Harvey v. Merrill

150 Mass. 1 | Mass. | 1889

Field, J.

The rights of the parties are to be determined by the law of Illinois, but there is no evidence that the common law of Illinois differs from that of Massachusetts. We cannot take notice of the statutes of Illinois, except so far as they are set out in the auditor’s report; and the auditor has set out but one- statutory provision of that State, and has found that the parties have not acted in violation of that. We are therefore to determine whether the contract between the parties, as the auditor has found it to be, is illegal and void by the common law of Massachusetts.

It is not denied that, if, in a formal contract for the purchase and sale of merchandise to be delivered in the future at a fixed price, it is actually the agreement of the parties that the merchandise shall not be delivered and the price paid, but that, when the stipulated time for performance arrives, a settlement shall be made by a payment in money of the difference between the contract price and the market price of the merchandise at that time, this agreement makes the contract a wagering contract. If, however, it is agreed by the parties that the contract shall be performed according to its terms, if either party requires it, and that either party shall have a right to require it, the contract does not become a wagering contract, because one or both of the parties intend, when the time for performance arrives, not to require performance, but to substitute therefor a settlement by the payment of the difference between the contract price and the market price at that time. Such an intention is immaterial, except so far as it is made a part of the contract, although it need not be made expressly a part of the contract. To constitute a wagering contract, it is sufficient, whatever may be the form of the contract, that both parties understand and intend that one party shall not be bound to deliver the merchandise and the other to receive it and to pay the price, but that a settlement shall be made by the payment of the difference in prices.

The construction which we think should be given to the auditor’s report is, that he finds that the contracts which the plaintiffs made on the board of trade with other members of that board were not shown to be wagering contracts, and that the contract which the defendants made with the plaintiffs was, that the defendants should give orders from time to time to the plaintiffs for the purchase and the sale on account of the defendants of equal amounts of pork to be delivered in the future; that the plaintiffs should, in their own names, make these purchases and these sales on the board of trade; that the plaintiffs should, at or before the time of delivery, procure these contracts to be set off against each other, according to the usages of that board; that the defendants should not be required to receive any pork and pay for it, or to deliver any pork and receive the pay for it, but should only be required to pay to the plaintiffs, and should only be entitled to receive from them, the differences between the amounts of money which the pork was bought for and was sold for; and that the defendants should furnish a certain margin, and should pay the plaintiffs their commissions.

The defendants gave orders in pursuance of this contract, the plaintiffs made the purchases and sales on the board of trade, set them off against each other, and now sue the defendants for the differences which they have paid and for their commissions.

The auditor has found, that, “ in a vast majority of the transactions of the board of trade, settlement was made by the set-off of opposite contracts.” In his supplemental report he says, “ My conclusion is unchanged, that the parties to this suit entered into the dealings with each other which are the subject thereof with a clear understanding that actual deliveries were not contemplated and were not to be enforced; and it appears to me that the question whether the members of this board with whom the defendants dealt had such an understanding with each other is not material to the issue of this case.”

The peculiarity of this case, according to the findings of the auditor, is, that while the contracts which the plaintiffs made on the board of trade must be taken to.be legal, the plaintiffs have undertaken to agree with the defendants that these contracts should not be enforced by or against them, except by settlements according to differences in prices. If such an agreement seems improbable, it is enough to say that the auditor has found that it was made. The usages of the board of trade were such that the plaintiffs might well think that they risked little or nothing in making such an agreement. Indeed, the distinction in practice between the majority of contracts which by the auditor’s report appear to be made and settled on the board of trade, and wagering contracts, is not very plain, and brokers, for the purpose of encouraging speculation and of earning commissions, might be willing to guarantee to their customers that the contracts made for them on the board of trade should not be enforced, except by a settlement, according to differences in prices.

We do not see why the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendants, that the defendants should not be required to receive or deliver merchandise, or to pay for or receive pay for merchandise, but should be required to pay to and to receive from the plaintiffs only the differences in prices, is not, as between the parties, open to all the objections which lie against wagering contracts. On the construction we have given to the auditor’s report, the plaintiffs, in their dealings with the defendants, in some respects acted as principals. In making the contracts on the board of trade with other brokers, they may have been agents of the defendants. In agreeing with the defendants that they should not be compelled to perform or accept performance of the contracts so made, the plaintiffs acted for themselves as principals. If the defendants had made a contract with the plaintiffs to pay and receive the differences in the prices of pork ordered to be bought and sold for future delivery, with the understanding that no pork was to be bought or sold, this would be a wagering contract. On such a contract the defendants would win what the plaintiffs lose, and the plaintiffs would win what the defendants lose. But so far as the defendants are concerned, the contracts which the auditor has found they made with the plaintiffs are contracts on which they win or lose according to the rise or fall in prices, in the same manner as on wagering contracts. If the plaintiffs, by virtue of the contracts they made with other members of the board of trade, were bound to receive or deliver merchandise, and to pay or receive the price therefor, on the auditor’s finding they must be held as against the defendants to have agreed to do these things on their own account, and that the defendants should only be bound to pay to them and to receive from them the differences in prices. If the defendants, as undisclosed principals, should be held bound to other members of the board of trade on the contracts made by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs by the terms of their employment would be bound to indemnify the defendants, except so far as the contracts were settled, by a payment of differences in prices. The agreement of the parties, as the auditor has found it, excludes any implied liability on the part of the defendants to indemnify the plaintiffs, except for money paid in the settlement of differences in prices. The position of the plaintiffs towards the defendants is no better than it would have been if the plaintiffs had been employed to make wagering contracts for pork on account of the defendants, and had made such contracts, because the plaintiffs, relying upon the usages of the board of trade, have undertaken to agree with the defendants that whatever contracts they make shall bind the defendants only as wagering contracts, and shall be settled as such.

