153 Mich. 337 | Mich. | 1908
This is an action of ejectment. After suit was commenced, the defendant filed a bill of complaint to enjoin the further prosecution of the suit, which was decided both in the circuit court in chancery and in this court against the contention of the defendant. De
Two questions are raised :
It is the settled law in Michigan that the owner of lands abutting on a watercourse owns to the middle of the stream. Butler v. Railroad Co., 85 Mich. 246, affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States, Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Butler, 159 U. S. 87. The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Chief Justice Fuller, said:
“In Michigan the common law prevails, and the rule is sustained by an unbroken line of authorities that a*339 grant of land bounded by a stream, whether navigable in fact or not, carries with it the bed of the stream to the center of the thread thereof.”
This is conceded by the learned counsel for the defendant, but he insists that there is a distinction to be drawn between natural and artificial streams and ponds. The stream in this case is not an artificial one. The boundaries of the stream have been changed by artificial means. Counsel cite no case in Michigan where this precise question has been raised.
Where the boundary of the land conveyed was described as “east by the pond” (an artificial one), it was held that the grantee took to the middle of the original stream the same as if no pond existed. Mill River Woolen Manfg. Co. v. Smith, 34 Conn. 462.
So, where an artificial pond was created by damming a stream, it was held that “the same rule applies to the pond as to the stream before the dam was built.” Mansur v. Blake, 62 Me. 38. A like holding is found in Lowell v. Robinson, 16 Me. 357. See, also, Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160, at pages 169, 170; Wheeler v. Spinola, 54 N. Y. 377; Waterman v. Johnson, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 261; 5 Cyc. p. 900; 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), p. 832.
There is nothing in the language of these deeds to indicate an intention on the part of the grantors to retain title to the land lying between the edge of the water of this pond and the middle thread of the stream. It seems to us reasonable to hold that these deeds conveyed to the plaintiff the right to the water front and for the use of the water in the stream in its natural state, should the artificial pond be discontinued. It follows that the circuit judge was right in directing a verdict for the plaintiff for the land covered by the bridge.
The judgment is affirmed.