215 F. 986 | N.D.W. Va. | 1914
(after stating the facts as above).
“If the relationship oí attorney and client, exists, the possessory lien will cover in general property of any sort belonging to the client and held by tbc attorney.” 4 Cyc. 1005.
It also extends to the fees of associated counsel employed by the attorney or, rather:
“If the attorney collects the judgment, he may deduct, not only his own fee, but he is protected in the payment of like reasonable fees to other attorneys or counsel employed in the suit.” Jones on Liens, § 144.
In the leading case in this state of Renick v. Rudington, 16 W. Va. 378, it is said:
“(1) An attorney has a lien, on the judgment * * * obtained by him for his client, for services and disbursements in the case, whether the amount of his compensation is agreed upon or depends upon a quantum meruit.
“(2) This lien includes not only the amount necessary to pay for his services and disbursements in the case, in which the judgment or decree is rendered, but also the amount necessary to pay for his services and disbursements in any other case, so connected with it as to form the basis on which such judgment or decree is rendered, or essential to the realizing of such judgment or decree. * * *
“(4) * * * Notice of the existence of such lien to the assignee of such judgment or decree is not essential to the maintenance of such lien against such assignee without notice.”
Under these well-settled principles it is beyond doubt that these attorneys would be entitled to the lien claimed by them as attorneys of record in this running and related litigation, involving Plartman’s interest in these two companies, as against Hartman, if he had not assigned his stock, or part of it, to his mother and wife, or if he had not been adjudged bankrupt and his interest had not vested thereby in his trustee. Do these or either of these conditions affect or destroy the lien? We have already seen that assignment, pending the litigation, even where no notice is given the assignee of the lien, neither affects nor defeats it. Renick v. Rudington, supra. If this were not so as a general principle, it seems to me that where, as in this case, one assigns his interests to near relatives, such as mother and wife, and continues to call upon the attorneys originally employed by him to prosecute and protect such interests, to perform such additional services, the law would presume him as doing so with knowledge and consent of such related assignees, in short, as their agent.
So far as the assignment by law to the bankrupt trustee is concerned, it is too well-settled to admit of controversy that such trustee takes only such title as the bankrupt has, subject to all liens and equities existing upon or against the property. Zartman v. Bank, 216 U. S. 134, 30 Sup. Ct. 368, 54 L. Ed. 418.
It follows that the defendants are entitled to retain out of this fund the $2,000 for fees as claimed by them, and to surrender to plaintiffs only the balance, and decree may be entered to that effect.