441 N.E.2d 842 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1981
This case comes before this court on appeal from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County granting appellee's motion to dismiss appellant's counterclaim.
On December 10, 1979, appellee, Robert Haskins, filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County against appellant, Eli Bias, seeking damages for injuries sustained during an incident involving appellant. In his complaint, appellee alleged that on July 31, 1979, appellant had shot appellee repeatedly, wounding appellee in the abdomen and chest, and causing appellee permanent injury. On June 16, 1980, appellant filed an answer and counterclaim. The counterclaim was based upon the common law torts of alienation of affections and criminal conversation. On June 19, 1980, appellee filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim for failure to state a claim upon which relief might be granted. Finding that R.C.
Appellant presents the following assignment of error:
"The trial court erred in granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaim."
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing appellant's counterclaim on the ground that R.C.
Appellant argues that three distinct causes of action were recognized at common law for the protection of certain marital interests. Those causes of action were alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and enticement. Appellant further argues that the cause of action for enticement remains untouched by R.C.
R.C.
"No person shall be liable in civil damages for any breach of a promise to marry, alienation of affections, or criminal conversation * * *."
Although enticement is not specifically enumerated in the statute, we find it to have been abolished thereby as included under the cause of action for alienation of affections. Our review of Ohio case law in this area reveals that, while a distinction was drawn between alienation of affections and criminal conversation, no such distinction was drawn concerning enticement. We find, in fact, that the tort of enticement was treated as subsumed by the tort of alienation of affections. See, for example, Trainor v. Deters (1969),
Appellant's second contention is that R.C.
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law * * *."
Appellant contends that R.C.
"The constitutional guaranties are that `every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law' (Const. Ohio, Art. I, Sec. 16), and, `No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.' Const. U.S., Fourteenth Amendment. In Park v. Free Press Co., supra, [
We find that the causes of action abolished by R.C.
We find that the interests protected by the common law causes of action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation are not interests in "land, goods, person or reputation" such as may be recognized at law. We therefore find R.C.
Finally, appellant contends that the trial court's dismissal of his counterclaim gave a retroactive effect to R.C.
"The provisions of sections 1 and 2 of this act shall not apply to either a civil action commenced or a contract to marry entered into on or before the effective date of this act." (Emphasis added.) (137 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2225.)
Thus, appellant's claim was barred according to the terms of applicability of the statute. Appellant contends, however, that such application is violative of Section
Ohio courts have generally held that a person has no vested interest in any rule of the common law. See, for example, Leis v.Cleveland Ry. Co. (1920),
"`A right cannot be regarded as vested, in the constitutional sense, unless it amounts to something more than a mere expectation of future benefit or interest founded upon an anticipated continuance of the existing general laws.'"
Upon consideration of the case law discussed above and applying the definition in Moore to the facts in the instant case, we find that appellant did not have a vested interest prior to the enactment of R.C.
For the foregoing reasons, we find appellant's assignment of error not well taken.
On consideration whereof, the court finds substantial justice has been done the party complaining, and judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
CONNORS, P.J., and BARBER, J., concur.