179 Pa. 560 | Pa. | 1897
Opinion by
It may be seriously questioned whether the learned judge below did not state the law too broadly when he held the general rule to be that whenever a person obtains by voluntary donation a large pecuniary benefit from another, he has the burden of proof to sustain the transaction. There is high English authority for such position, though Lord Romilly, in Cooke v. Lamotte, 15 Beavan, 234, cited by the judge below, adopts it with much reserve, but the American courts have not usually required such proof from the donee until he is put on the defensive by the appearance in the case of some indication of weakness of mind, undue influence, fraud, deception, confidential relation, or other element to render the transaction at least suspicious. See Stepp v. Frampton, ante, p. 284.
But the learned judge goes farther and finds that it was not a gift at all, but a transfer “ to the defendant in trust and confidence to keep for the plaintiff, subject to his demand.” Tins is decisive of the whole case and renders superfluous any discussion of the assignments of error to subordinate findings of fact. It is argued for appellant that this conclusion is reached by the court below in disregard of the weight always given in equity to a responsive answer in denial. But the learned judge states expressly that he had given the appellant the benefit of that rule, and after an examination of the evidence we find no reason to differ with his conclusion. The testimony of the plaintiff himself is supported by that of Fallhaber, that appellant told him he only took care of the money and exhibited a little book where he kept the account, “ so that he could show it to the old man again.” And the testimony of both receives strong corroboration from the circumstances of the case already noted.
The testimony objected to in the thirteenth to seventeenth assignments had some bearing on plaintiff’s character and disposition with regard to money, and consequently on the probability
Appellant charges that plaintiff divested himself of his property in order to enter the Soldiers’ Home, and thereby committed a fraud on the government which will prevent a court of equity from aiding him. It is sufficient to say that the evidence of such intent is slight, and there is no evidence at all that his having or not having such an amount of property had any bearing on his admission to the Home.
Decree affirmed with costs.