70 N.C. 601 | N.C. | 1874
Lead Opinion
We take it to be a settled principle of law, that if one contracts npon a consideration to render personal services for another, any third person who maliciously, that is, without a lawful justification, induces the party who contracted to render the service to refuse to do so, is liable to the injured
We are relieved from any labor in finding authorities for fhis principle, by a very recent decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in which a learned and able Judge delivers the opinion of the Court. Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. R., 555.
That case was this: The plaintiffs declared in substance that they were shoemakers, and employed a large number of persons as bottomers of boots and shoes, and defendant unlawfully and intending to injure the plaintiff in his business, persuaded and induced the persons so employed to abandon the employment of the plaintiff, whereby plaintiff was damaged, &o.
A second count says that plaintiff had employed certain persons named to make np stock into boots and shoes, and defendant well knowing, &c., induced said persons to refuse to make and finish such boots and shoes, &e.
The third count is not material to be noticed.
The defendant demurred. The Court held each of the counts good.
I shall make no apology for quoting copiously from this opinion, because the high respectability of the Court, and the learning and care with which the question is discussed, make the decision eminently an authority.
“ This (the declaration) sets forth sufficiently (1) intentional and willful acts, (2) calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their lawful business, (8) done with the unlawful purpose to cause such damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause
“ The general principle is announced in Com. Dig. Action on the case M.” In all casos where a man has a temporal loss I or damage by the wrong of another, he may have an action | upon the case to be repaired in damages.” Tlpe intentional | causing such loss to another, without justifiable cause, and with ; the malicious purpose to inflict it, is of itself a wrong.” See Carew v. Rutherfords 106 Mass., 1, 10, 11.
“ Thus every one has an equal right to employ workmen in his business or service; and if by the exercise of this right in such manner as he may see fit, persons are induced to leave their employment elsewhere, no wrong is done to him whose employment they leave, unless a contract exists by which such other person has a legal right to the further continuance-of their services. If such a contract exists, one who knowingly and intentionally procures it to bo violated, may be held liable for the wrong, although he did it for the purpose of promoting his own business.”
“Every one has a right to enjoy the fruits and advantages of his own enterprise, industry, skill, and credit. lie has no right to bo protected against competition ; hut he has a right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance or annoyance. If disturbance or loss come as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with. But if it come from the merely wanton or malicious acts of others, without the justification of competition or the service of any interest or lawful purpose, it then stands upon a different footing, and falls within the principle of the authorities first referred to.”
“ It is a familiar and well established doctrine of the law upon the relation of master and servant, that one who entices away a servant, or induces him to leave his master, may be held liable in damages therefor, provided there exists a valid contract for continued service known to the defendant. It has
^ In Hart v. Aldridge, Cowp. 54, it was applied to a case very much like the present. ’’
* In Gunter v. Astor, 4 J. B. Moore, 12, it was applied to the enticing away of workmen not hired for a limited or constant period, but who worked by the piece for a piano manufacturer.
V In Shepperd v. Wakeman, Sid. 79, it was applied to the loss of a contract of marriage, by reason of a false ¿nd malicious letter claiming a previous engagement.
t( In Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577, the defendant was held liable in damages for unlawfully and unjustly “ procuring, enticing, and persuading ” the plaintiff’s wife to remain away from him, whereby he lost the comfort and society of his wife, and the profit and advantage of her fortune. Barbee v. Armstead 10, Ire., 530.
