59 Ga. App. 194 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1938
Hartsfield Company sued J. R. Fulwiler under the “small-loan act” on a contract executed before the act of 1935 (Ga. L. 1935, p. 394), to amend Code, § 25-313, and restrict the rate of interest on small loans of $300 or less, from 3% per. cent, per month to 1% per cent, per month. The court below found for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff received interest under the contract in an amount which was more than 3% per cent, per month, and the contract thereby became null and void. To this ruling the plaintiff excepted.
The note sued on was given October 18, 1934, for a debt of $300 under the provisions of what is known as the “small-loan act.” The note provided: “For value received, I promise to pay to the order of Hartsfield Company three hundred dollars in equal instalments of $15.65 on the 25th day of each month following date of this note, until the full amount of this note shall have been paid, with interest from date of actual consufnmation of loan at the rate of 3% per cent, per month; said interest to be payable monthly on unpaid balance of principal. If all of the instalments of principal and interest are paid on or before date due, and if the receipt card is presented with each and every payment of principal or interest, or part thereof, no interest in excess of $75 will be charged.” Code, § 25-313, provides in part as follows: “Every per
Can the plaintiff, under the “small-loan act,” spread his interest rate over a period of ten months and arbitrarily divide his interest up for each separate month of the ten months to suit himself, even though in some of these months he charges more than 3% per cent, per month, so long as at the expiration of the ten-month period he had not charged as interest for the entire ten months a sum total in excess of 3% per cent, per month? We think not. This Avould be alloAving the plaintiff to arbitrarily treat the ten-month period as the unit of time for the computation of interest, whereas the statute says that the unit of time for the computation of interest is a month, not ten months, not a year, not five years, not any other time, but a month. Code, § 25-313, makes the unit of time for the computation of interest 3% per cent, per month. No other -unit of time for the computation of interest is mentioned in said section. We think one of the objects of this section- is that the contract must be so draAAm that under its provisions a debtor may pay at the end of each month, and may thus be able to refix his status as to the
The cases of Bailey v. Williams, 155 Ga. 806, 809 (118 S. E. 354) and Broce v. Master Loan and Service Inc., 171 Ga. 22 (154 S. E. 324), are distinguishable from the instant case in that the question here is not whether, in computing interest, the calendar month should be used, or whether it is permissible to compute the interest on the basis of thirty days as comprising a month, but the question here is whether or not a month is the unit of time which should be used in computing interest, and, if so, would an overcharge of interest for one month void the said contract, irrespectively of whether the sum total of interest collected for a period of many months may not, at the expiration of this longer period, average more than 3% per cent, per month? We think the judge, sitting without the intervention of a jury, was authorized to find that the plaintiff made a loan of $300 to the defendant under the “small-loan act,” that it collected and “received” the following amounts in excess of 3% per cent, per month: for one month $0.12 in excess, for another month $0.62 in excess, for another $0.73 in excess, and for another $1.89 in excess; and that plaintiff intended to and did purposely collect and “receive” more than 3% per cent, per
Judgment affirmed.