OPINION
¶ 1 Ken Ray Harward challenges the trial court's award of summary judgment to Utah County and the cities of Lehi, Pleasant Grove, and Provo (defendants). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2 When reviewing a trial court's summary judgment ruling, we regard "the facts in the light most favorable to the losing party, while giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions." Litster v. Utah Valley Community College,
13 In 1996, Harward sought to "deliver[ ]" notices of claim to defendants under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. § 68-30-11(8)(b)(@i) (1997) ("The notice of claim shall be ... directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity ...."); see generally id. §§ 68-30-1 to -88 (Utah Governmental Immunity Act). Using express mail service, he mailed the notices through the United States Postal Service. The date of mailing entered on the envelopes in the section marked "postal use only" shows June 6, 1996. -
14 Harward did not receive approvals or denials of his claims from defendants within ninety days of filing his сlaims. The claims were therefore "deemed to have been denied . at the end of the ninety-day period." Id. § 63-30-14. On September 5, 1997, Har-ward filed a сomplaint bringing his claims against defendants in district court. See id. § 63-30-15(1) ("If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court against the governmental enti-2."
15 Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing under Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1(1)
ANALYSIS
T6 Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party has a right to judgment as a matter of law. See Litster v. Utah Valley Community College,
17 Harward argues that the triаl court incorrectly concluded that Utah Code Ann. § 63-87-1 (1997) controls the date on which a notice of claim placed in the United States mail is dеemed "delivered" to a governmental addressee under the Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(8)(b)@i) (1997). The Litster case distinctly invalidates Harward's argument, specifically importing section 68-37-1 into the Governmental Immunity Act to determine the date upon which a notice of claim was "filed" or "deliverеd" in that case. Litster,
18 Thus, Harward's notices of claim were delivered to, or filed with, defendants on June 6, 1996-the date on which postal
19 We have carefully considered Har-ward's other arguments (regarding his subjectively intended delivery date, waiver of an affirmative defense, and substantive due process) and conclude they are wholly without merit; we thus decline to address them. See State v. Carter,
1 10 Affirmed.
11 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge.
Notes
. Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1(1) (1997) reads:
Any report, claim, tax return, statement or other document or any payment required or authorized to be filed or mаde to the state of Viah, or to any political subdivision thereof, which is:
(1) Transmitted through the United States mail, shall be deemed filed or made and reсeived by the state or political subdivisions on the date shown by the post-office cancellation mark stamped upon the envelope or other appropriate wrapper containing it.
. Defendant Pleasant Grove City argues that the language of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 (1997), requiring that the complaint be filed in district court "within one year after denial of the claim," means that Harward's complaint should have been filed by Seрtember 3, 1997 to be timely. Meanwhile, the other defendants argue that, based on the computation rule of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a), Harward hаd until September 4, 1997 to file a timely complaint. We need not choose between these two dates; we simply conclude that Harward's cоmplaint was barred as untimely when he filed it on September 5, 1997.
. Defendants alleged they never received the notices of claim. However, thеy have not disputed Harward's assertions that the express mail envelopes dated June 6, 1996 are authentic and, for purposes of summary judgment аnd appeal, that those envelopes have the legal effect of establishing that Harward complied with the Governmental Immunity Act by "direсt[ing] and deliver{ing]" his notices of claim to defendants. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(3)(b)(ii) (1997). We therefore do not further address Harward's argument that Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1(2) (1997) controls this case. That section deals with situations in which a claimant needs to prove a notice of claim was sent when the governmental entity to which it was directed professes to have never received it "and the [post-office] cancellation mark is illegible, erroneous, or omittеd." Id. § 63-37-1(2); see Litster v. Utah Valley Community College,
. In particular, Litster analyzes subsection two of section 63-37-1, whеreas subsection one controls this case. That difference is immaterial to our analysis, however: Our point is that section 63-37-1 as a whole is imрorted into the Governmental Immunity Act, while Harward urges the section applies not at all. f
. For purposes of this case involving the United States express mail service, as opposed to those cases involving other classes of United States mail, we view the written date notation аs equivalent to the "date shown by the post-office cancellation mark" described in Utah Code Ann. § 63-37-1(1) (1997). The parties do not argue it should be viewed otherwise.