a In Lumly v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl., 216 (20 Eng. L. & E. R., 168,) the plaintiff had engaged Miss Wagner to sing in his opera, and'the defendant knowingly induced her to break her contract and refuse to sing. It was objected that the action would not lie, because her contract was merely executory, and she had never actually entered into the service of the plaintiff; and Col BRIDGE, J., dissented, insisting that the only foundation for such an action was the statute of laborers, which did not apply to a service of that character; but after full discussion and deliberation, it was held that the action woi^^he for the damage thus caused by the defendant.” w/r , «
To the same effect are Jones v. Jeter, 43 Gao. 331, and Salter v. Howard, Ib. 601, in both which cases the servants enticed were employees in husbandry. The only case to the contrary that we are aware of, is Burgess v. Carpenter, 2 Rich. S. C. 7; but the authorities relied on in that case seem to
It is suggested, (for we did not have the benefit of an argument for the defendant,) that in the present case the contract between the plaintiff and Eastwood and Wilkcrson is unreasonable and therefore void. We cannot suppose it to be contended that this Court, or any Court, when there is no suggestion of fraud, can inquire whether the reward agreed to be paid to a workman is the highest that he might have got in the market, and to declare the contract void, or to make a new,one if it thought not to be the highest. No Court can mafre itself the guardian of persons sui juris. That would be an assumption inconsistent with their freedom. We suppose the objection to point to that part of the contract which is, in substance, that if either party of the second part, or any person for whom they contract, shall misbehave in the opinion of the party of the first part, such misbehaving party shall quit the premises and forfeit to the party of the first part all his interest in the common crop.
It is said that these provisions make the plaintiff' a judge in his own cause, which the law will not allow, and that they are manifestly so oppressive and fraudulent as to avoid the whole contract. This proposition will be found on examination to go much too far even as between the parties to the contract, and to have no application as between one of the parties and a malicious intermeddler, as the defendant must, in this stage of the case, be considered.
It is not necessary to decide what would be the effect of such a stipulation in an action on the contract between the parties to it. But as there seems to be some misconception of the law of such a case, and as although there are numerous authorities on the question, it is not yet of “familiar learning.” in our Courts, a few observations will more conveniently lead us to the question actually presented.
The authorities are conclusive that the parties to a contract,
In Watson on Arbitration, (85) it is said, “ It seems that it is no objection to an award, that the arbitrator was a party, or interested in the matter submitted, provided that the party objecting, at the time of the submission knew that the arbitrator was so interested; as in the case when Sergeant Hards took a horse from my lord of Canterbury’s bailiff for a deodand, •and thereupon the Archbishop brought his action, and by a rule of Court it was referred to the Archbishop to set the price upon the horse-; the sergeant afterwards sought to set aside the award, on the ground of the interest of the Archbishop; but it was denied by Lord Hale, and jjer totam curiam. Comb. 218; S. C., 4; Mod., 226; Hard, 43; 1 Inc.& W., 511. See also Bussell on Arbitration, 108. In Morse on Arbitration, it is said that a person interested or .partial, is incompetent to act -as an arbitrator, (p. 100.) But the parties may, if they choose, waive the objection. “ They are at liberty to select a person interested or a person prejudiced, a relation, or an enemy of either of them. Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. 560; Fox v. Hamilton, 10 Pick, 275. See also Morse 108. The most important case on this question, however, is Ranger v. Great Western R. W. Co., 5 H. L. 72. There it was agreed between the plaintiff, who contracted to build the road, and the Company, that Brunei, who was the engineer of the Company, and a large shareholder in it, should be the judge of the amount and value of the work done. The Lord Chancellor, after saying that Brunei was the mere agent of the Company, and in effect the Company itself, continues: “It does not appear to me to be necessary to institute any minute inquiry as to how far the calculations of Mr. Brunei were accurate. 1 think it guile •enough if they were bona fide, and with the intention of acting according to the exigency of the terms of the contract. The Company expressly stipulated that during the progress of the
The case of Ranger v. Great Western Railway Company, also holds that penalties and forfeitures upon a contractor, provided for in case the work be not properly done, or done in due-time, are reasonable,, and will be enforced, even to the great loss of the careless or dilatory contractor.
These authorities unquestionably establish that such stipulations are not void or voidable, even as between the parties, and it has never been supposed or contended that they made the whole contract void ;• as even if void themselves, they are clearly separable from, the other parts. Either party, therefore, could maintain an action on this contract.
It is important however to notice, that none of these authorities goes to the- length of holding, that if after the contractors had duly performed all or a part of the work, the plaintiff had mala fide,, or without lawful cause, discharged them, they could not recover upon the contract. The contrary is implied in the language of the Lord Chancellor in Ranger v. Great Western Railway Co., and is evidently most consistent with reason and justice. The power attempted to be reserved cannot have any greater effect than 'to make the discharge prima facie lawful, if so much as that.
