12 Ct. Cl. 141 | Ct. Cl. | 1876
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court:
The claimants brought their former action in this court upon a written contract. By reason of the common-law rule prevailing in this court, all parol evidence tending to vary the terms of the agreement was excluded, and the claimants were held to be concluded by the terms of their contract. A judgment, however, was rendered upon the contract, as construed by the court, in favor of the claimants, though for a much less amount than they deemed themselves entitled to recover. This judgment was not appealed from; the claimants accepted payment thereof, and then applied to Congress for relief. A private act was passed, Act 14th August, 1876, (19 Stat. L;, p. 490, chap. 279,) referring the claim to this court, authorizing it to reform the contract, and to that end conferring equity jurisdiction. Under that act the claimants have brought this their second suit, and to their.petition the defendants have demurred. .
“That the claim of James W. Harvey and James Livesey for alleged labor done and materials furnished under their contract with the United States for the building of the masonry-work for the piers and abutments of the bridge across the Mississippi River from Rook Island to Davenport, Iowa, bearing date June first, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, be, and the same is hereby, referred to the Court of Claims for hearing and adjudication, and to that end jurisdiction is hereby conferred on said court to proceed, in the adjustment of the accounts between said claimants and the United States, as a court of equity jurisdiction, and may, if according to the rules and principles of equity jurisprudence, in its judicial discretion, reform said contract and render such judgment as justice and right between the claimants and the said Government may require.” (Act 14=th August, 1876,19 Stat. L., p. 490, chap. 279.)
The question of construction which it presents is a very simple one, viz, whether Congress intended to supply a defect of jurisdiction which, in the former action, might have prevented complete justice from being done; or whether they intended to undo all that had been judicially done and give the claimants an opportunity of re-opening demands, all of which were in a legal sense extinguished, aud some absolutely satisfied. Manifestly, in our view of the case, the purpose of the statute was to supply a defect and not to duplicate litigation. The court is to act as a court of equity, aud not to act, as it before might have acted, as a court of law. What has been done is to remain
As to the petition which has been demurred to, it is sufficient to say that it is good as a declaration at law, and is therefore bad as a bill in equity. The matters which it sets up might be inquired into by any court of common-law jurisdiction, but its averments are absolutely silent as to any matter requiring the interposition of a court of equity. It does indeed ask the court “to reform the said contract, if the same be necessary, so as to make the same conform to the intention of the parties; ” but the jurisdiction of a court of equity in such cases does not depend upon the relief sought for, but upon averments showing that the party is entitled to some specific redress as to which a court of law is incompetent to give relief.
The power of a court of equity to reform the terms of a written contract rests on fraud, mistake, or a grossly unconscionable advantage obtained by one party over another. It is only to establish such facts that parol evidence may be admitted to vary or contradict the terms of a written agreement; and the aver-ments in the bill setting them up present the primary or fundamental issues on which equity jurisdiction in such cases depends. In other words, it must primarily be alleged and proven that the written contract does not represent the true agreement.
But it is not essential that there be two proceedings. When the fact is established that the terms of a written contract should be reformed, a court of equity will act upon the well-established principle of equity jurisprudence of considering that which ought to be done as actually done, and will give effect to the instrument “not as it is, but as it would be if the fraud or mistake had never existed.” (2 Ldg. G. in'Eq., 682.) For this reason the bill must be complete, showing the fraud, mistake, or wrong upon which the equitable relief depends, and then, by proper allegations, the facts which will entitle the party to recover upon the reformed agreement, and enable the court to determine the extent of the relief which should be awarded to him.
The demurrer is sustained, with leave to the claimants to file an amended petition.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I-dissent from the opinion read. I think the demurrer should be overruled. It is a general demurrer to the petition, and the only question that can be raised on it is, whether the petition sets forth a cause of action. That is the issue tendered by the demurrer, and the only issue joined. As to that, the statute refers here, to be heard in equity, the claim of petitioners “/or labor done and materials furnished” on the contract it describes. And the petitioner, following the statute, sets forth a claim for $75,000 “/or labor done and materials furnished” under the contract by the petitioners “ in constructing the coffer-dams and in performing the work necessarily connected therewith, and preliminary to the mason-work for said piers and abutments.” This certainly is a claim “ for labor done and materials furnished,” and therefore the petition specifies as a cause of action the very thing which the statute refers to our adjudication.
And I think it cannot be objected to this claim that it was heard and not allowed in the previous suit at law. For it cannot be questioned here that Congress heard all the circumstances of the case on which it acted, or that it was competent for Congress to set aside and waive any legal defense the previous suit might furnish, and to order this claim, not allowed at law, to be heard here in equity. The prescribed form of process here is a petition, and that is not, and is not intended to be, a declaration at common law or a bill in equity. And the jurisdiction of this court is created by. statute, and it may be modified by statute, at the pleasure of Congress j and the only reason that courts of equity do not generally entertain claims like this is not that, in their nature, they are not suitable for equity jurisdiction, but merely that there is for them a remedy in law. There is, therefore, no reason in the claim itself why Congress should not order it to be heard here in equity, and that intent is patent on the face of the statute, which, of its own force, gives us, over the claim, such jurisdiction as it prescribes.
And there is here no plea of a former suit and judgment, but only a general demurrer, which, as I have said, puts in issue only the question whether the petition, per se and on its face, sets forth a cause of action; and whether that cause of action is de-feasible by a plea of the former suit and judgment does not arise, and cannot be heard or considered on the pleadings before us.