The plaintiffs contend that, even if the contracts which the defendants authorized them to make and which they made on the board of trade had been wagering contracts, yet they could recover whatever money they had paid in settlement of these contracts in the manner authorized by the defendants.

In Thacker v. Hardy, 4 Q. B. D. 685, the court found that the plaintiff was employed to make lawful contracts, and ruled that the understanding between the plaintiff and his customer, that the contract should be so managed that only differences in prices should be paid, did not violate the provisions of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, § 18. Lindley, J., in giving the opinion at the trial, said, at p. 687: “ What the plaintiff was employed to do was to buy and sell on the Stock Exchange, and this he did; and everything he did was perfectly legal, unless it was rendered illegal as between the defendant and himself by reason of the illegality of the object they had in view, or of the transactions in which they were engaged. Now,' if gaming and wagering were illegal, I should be of opinion that the illegality of the transactions in which the plaintiff and the defendant were engaged would have tainted, as between themselves, whatever the plaintiff had done in furtherance of their illegal designs, and would have precluded him from claiming, in a court of law, any indemnity from the defendant in respect of the liabilities he had incurred: Cannan v. Bryce, 3 B. & Ald. 179; M’Kinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 434; Lyne v. Siesfield, 1 H. & N. 278. But it has been held that although gaming and wagering contracts cannot be enforced, they are not illegal. Fitch v. Jones, 5 E. & B. 238, is plain to that effect.” On appeal, Brett, B. J., said, at p. 694: “ It was further suggested in Cooper v. Neil, W. N., 1 June, 1878, that the agreement was, that although the plaintiff being broker to the defendant, but contracting in his own person as principal, should enter into real bargains, yet the defendant should be called upon only to pay the loss if the market should be unfavorable, and should receive only the profit if it proved favorable f and that no further liability should accrue to the principal, whatever might become of the broker upon the Stock Exchange; so that, as regarded the real principal, the defendant in the action, it should be a mere gambling transaction. I then considered that a transaction, of that kind might fall within the provisions of 8 & 9 Viet. c. 109, § 18, but I thought that there was no evidence of it. And with respect to the present action, I say that there is no evidence that the bargain between the parties amounted to a transaction of that nature. I retract nothing from what I said in that case.”

In England, wagering contracts concerning stocks or merchandise are not illegal at common law, and all the judges in Thacker v. Hardy were of opinion that the facts in that case did not show that the transactions between the parties were in violation of the statute.

In Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499, 510, the Supreme Court of the United States says of wagering contracts: “ In England, it is held that the contracts, although wagers, were not void at common law, and that the statute has not made them illegal, but only non-enforceable, Thacker v. Hardy, ubi supra, while generally, in this country, all wagering contracts are held to be illegal and void as against public policy. Dickson’s Executor v. Thomas, 97 Penn. St. 278; Gregory v. Wendell, 40 Mich. 432; Lyon v. Culbertson, 83 Ill. 33; Melchert v. American Union Telegraph Co. 3 McCrary, 521; S. C. 11 Fed. Rep. 193 and note; Barnard v. Backhaus, 52 Wis. 593; Kingsbury v. Kirwan, 77 N. Y. 612; Story v. Saloman, 71 N. Y. 420; Love v. Harvey, 114 Mass. 80.” In considering how far brokers would be affected by the illegality of contracts made by them, that court says: “ It is certainly true that a broker might negotiate such a contract without being privy to the illegal intent of the principal parties to it which renders it void, and in such a case, being innocent of any violation of law, and not suing to enforce an unlawful contract, has a meritorious ground'for the recovery of compensation for services and advances. But we are also of the opinion that when the broker is privy to the unlawful design of the parties, and brings them together for the very purpose of entering into an illegal agreement, he is particeps criminis, and cannot recover for services rendered or losses incurred by himself on behalf of either in forwarding the transaction.” This was decided in Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336. See also Kahn v. Walton, (Ohio, 1888,) 20 N. E. Rep. 203; Cothran v. Ellis, 125 Ill. 496 ; Fareira v. Gabell, 89 Penn. St. 89; Crawford v. Spencer, 92 Misso. 498; Lowry v. Dillman, 59 Wis. 197; Whitesides v. Hunt, 97 Ind. 191; First National Bank v. Oskaloosa Packing Co. 66 Iowa, 41; Rumsey v. Berry, 65 Maine, 570.

It is not denied that wagering contracts are void by the common law of Massachusetts; but it is argued that they are not illegal, and that, if one pays money in settlement of them at the request of another, he can recover it of the person at whose request he pays it. It is now settled here, that contracts which are void at common law, because they are against public policy, like contracts which are prohibited by statute, are illegal as well as void. They are prohibited by law because they are considered vicious, and it is not necessary to impose a penalty in order to render them illegal. Bishop v. Palmer, 146 Mass. 469. Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co. 130 U. S. 396. The weight of authority in this country is, we think, that brokers who knowingly make contracts that are void and illegal as against public policy, and advance money on account of them at the request of their principals, cannot recover either the money advanced or their commissions, and we are inclined to adopt this view of the law. Embrey v. Jemison, 131 U. S. 336, ubi supra, and the other cases there cited.

We are of opinion that the instruction of the presiding justice, that on the auditor’s report the plaintiffs were entitled to a verdict, cannot be sustained. Whether on the auditor’s report the defendants were entitled to a ruling directing the jury to render a verdict in their favor, or whether the case should have been submitted to the jury for the reasons stated in Peaslee v. Ross, 143 Mass. 275, is a question which has not been carefully argued, and upon which we express no opinion.

Exceptions sustained.