Contracts with such stipulations as we find in the present, are not to be commended as precedents. Such stipulations are unusual; they answer no useful purpose, and suggest an intent (perhaps in this case untruly) to take some improper advantage, and to exact from the employees a degree of personal deference and respect, beyond that civil and courteous deportment which every man owes to his fellow in every relation in life. To this extent, a mutual-duty is implied
Again it is suggested, that the contractors of the second part in this contract are croppers, and not servants. By cropper, I understand a laborer who is to be paid for his labor by being given a proportion of the crop. But such a person is not a tenant, for he has no estate in the land, nor in the crop-until the landlord assigns him his share. He is as much a servant as if his wages were fixed and payable in money.
It is unnecessary to discuss the question whether one who-maliciously persuaded a tenant to abandon his holding, would not be liable in damages for such officious intermeddling.
But whatever may be the effect of the provisions commented on, as between the parties to the contract, the authorities.are clear and decisive that a person in the situation of the defendant, can take no advantage from them. As the case now stands, he cannot pretend to play the part of a chivalrous protector of defrauded ignorance. For the present at least, he must be regarded as a malicious intermeddler, using the word malicious in its legal sense.
There is a certain analogy among all the domestic relations,, and it would be dangerous to the repose and happiness of families if the law permitted any man, under whatever professions-of philanthropy or charity, to sow discontent between the head of a family and its various members, wife, children and servants. Interference with such relations can -only be justified under the most special circumstances, and where there cannot be the slightest suspicion of a spirit of mischief-making, or self interest.
To enable a plaintiff to recover from one who entices his servant, it is sufficient to show a subsisting relation of service, even if it be determinable at will. In Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl., 511, the plaintiff sued a recruiting officer for enticing his servant. The servant was an infant and had been a slave in St. Vincents where he indentured himself to serve the plain
We are of opinion that the complaint sets forth a sufficient cause of action.
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to be proceeded in, &e. Let this opinion be certified.
Per Curiam. Judgment reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) I cannot agree with the majority of the Court, and the subject is of such general concern and of so much importance, that I must depart from our usage to allow the opiuion of the majority to pass as the opinion of all in matters of minor importance.
I do not deny that, in some sense, every one who renders .service for another is that other’s servant; but I do deny that in every such case the relation of master and servant is established. The-child is servant of the parent, the wife of the husband, (and why not the husband of the wife ?) the lawyer of his client, the physician of his patient, the pastor of his .church, &c. And so the mechanic who contracts to build my .house, and the teacher who contracts to teach my children, and -.every one who contracts to do anything for me, is, in some
This is an ancient servitude, embracing duty, subjecti m and allegiance on the part of the servant, and superiority and power on the part of the master. Bac. Ab. Master and Servant. And these characteristics, modified by times and circumstances, always distinguish the relation of master and servant; and Mr. Graham’s brief refers ns to the decalogue, fourth and tenth commandments, as showing that such were the cliar-acterislics of servitude in those days.
Quoting again from Blackstone : “ Another species of ser-
vants are called apprentices, (from apprendre, to learn,) and arc usually bound for a term of years by deed indented, or indentures, to serve their masters, and be maintained and instructed by them.”
Servitudes of this kind were at first formed by the parties themselves, or by their parents or friends acting for them. But subsequently, the overseers of the poor, or other proper authorities bound out poor children as apprentices. The incidents to the relation of master and apprentice were, on the part of the apprentice, service and subjection ; and on the part
It is not pretended that any such relation as I have de_ scribed exists in the ease before us. There is no other relation of master and servant known to the common law. How then an the relation in this case be that of master and servant ? Take it that there is a contract of service — hard enough in its terms — yet there is wanting the element of protection and maintenance on the part of the plaintiff, which is indispensable to create the relation of master and apprentice. If therefore, any of the many authorities cited in the learned opinion of the majority in this case are founded on the relation of master and servant which I have been considering, they are inapplicable. There are, however, relations of master and servant in England other than those which I have been considering.
