1 Leigh 108 | Va. | 1829
Lead Opinion
All decrees are either interlocutory or final: there is no middle class. In the progress of a cause, it often becomes necessary to make orders of different kinds, in order to enable the court to come at the whole case, or to settle the details, after the principles of the cause are decided: all these are interlocutory orders or decrees. But when a decree makes an end of a case, and decides the whole matter in contest, costs and all, leaving nothing further for the court to do, it is certainly a final decree. Let us try the case before us by this test.
It is said the chancellor heard them together, and pronounced one decree in them all. It is true the chancellor found it more convenient to have one hearing, and to pronounce one decree, than two; but it was never in his
I cannot think then, that this case is, in any respect, made a part of Borden v. Bowyer. But if it were, and if the decree in Borden v. Bowyer, was clearly interlocutory, it would not follow, that the decree here must of necessity be so too. The claim of Branson was certainly a distinct one: none of the parties to the other suit, none of the heirs of Borden, participated in that claim : he claimed for himself alone, the share of his mother; her 1000 acres. Even, then, if he had carried this separate claim into the general suit, there might have been a final decree as to him, without any decree on the other parts of the cause. For, I think, this court clearly right in Royal’s adm’r. v. Johnson, where it decided, that where a decree is made as to one of several defendants, the interests of that one being wholly unconnected with the others, and he being directed to receiye or pay costs, such decree is final as to him, though the cause may be still pending in court as to the rest. Now, I have shewn, that the decree makes a complete disposition of the subjects of the bill and cross-bill of Branson v. Harvey, with the costs; and these subjects are so intirely unconnected with the objects of Borden v. Bowyer, that it would be difficult to imagine, how any thing subsequently done in this last, could affect the right or interest of Branson.
But I am strongly inclined to think this decree is final as to Borden v. Bowyer itself. I can only judge from the extracts from the record of that case, before mentioned, and the decree itself. The objection taken at the bar, I understood to be, not that the court had left any part of the case undecided, but that the decision was not final, because the commissioner of the court was still to go on and sell the lands, and because liberty was reserved to the parties to apply to the court to supersede him, or to .appoint one or
It seems to me, that such a doctrine in this case, would be calculated to do much mischief. How long will you keep the decree open ? The parties may apply or not: it is perfectly optional with them. The decree may be for years in a course of execution. There seem to be various scraps and slipes of land, the remnants of a large body, scattered here and- there, through two or three counties. The commissioner is not to sell at once, or at auction: this would involve a sacrifice, which the parties did not wish. Years may
I have met with but one case in our reports, which may seem to apply to this point; the case of Sheppard v. Starke. That was a bill brought against an executor by a distributee, for an account, and division of the residuum: a certain sum was decreed against the executor, to be paid to the children on their executing bonds &sc: “ and liberty was reserved to the parties, or either of them, to resort to the court for its further interposition, if it should be found necessary.” To this decree, the executor filed a bill of review, upon which proceedings and a decree were had; and the cause came up by appeal. On the argument here, not a word was said about the character of the decree, or the regularity of the bill of review. This court prefaced its opinion on the merits, by saying, “ the court is of opinion, that though either of the parties to the original decree pronounced in this cause, might, in a summary way, have resorted to the court of chancery, for its further interposition, if deemed necessary, (under the special reservation in the decree contained), they might also proceed by hill, as was done in the present instance ; that mode being equally justified by the reservation aforesaid, and beneficial to the parties.” It is clear to me, that the court had no intention, there, of expressing an opinion, that the decree was interlocutory: if so, it could not have sustained the bill of review, which, we know, can only be filed after a final decree ; for not even the consent of parties can make a decree final, which in its nature and terms
Upon tire whole, I am of opinion, that the.decree in the two suits of Branson v. Harvey, was final, and not being appealed from in time, the appeal must be dismissed.
I am of the same opinion. In my judgment, every decree which leaves nothing more to be done in the cause, no subject to be acted upon or disposed of, no question to be decided by the court, is in its nature final; and that, therefore, this decree, in respect both to the case of Borden v. Bowyer and the cases of Branson and Harvey, is final. But I have some doubts, whether this opinion be quite conformable with former adjudications of the court, on questions touching the character of decrees, whether interlocutory or final.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the opinion, that the decree is final and conclusive, as to all the cases; and this, as well upon the former decisions of the court on like questions, as upon principle. I consider the case of Sheppard v. Starke, as in point: the court there, must have regarded the decree as final, else it could not have entertained the bill of review as regular and proper. As to the reservations in this decree, those and all similar reservations, are, in my view, simply provisions for the execution of the decree, as one final and conclusive, not reservations of any points for future consideration and decision.
The appeal was dismissed.