Defendant-appellant Jerry Haskett (Haskett) alleges five specifications of error in appealing his conviction by a jury of the offense оf failure to appear, Ind. Code 35-44-3-6.
Haskett first alleges error in the summary denial of his motion for a change of venue upon the authority of
Hanrahan v. State,
(1968)
Pauper counsel was appointed on April 5, 1978, and Haskett pled not guilty on July 7,1978. The venue motion was not filed until July 18, 1978, and was therefore not within the ten day requirement of CR. 12. As such, it was incumbent upon Haskett to support his motion with specific allegations concerning the cause of delay, the reasons why the factual foundation of the motion cоuld not have been discovered with due diligence within ten days of the plea, and when such facts were actually discovered.
Rex v. State,
(1976) Ind.App.,
We believe Haskett has failed to comply with CR. 12 and the above-cited cases. The exhibits reliеd upon by Haskett in his motion for change of venue due to prejudicial publicity were dated from sometime in October, 1973, through early April, 1978. Haskett was represented by counsel *1014 in April of 1978 but failed to file until July 18, 1978. The motion contained no allegations of why it could not have been filed within ten days of July 7. Additionally, the factual basis was clearly present for a timely motion, and the trial court had the benefit of a memorandum in support of the motion with relevant exhibits aрpended thereto. As such, we are unable to conclude that the trial court erred in the summary denial of the motion. 1
Haskett next alleges error in thе denial of his request to take depositions in Florida at State expense. The ostensible purpose was to substantiate Haskett’s defense for failure to appear due to medical reasons. It is settled, however, that orders with respect to discovery in
favor
of the defendant are not of constitutional dimension — such discovery is not required by due process.
State ex rel. Grammer v. Tippecanoe Circuit Court,
(1978) Ind.,
Hаskett’s next issue challenges the exclusion of certain testimony. Facts relating to the issue are that Haskett’s attorney, in the presence of a рrobation officer, and on the day before the trial spoke by telephone to officials at a Florida hospital. The probation offiсer was asked on cross-examination what she heard those officials say. The trial court sustained an objection based on hearsay. We seе no error in the ruling— the proffered evidence was clearly hearsay as defined in
Harvey v. State,
(1971)
For purposes of discussion we shall combine Haskett’s final two issues. The first is whether his conduct constitutes an offense under IC 35-44-3-6, and, sеcondly, whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
Haskett was convicted of rape, let to bail, and ordered to аppear for sentencing on January 20, 1978. He had also missed certain appointments with the probation officer prior to the 20th of January. On the 12th of January, Haskett called from somewhere north of Nashville, Tennessee, and said he had car trouble and that he would be home that night or the following morning. On the 23rd of January, a warrant, pursuant to IC 35-44-3-6, was issued. Haskett finally surrendered to the Sheriff on the 3rd of April, 1978.
IC 35-44-3-6 provides:
(a) A person who, having been released from lawful detеntion on condition that he appear at a specified time and place in connection with a charge of a crime, intentionally fails to appear at that time and place commits failure to appear, a Class A misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Class D felony if the charge was a felony charge.
(b) It is no defense that the accused person was not convicted of the crime with which he was originally chаrged.
(c) This section does not apply to obligations to appear incident to release under suspended sentence or on probation or parole, [as added by Acts 1976, P.L. 148, SEC. 4. Amended by Acts 1977, P.L. 340, SEC. 64.]
Lawful detention is defined in IC 35-41-1-2 as:
“Lawful detention” means arrest, custody following surrender in lieu of arrest, detention in a penal facility, dеtention in a facility for custody of persons alleged or *1015 found to be delinquent children, detention under a law authorizing civil commitment in lieu of criminal proceedings or authorizing such detention while criminal proceedings are held in abeyance, detention for extradition or deportation, or custody for purposes incident to any [to] the above including transportation, medical diagnosis or treatment, court appearances, wоrk, or recreation, or any other detention for law enforcement purposes; but it does not include supervision of a person on probation or parole or constraint incidental to release with or without bail.
Haskett contends that these statutes do not embrace the situation presented here, i.e., when the defendant is on bail pending sentencing. We are unable to concur in Hask-ett’s contention. The plain meaning of subseсtion (c) in IC 35-44-3-6 is to exempt from prosecution thereunder only those cases wherein the criminal adjudicatory process has been completed and the defеndant has been conditionally released from physical restraint. Together, these statutes evince a clear intent to cover all stages of the law enforcement process excepting only those situations where enforcement machinery operates merely in a supervisory capacity. Haskett’s contention, if adopted, would result in the absurdity that a defendant is not lawfully detained after the jury has returned a verdict of guilty. We hоld the statute applies to the case at bar and hence Haskett’s contention is without merit.
We also believe the evidence most favorаble to the State sustains the conviction. Haskett only contends that the evidence is wanting with respect to his intentional failure to appear.
Intent may be presumed from the voluntary cоmmission of a crime.
Black v. State,
(1971)
Finding no reversible error, the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Haskett filed a second motion оn August 10, 1978, which was also summarily denied. This denial was proper since the factual basis was merely cumulative.
. In light of his failure to seek a continuance, Haskett may not complain that certain grounds for the deposition were not known until a day before trial.