Quoting again from Blackstone: “ A third species of servants are laborers, who are only hired by the day or the week, and do not live inira menia as part of the family7; concerning whom the statutes before cited have made many very good regulations: 1. Directing that all persons who have no visible effects may be compelled to work. 2. Defining how long they must continue at work in summer and in winter. 3. Punishing sucli as desert their work. 4. Empowering the justices at sessions, or the sheriff of the county to settle their wages; and 5. Inflicting penalties on such as either give or exact more wages than are so settled.
There are many of these statutes in England, regulating almost every species of trade and labor, with very stringent terms against the laborers and servants, as well as against the masters, and innumerable decisions have been made under these statutes, and neither text writers nor judges have always been careful to distinguish between cases under the statutes, and not under the statutes. Such cases are not authority here, because we have no such statutes. And yet it is very evident
Having divested the case of the supposed character of master and servant, I propose now to consider it as it is, a contract between the parties.
I do not deny what is said in the learned opinion of the ma- ] jority that if there is a eontraet between A & B for any pur-1 pose, and C induces B to violate the contract to the injury of A, A has his action against C for damages. Not upon any | idea_of master and servant, however. In the leading case from Massachusetts, put by my learned brother, where the shoemaker was induced to break his contract, the learned Judge puts it upon the ground, of breach of contract. And so it was ? where the actress was induced to refuse,to fulfill her engagement. There was no relation of master and servant. And j fhe reference to it is only for the analogy. "
The relation of master and servant was never supposed to (¡^¿nA^xist between Barnum and Jennie Lind, nor between Strata f* -kosch and Neill bob? But still I admit that if a third person had induced these queens, not servants of song, to violate their contracts, such third person would have been liable in damages.
But I do not admit that to induce one to violate a contract is per se actionable, as it is the relation of master and servant or master and apprentice. In order to make it so there must be damage. And the damage must be specifically charged and proved. There is no charge of damage. Damages are “ demanded'” but none are charged to have been sustained. There must be a per.quod in all such eases. Here there is none. In the Massachusetts case, which leads and is made the basis of the opinion of the majority, the learned Judge enumerates four requisites to sustain the action, which the declaration .must eon-(tain, and which the declaration in that case did .contain;
L Intentional and wilful acts*
3. Done with the unlawful purpose to cause such damage.”1
Now grant, for the sake of the argument, that the complaint in this case contains the three first requisites, although I do not think it does, yet the fourth requisite is wholly wanting..
“4. Actual damage and loss resulting.”
In regard to this last requisite, which is the gist of the whole matter, and without which there can be no recovery in any such case, there is no allegation, whatever. In the Massachusetts case, each count in the declaration contained theper quody “ Whereby the plaintiff' lost the services, &c., and' all the advantages and profits, dec-., and incurred large expense to procure other suitable workmen, &c., and were com polled to pay much larger prices, &c., and have been hindered in their business to a large extent, &c.,. from which they would otherwise have realized large- profits, &cJ’ And the second count: “ Whereby their stock of leather was greatly damaged, and1 they were compelled1 to pay much higher prices, &c.” And1 so in the other count. If all this was necessary in that ease, which is the basis of this, why is it not necessary in this % It is necessary in every ease, and no ease can be found in England or America, where it has been held otherwise. It is common-learning. And doubtless was overlooked in the learned opinion of the majority, because we had no argument on the part of the defendant, and other points were made prominent as the only points by the learned counsel for the plaintiff.
2. The contract is not binding, upon the laborers because of fraud and imposition apparent on its face.
That Eastwood, and Wilkerson are ignorant, is apparent from: the fact, that they make their mark to the agreement. That they are poor, is apparent from the fact that they have no-homes,'but have to live on the land's of the plaintiff;, and they have neither teams nor tools with which to make a crop, and that they are dependent, is apparent from the fact that they stipulate against their “insólense,”'and' that of all their family,.
