115 Ga. App. 625 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1967
In this action on an insurance contract the defendant insurer appeals from a judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that a judgment for the defendant was demanded upon the following evidence. The insurer issued to the insured a policy of fire insurance effective December 15, 1964, covering six structures, including a log cabin. In early 1965 before the fire loss for which this suit was brought, the insured talked with the insurer’s agent and told him that he wanted to eliminate the log cabin from the policy to reduce the premiums. Within a few days the insurer’s agent or the secretary in the agent’s office telephoned the insured and stated that an endorsement was being prepared and would be mailed to the insured, which he would have to sign and return to them to eliminate the log cabin. The insured testified that as a result of his communications with the insurance agency and the language of the endorsement itself he understood that the coverage on the log cabin would not be eliminated until he had signed and returned the endorsement. The insured received a
The insurer introduced in evidence a copy of a letter from its agent to the plaintiff dated February 24, 1965, stating that it enclosed an endorsement eliminating the log cabin from the previous coverage and “this produces a credit of $157.00 which has been applied to your account,” and testimony of the agent that he sent this letter and endorsement to the insured on February 24. The insured testified he did not know whether he had received this letter and did not think that he did.
The insurer proposed the terms of the amendment to the policy, including the requirement of the insured's signature on the endorsement. While neither the endorsement nor the policy especially required that the endorsement be returned to the insurer after it had been signed by the insured, it is the law of contracts that an acceptance of a bilateral contract requires communication. “Where an express acceptance by the opposite party is required by the offer in order to establish a contract, the fact of such subsequent acceptance must be communicated to the offerer by the opposite party . . . ; and a mere private uncommunicated assent would not effect an
The trial court did not err in entering judgment for the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.