The opinion of the Court was delivered by
In this appeal, as in
Wallace v. JFK Hartwyck,
149
N.J.
605,
I
On January 11,1991, plaintiff, Mary Hartsfield, was driving her ear on County Road 530 in Southampton, New Jersey, when she was struck head on by а vehicle driven by defendant Fred Fantini and owned by defendant Best For You Auto Sales (Best). Fantini also struck another car, driven by defendant Helen Matthews. 1
Hartsfield suffered permanent injuries. She had graduated from cosmetology school one day before the accident, on January 10, 1991, and was scheduled to begin work on January 14, 1991. Due to her injuries, Hartsfield claims that she has been unable to pursue her chosen profession as a hairstylist.
On January 6,1993, Hartsfield filed a personal injury complaint against defendants. The matter was scheduled for arbitration in *614 Burlington County, on December 7, 1994, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-25. Prior to the arbitration, Best made Hartsfield a settlement offer of $100,000, which she refused.
The arbitration proceeding was held. Thе arbitrators determined that defendants Fantini and Best were 100% liable and awarded Hartsfield $65,000 in damages. Immediately following the arbitration, plaintiff’s attorney, David Daniels, advised Best’s attorney that a request for a trial de novo would be filed.
Daniels failed to file for a trial de novo within the thirty-day pеriod, which expired on June 9,1995. He claims that that failure was the result of secretarial error and a breakdown in his case management system. Although Daniels’s secretary followed some of his instructions regarding the case, suсh as verifying Harts-field’s educational background and retaining an economist, she did not follow his instruction to petition for a trial de novo. That error was compounded when Daniels failed to review his diary. Daniels blames his inattention to his diary on an increased case load caused by the departure six months earlier of two bankruptcy associates responsible for over 1,000 eases.
On June 28, 1995, Daniels received a phone call from Best’s attorney concerning a possible settlement, and was advised that the demand for a trial de novo had not been filed. Within twenty-four hours, he prepared and filed a motion to petition for a trial de novo out of time. Best’s attorney filed a motiоn to confirm the arbitration award within the fifty-day deadline, pursuant to Rule 4:21A-6 (b)(2).
The trial court held that Daniels’s conduct did not constitute due diligence and that the internal failure in his office did not constitute the “extraordinary circumstancеs” necessary to allow the motion for a trial
de novo
to be filed out of time, under
Hart v. Property Management Systems,
280
N.J.Super.
145,
We granted plaintiffs petition for certification, 146
N.J.
566,
II
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-24 to -35, one of five bills enacted in 1983 to revise New Jersey’s nо-fault automobile insurance system, provides for the mandatory arbitration of certain automobile accident claims. “The purpose and intent ... [of the Legislature was] to establish an informal system of settling tort claims аrising out of automobile accidents in an expeditious and least costly manner, and to ease the burden and congestion of the State’s courts.” N.J.S.A 39:6A-24. The legislation requires nonbinding arbitration for claims involving less than $15,000 in total damages and for those claims involving non-economic damages of less than $15,000. N.J.S.A 39:6A-25a.' Actions for non-economic loss greater than $15,000 can be referred by the trial court to arbitration, if all parties to the action consent in writing. N.J.S.A 30:6A-25b. Under the legislation, each party has thirty days within which to reject the arbitration award and petition the court for a trial de novo. N.J.S.A. 39-.6A-31.
In 1987, the Legislature enacted similar legislation requiring mandatory arbitration of other personal injury actions in which the amount in controversy involved $20,000 or less. N.J.S.A 2A:23A-20a. The legislation authorized the courts to refer matters involving more than $20,000 to arbitration if all parties consented in writing and the matter did not involve “novel legal or ■unduly complex factual issues.” N.J.S.A 2A:23A-20b. N.J.S.A 2A:23A-26 provides for mandatory confirmation of the arbitration decision upon motion, “unless one of the parties petitions the court *616 within 30 days of the filing of the arbitration decision for a trial de novo.”
An exаmination of those arbitration statutes discloses that the Legislature sought to preserve judicial resources and improve efficiency by providing for arbitration. It also sought to preserve an individual’s right to a jury trial by providing thаt a person dissatisfied with the arbitration award has the right to request a trial de novo.
The Court adopted rules to implement the automobile arbitration provision, effective January 1986.