The plaintiff’s counsel informed us that his researches had found but one case where a contract had been resisted at law as unconscionable; where a grain of rye had been promised for the first day, increasing every day in geometrical progression for a considerable time, when it was found that there was not as much rye in all the world. There is another kindred ease, where a horse was shod for a penny for the first nail, and increasing for every other nail, in geometrical progression. These cases are too remote and comical to be of any practical use, but the books are full of cases where Courts of equity, as we are now, have relieved against contracts founded in fraud and circumvention, and where equity refuses to enforce contracts which have the element of hardship or unfair advantage. In order to meet this view of the case, the opinion of the majority estimates that although the contract stipulates that Has-kins has everything in his own hands/and he is to do whatever “ suits ” him, yet if he were to discharge the laborers without good cause, they might have their action against him. But then the opinion fritters the right away to nothing, because it goes on to argue and cite authorities to show that a man may be judge or arbitrator in his own cause; and besides, what poor remedy is a law suit for these laborers who have neither time nor money to spare. The only security against such contracts is for the Courts utterly to ignore them. And yet,
• 8. Rut the gravest objection to the contract is, that is against public policy.
If Eastwood and Wilkerson had contracted in so many words to be the slaves of the plaintiff, it would be conceded to be against public policy, and void. But here is a condition worse than slavery. If slaves, ho wmuld have been entitled to their services and could have enforced their good behavior and punished their insolence, but he would have been obliged to feed and clothe them and provide them shelter. But here he stipulates for their services and for their good behavior, and that they shall feed and clothe themselves and leave their homes at his bidding, leaving to him the results of their labor. And then, if any third person shall entice them away from such a /Contract and furnish them employment by which they can live, he claims to recover of such person damages. It is plain to see that if such contracts were allowed, society would soon be disorganized with the worst results, both to employers and laborers. There is no greater danger in any community than a dependent class upon whom is the hand of oppression bearing hard, and who have no where to look for relief. Consider who these parties are, and their condition. The plaintiff is a land owner. He agrees with two laborers, one white and the other colored, to furnish them land, teams, <&e., and they are to cultivate the land and the crop is to be divided between them. Such relations have always existed in the State. They have never been called master and servant, but landlord and tenant, lessor and lessee, cropper or partners, according to the contract. There has never been anything degrading in any of these relations ; public policy requires that there should not be. The State has no greater interest, than that all her citizens,
What would be the condition of society if every contract was of this character? And if one may be, all may be. On the first of November the plaintiff might drive off" the laborers and their families, and keep all their earnings; and then for the winter, they would be without shelter, food or raiment; they would be paupers, and every community must support its paupers. And every government must provide for its paupers, and to prevent pauperism, every prudent government regulates the relations of masters and servants, and masters
4. This brings me to the only other point. It is said that even if the contract is such as the laborers may violate with impunity, yet the defendant is a malicious intermeddler, and does not stand upon the same footing with the laborers. I admit that it is of much importance to the best interests of society that valid contracts of every kind, and especially those between employers and laborers, should be observed in good faith; and that officious intermeddlers should find no favor. But it is a rule of common sense, that what one may lawfully do, another may advise him to do. Yet I admit that there is respectable authority for saying, that where there is a voidable contract which one of the parties may violate with impunity, if a third person induces him to violate it, he may be liable. The instance put is, where an infant is a party to a contract which is voidable by him, and a third person induces him to violate it, he is liable. And why should he not be ? for the contract may be for the advantage of the infant; and both the infant aud the public interested in its observance. But Mr. Smith, in his work, entitled master and servant, p. 7, says: “But it has been held that a contract by an infant binding himself to serve during a < ertain time for wages, but enabling the master to stop the work whenever he chose, and retain the wages during the stoppage, is wholly void as not being beneficial to the infant.” For which he cites Reg. v. Lord, 12 Q.
Under the new regime, much of the labor of the country is performed under contract. This is the first case which has been before us in which the incidents’ of the relation of employer and laborer have been under discussion, and will probably be looked to as a precedent. I think it of great importance that employers should make only just and reasonable contracts ; that laborers should be faithful on their part; and that third persons should not intermeddle. If either of these classes violate their plain duties, they will find no favor. What I say for myself, I thifik I may say for this Court, and for all Courts Only to prevent a contrary influence is the aim of much that I have said.
