128 F. 306 | U.S. Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illnois | 1904
This cause comes before the court on appeal from the decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers made June 26, 1903, overruling said lumber company’s protest against the action of the collector, holding that certain importations of lumber came under the so-called Dingley bill, which went into force on July 24, 1897, at 4:06 p. m., Washington time. From the evidence it appears that the propeller Maine, having in tow the barges Pendell and Buckhout, consigned to the Hartwell Dumber Company, of Chicago, and the barge Rxile, consigned to the Spry Dumber Company, of Chicago, all loaded with lumber brought from Canada, were lying to at a point somewhere between the two-mile waterworks crib and the entrance to the Chicago river. One witness says he saw them later casting their lines to the tugs, which are required in such cases to take the vessels to their several docks. He says that he could not understand why they were so long in taking their lines. They were, he says, having some trouble about whether they would be towed by the Dunham or Barry tugs. The barges did not reach the barge office, which is a little more than a quarter of a mile from the mouth of the river westerly, until 6 p. m. July 24th. The agent of the owner and consignee of these vessels made tenders of entry of the same the day before they arrived, and on the day of arrival, up to 12 o’clock m., which were refused for the expressed reason “that the vessels had not reported at the customhouse.” The statutes of Illinois provide that the city of Chicago shall have jurisdiction over Dake Michigan for a distance .of three miles beyond the city limits. By ordinance of the city of Chicago it is provided that the city harbor master shall1 have control over lake water between the north and south lines of the city for a distance of three miles out. The vessels in question were within that district. They -were also within this collection district.
There are two questions which must determine the rights of the parties herein: (1) Had the Maine and her tow arrived at the port of Chicago before the Dingley bill went into effect? (2) If so, was a proper tender of entry made?
With regard to the first, the Board of General Appraisers held that the vessels had not arrived in the port. There are circumstances peculiar-to this port which made it difficult to determine what constitutes the port. Section 2767 of the Revised Statutes [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1861] defines a “port” as follows: “The-word ‘port’ as used in this title, may include any place from which merchandise can he shipped for importation or at which merchandise can be imported.” Section 2601 of the Revised Statutes [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1794] provides that the district of Chicago comprises all the waters and shores of Dake Michigan within the states of Indiana and Illinois; that Chicago shall be the port of entry, and Waukegan and Michigan City ports of delivery. There is nowhere a determination of what constitutes the port of Chicago. There exist in the harbor what are termed the “Government Pier" and the “North Pier.” These, or-some' of them, are sometimes spoken of as the “Outer Pier.” The usual method of bringing a tow such as accompanied the Maine within this outer breakwater or pier is to break up the tow, and cause each one tó be taken in by a tug, and thence on up the liver to its own dock. It appears that vessels
The only remaining question is whether, having failed to tender entry within that half hour, the Dingley law took effect as to the importation. Tariff Act July 27, 1897, c. 11, § 33, 30 Stat. 213 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1701], provides that, “on and after the day when this act shall go into effect, all goods, wares and merchandise previously imported for which no entry has been made * *. * shall be subjected to
The claim made in cases of the Toltec, a propeller, and her tow, the barge Miztec, cannot be sustained. These two were loaded with lumber imported from Canada, and consigned to the Spry Lumber Company. From the record, it appears they were within the collection district,’ but not within the port. It is held in U. S. v. Vowell, 5 Cranch, 368, 3 L. Ed. 128, and Arnold v. U. S., 9 Cranch, 104, 3 L. Ed. 671, and U. S. v. Legg, supra, that there would be an arrival within some port of entry, in order to constitute an importation. It is insisted that an arrival within the collection district and the tender of entry, combined, take the present case out of the rule. With this contention I do not agree. If such acts as amounted to tender of entry were not at the time an obligation, the attempt at tender cannot make them so.
The finding of the Board of General Appraisers with regard to the Maine, the Pendell, and Buckhout is reversed, and it is ordered that the Hartwell Lumber Company have and recover from the collector the sum of money so by him collected from it. See section 989, Rev. St. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 708]. The same order will' be entered in the case of the barge Exile in favor of the Sp’ry Lumber Company. The appeal of the Spry Lumber Company with reference to the propeller Toltec and the barge Miztec is dismissed.