36 Ky. 242 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1838
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The County Court of Franklin having granted to the appellees a ferry across the Kentucky River, at Frank-for[5 an(j very near the authorized and accustomed landings of a ferry established by the- Legislature of Virl?86! and now owned by the appellant, who opposed the grant in the County Court — he now seeks a reversa^ °f the order, and insists on various assign-mentS'Of error.
An act of 1820, which-authorizes an appeal in such a case -to the Circuit Court, having been hitherto practically considered as merely cumulative, we overruled, an objection to the jurisdiction of this Court; and, being
The errors assigned embrace two propositions: first— that the ferry is not required for any public interest or purpose; and, second — that the appellees do not own the-landing on either side of the river.
First. In Lawless vs. Reese (4 Bibb, 309,) it was decided that the statute of 1796, respecting Ferries, gave to the County Courts an uncontrollable discretion in determining as to the expediency of establishing ferries over streams within the State. And although we are of the opinion that the discretion conferred is judicial, when private rights may be injuriously affected by its exercise, and'is not therefore unlimited, yet, as it is given chiefly for the public good, we should control the regular exercise of it only when it has been.clearly abused. No such abuse of' a sound and provident discretion has been shown in this case. On the contrary, the testimony rather tends to the deduction that the public may be benefitted by the establishment of the ferry. We cannot, therefore, on this ground, set aside the order.
Second. In Lawless vs. Reese (supra,) and in the same vs. the same (1 Bibb, 495,) this Court seems to have decided that a ferry may be granted by a County Court,, over a stream within the exclusive jurisdiction of this State, to a person who owns no land — provided the owner or owners of the landings shall have been notified of the application one month previously thereto. And that interpretation of the statute of 1796 (1 Stat. Law, 706,)-has been since recognized by the Court.
Though, upon such a small river as that of the Kentucky, only occasionally navigable by small vessels, a private right to land, of which it is a boundary, would constructively extend ad filum- medium-aqurn (the middle of the river,) yet the banks are subject to the jus publicum of a common transit and landing; and therefore, a grant by the Commonwealth, of an exclusive ferry franchise to one person for the benefit of all, and which only entitles the grantee to. the use of the banks for landings,.
There has been no proof of notice to any person as owner or claimant of the north landing — the title to which seems to be involved in much doubt and perplexity.
Christopher Cammack, the father of some of the appellants, lived for more than thirty years on the lot next to that point, and including it, if the river be a boundary of the lot; and though his actual close never extended beyond the brink of a precipitous bank extending some distance to the ordinary water mark, yet he had a warehouse on the bluff, and used the intermediate ground as a pass-way to the river; and it does not appear that he was ever disturbed in such use, or that any other person ever made a similar use, or claimed a title to the land between high and low water mark. From those facts, had they been the only ones exhibited, we should not have doubted that Cammack’s lot is bounded by the river.
But a witness testified that, though the river is the boundary of the town lots generally, the one on which Cammack lived did not extend to the river; but that Wilkinson, as proprietor of the town, had reserved, at
Moreover, we are strongly inclined to the opinion that, if Cammack was not the owner of this landing, it was reserved for the benefit of the ferry now owned by the appellant. Upon that hypothesis,- the notice to him should be deemed sufficient for the north as well as for the south side of the river. And the fact that the question of notice to any person, as the owner or claimant on the north side of the river, was not considered or touched on the trial in this Court, and does not appear to have been made in the County Court, tends, with no slight force, to the deduction that the appellant considered either himself or Cammack as entitled to the north landing. Upon these grounds, we are inclined to think
Besides, according to our interpretation of the assignments of error, want of notice has neither been suggested nor contemplated by the appellant. There can be no doubt that want of notice has not been assigned as error, unless it be constructively embraced by one of the following assignments:—
“ The Court erred in adjudging the appellees to be “ owners of the land on both sides of the river: in fact, “ they are not the owners of the land on either side of “ the river.”
“The Court erred in establishing the ferry on the defendants’ application: in point of fact, the convenience “ of the public did not require the establishment of a fer- “ ry; nor was there any necessity for the establishment “ of it. The Court therefore erred in deciding in favor “ of the appellees, and in establishing a ferry.”
The first of these assignments does not embrace the question of notice; it suggests only, that the appellees do not own the landing on either side of the river, and therefore concludes that the County Court erred in deciding that they are the owners of one or both of the landings; and such an error, as to title, is not here material; because the fact that the County Court erred in deciding upon the titles, does not show that there was error in establishing the ferry; nor imply that there was no notice, or an insufficient notice.
The residue of the assignment, as just quoted, complains, as we understand it, of but one error, and that, we think, is special, and does not include want of notice. Thus, understood, it means only that the County Court erred in establishing the ferry, because public convenience did not require it. But even if there can here be two separate assignments of error, the first of them being so general as to embrace every error that may have been committed, and might possibly be detected, is too vague and indefinite to require the Court, or the counsel of the appellees, to consider it as referring to or assigning any specific ground of objection. .The law of this Court requires the complaining party to “assign in writing the
Now, though, when a judgment, or decree, or judicial order, is erroneous on the merits, and in no other respect, a general assignment may not only be proper, but would be the only, one that could be made; yet whenever there is any other and “particular” ground of objection, it may be specially assigned, and it is the duty of the complaining party, both to his adversary and .to this Court, if he intends to avail himself of it, to point it out by a special assignment in writing. If a general assignment, that “the Court erred,” should be deemed sufficient to embrace any such particular error,.and require the adverse party and the Court to hunt it out and consider it, then no special assignment would be necessary in any case, and the law of this Court, just quoted, would be nugatory and dead. And, in such a case as this, where, if the appellant be not virtually the owner of the north landing, he is seeking a reversal, not for any error predjudicial to himself, we should not endeavor to relax the law, or, by any very liberal interpretation, to make a general assignment of errors embrace -a particular error not specified.
Upon- the foregoing grounds, we do not feel that it is our duty to undo what has been doné by the County Court.
Wherefore, the order for establishing the ferry, must be affirmed.