71 Pa. 312 | Pa. | 1872
The opinion of the court was delivered, by
The eighth of the rules of this court, adopted at Pittsburg, September 6th 1852, 6 Harris 578, provides that “when the error assigned is to the admission or rejection of evidence, the specification must quote the full substance of the bill of exceptions, or copy the bill in immediate connection with the specification. Any assignment of error not according to this rule will be held the same as none.” This rule has been entirely disregarded in the assignment of errors in this case. There are ten errors assigned to the admission of testimony. There are, however, but two bills of exceptions, neither of which are assigned according to the rule. There was in the first instance an offer of testimony to be followed by other evidence, which was admitted and a bill of exceptions sealed. At the close of the evidence the judge gave a sweeping exception to all the evidence which had been produced by the defendant “ with the same effect as if a special bill of exception had been taken and allowed to each offer of testimony.” Without setting out either of these bills in his specifications of error as ground of complaint the defendant picks out from the whole mass of the testimony ten particulars which he declares to have been irrelevant and inadmissible. Such a mode of assigning errors is manifestly contrary both to the letter and spirit of the rule, and must accordingly be held “ the same as none.”
The real question, however, on the merits of the cause is presented by the remaining assignments — whether there was any evidence given which ought to have been submitted to the jury as tending to make out the defence, that there was no consideration for the note in suit. In every case of a promissory note the prima facies is in this respect in favor of the payee. It imports a valuable consideration. It is also undoubtedly true that without some evidence to cast suspicion upon the transaction — the pecuniary circumstances of the respective parties and their relations to each other would be irrelevant and calculated to mislead the jury: Woods v. Gummert, 17 P. F. Smith 136. But where there is evidence tending to show unfairness, undue influence or fraud, the evidence may take a wide range: Reinhard v. Keenbartz, 6 Watts 93; Kauffman v. Swar, 5 Barr 230; Stevenson v. Stewart, 1 Jones 307. The plaintiff below did not commence his case in the usual way by proof of the signature of the maker of the note but called two witnesses — his son and daughter — to prove its execution. The maker was his father-in-law and a man ninety-one
Judgment affirmed.