See
Pressler,
Current N.J. Court Rules,
comment 1 on
R.
4:21A (1997). The rules were amended, effective Januаry 1989, to encompass arbitration of non-auto personal injury claims, in accordance with
N.J.S.A
2A:23A-20 to -30.
See ibid. Rules
4:21A-6(b)(l), (2), and (3) provide that an order shall be entered dismissing the action following the filing of the arbitration award unless one of three сonditions set forth in
Rule
4:21A-6(b) is met. Only
Rule
4:21A-6(b)(l) is at issue. Under that rule, a party dissatisfied with the result of an arbitration may demand a trial
de novo
within thirty days after the filing of the arbitration award. “The Legislature intended [that rule] ... to be strictly enforced.”
Hart, supra,
280
N.J.Super.
at 147,
Ill
Although the Appellate Division has addressed the standard that should be used to determine whether there should be a relaxation of the thirty-day rule, we have not. In
Mazakas v. Wray,
205
N.J.Super.
367,
The need for a strict interpretation of what constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance” was expressed in Behm, supra:
This ease involves the integrity of the arbitration process and enforceability of arbitration awards. If a party could set aside an arbitration award and obtain a trial de novo whenever his or her attorney neglected to file for a trial de novo within tímе solely because of a clerical error or failure to note or advise the client of the thirty-day requirement to file for a trial de novo, there would be an open door which would render the thirty-day time limit of R. 4:21A-6(b)(l) meaningless. Such а relaxation of the rule “thwarts the effectiveness of a valid arbitration.”
[ 286 N.J.Super. at 574,670 A.2d 40 (citation omitted).]
See also Lawrence v. Matusewski,
210
N.J.Super.
268, 274,
IV
In determining what constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance,” the Appellate Division has held that trial courts should be guided by the same principlеs that apply in deciding a motion for relief under
Rule
4:50-1.
See Hart, supra,
280
N.J.Super.
at 148,
*618 Many parties seeking relief under Rule 4:50-1 have not had an opportunity to argue the merits of their case in court, i.e., default judgments have been entered against them. On the other hand, most parties seeking relief for failure to file a timely petition for trial de novo have had an opportunity to argue the merits of their case before an arbitrator. Such claimants have not been denied a day in court. They mil have received a fair if informal hearing on the merits. Therefore, we do not believe that the criteria set forth in Rule 4:50-1 should be considered in determining whether the thirty-day rule should be relaxed.
To relax the thirty-day rule, courts must determine that “extraordinary сircumstances” exist and that those circumstances did not arise from an attorney’s “mere carelessness” or “lack of proper diligence.”
In re T.,
95
N.J.Super.
228, 235,
Numerous cases have held that an attorney’s heavy workload or improper supervision of staff does not constitute “extraordinary circumstances.” In
Behm, supra,
for example, the court оbserved that “[t]he excuse that an attorney is too busy or has too heavy a workload to properly handle litigation or to supervise staff is insufficient to constitute extraordinary circumstances.” 286
N.J.Super.
at 574,
The court
held that in order to relax the thirty-day limitation on requests for trial de novo subsequent to arbitration decisions, “extraоrdinary circumstances” must exist. The policy underlying this decision is to allow the arbitration process to bring about the termination of litigation when neither party has requested a trial de novo. This furthers the stated aims of the compulsory arbitrаtion program, which is to bring about inexpensive, speedy adjudications of disputes and to ease the caseload of state courts.
[Behm, supra, 286 N.J.Super. at 573-74,670 A.2d 40 (citations omitted).]
Likewise, in
Hart, supra,
280
N.J.Super.
145,
V
We agree with those courts that have found an attorney’s failurе to supervise staff or heavy workload to be insufficient to satisfy the “extraordinary circumstances” requirement. We emphasize that the circumstances must be “exceptional and compelling.”
Baumann v. Marinaro,
95
N.J.
380, 393,
We are sympathetic to Mr. Daniels’s difficulties following the departure of two attorneys from his four-attorney office; however, his failure to review his diary and to ensure that his secretary followed his instructions cannot be characterized аs “extraordinary circumstances” sufficient to relax the thirty-day rule.
See, e.g., Behm, supra,
286
N.J.Super.
at 574,
The Appellate Division’s judgment is affirmed.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ, and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 7.
Opposed — None.
Notes
The matter against Matthews has been resolved.