in addition thereto, a sum of money equivalent to the total amount which the arbitrator may decide during the entire term of this agreement as specified in Paragraph I hereof, if he had faithfully performed the same, as partial compensation for the damage to the manager by reason of said breach, the exact or entire loss, damage or injury which the manager may sustain by reason of said breach being incapable of estimation or ascertainment; and said sum is agreed upon as partial compensation and not as a penalty.” The contract further provides: “The parties hereto agree that if any dispute shall arise between them in respect to salary or a claim to salary, and the same cannot be amicably adjusted between themselves, in that event such dispute shall be submitted and referred to the determination and award of three arbitrators.” The contract further provides the method of selecting the arbitrators.
It is seen, therefore, that the damage provided for in paragraph VIII is limited to any claim which may arise “ in respect to salary or a claim to salary.” There is nothing in the contract to lead one to the belief that all disputes between the parties were to be submitted to arbitration. They anticipated, possibly, some financial disagreement and provided a method for settling any dispute which might arise in that regard. In no event, however, can such a clause prevent the court from entertaining and properly determining a controversy which might otherwise arise. It was not apparently the intention of the parties to submit such a dispute as has arisen here to arbitrators, but in no event can the parties make a binding agreement which will deprive the court of jurisdiction to entertain
The contract contained a negative covenant whereby the defendant, no doubt grudgingly, admitted that his services were unique, special and extraordinary, and that he would in no event enter the service of another, and that in the event that the plaintiff should apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for an injunction to restrain the violation of this contract he would not set up or interpose in such an action the defense that his services are not unique, special or extraordinary or that an artist could be or can be obtained to render similar services. The estimation which he has of his ability as an artist is, however, not controlling, as the question whether his services are unique, special and extraordinary must be determined by the court as one of law; and if a consideration of the facts leads to the belief that such is the character of the services of this defendant, an injunction could issue to restrain him from breaching his contract. Men should be compelled to perform their contracts in proper cases. Unjustifiable breaches of contracts should never be countenanced. The difficulty in all cases of this character is to determine whether or not the services of an artist come within the category of those mentioned in the various decisions upon this subject. It is not always an easy question to determine.
Aside from the estimation which the critics entertain as to the ability of the defendant as a unique, extraordinary and unusual comedian, the papers in opposition to this motion lead to the conclusion that defendant is of the very type asserted by the plaintiff. He is now on what is known as the Broadway stage. By the affidavit of his present employers he is the principal character in the show, without whom the present attraction would be of little or no value. It is hardly consistent to say that a burlesque comedian was so adept as to be the principal character in a Broadway burlesque show and at the same time to say that he is of ordinary ability and in a class with many other mediocre actors.
Ordered accordingly.