401 A.2d 454 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1978
Pursuant to General Statutes
In the meantime, the state proceedings were stayed by bankruptcy proceedings instituted by the defendant. The bankruptcy court (Seidman, J.) terminated the stay associated with the Chapter 12 proceedings subject to the limitation discussed below. The Court of Common Pleas (Allen, J.) on September 6, 1977, terminated the stay of execution pending appeal which had been imposed automatically. This termination of the stay by the Court of Common Pleas was consistent with the bankruptcy court's order (Seidman, J.) that the receiver could pay the plaintiff, the Hartford Electric Light Company, for electrical services provided after the bankruptcy proceedings were initiated. The Court of Common Pleas (Allen, J.) specifically stated that "it is determined that the orderly administration of justice requires that the stay be terminated." See Practice Book, 1978, 1064, 3065. That order terminating the stay directed the receiver to hold the collected monies in an interest-bearing savings account.
The defendant, on June 22, 1977, filed a motion to declare
The court (Kinney, J.), on November 4, 1977, modified the order dated September 6, 1977, by appointing a new receiver of rents and by modifying the amount of money to be held in the savings account. The defendant then filed his third appeal.
At the hearing before this court on May 18, 1978, the court was informed that the defendant had filed a petition in the bankruptcy court under Chapter 12, which petition was dismissed in September, 1977. On March 30, 1978, another Chapter 12 petition was filed, which petition is still pending. The defendant has also sought relief in the United States District Court for invasion of his civil rights and for violation of the antitrust laws, which case has now reached the level of a petition for certiorari. In addition, foreclosures have been instituted in the state courts on the various apartment houses.
The defendant, who has appeared pro se in these appeals, has made a wholesale attack upon the receivership proceedings in the court below and has raised many points that were not before the lower court. Moreover, the finding does not give this court sufficient facts upon which to adjudicate several of the points. Matters not briefed or supported by the finding are considered to be abandoned. The defendant has failed to comply with Practice Book, 1978, 1064 and 3022 which direct him to include in the draft finding the claims of law made to the trial court. Mindful of the fact that our courts have been "solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants," we have read the transcript to determine which issues briefed by the defendant were raised below. Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Kluczinsky,
The only matters which appear to be properly before this court are the following: (a) Is
A public utility, although heavily regulated by the state, is not an arm thereof but retains its status as a private company. Thus when it has been claimed that acts of a regulated electric utility are acts "under color of state law," such claims have been dismissed. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
The statute provides for a taking which is necessary to compensate fairly the petitioning utility *613
for its services and its expenses of collection. Section
The legislature, in enacting Public Acts 1975, No. 75-625 (now
Since the prohibition against the termination of utility service was summary and absolute, the legislature thus clearly established the summary nature of the plaintiff's remedy. Accordingly, the receivership proceeding is to be short, concise, peremptory and immediate. *614
If, on the other hand, the receivership proceeding were to be construed as a "civil action" within the meaning of title 52 of the General Statutes, it would no longer be a summary proceeding or an adequate remedy, and the legislative intent and regulatory system contained in
In Slattery v. Woodin,
In denying that an appeal from a compensation commissioner's award is a "civil action," the Supreme Court in Chieppo v. Robert E. McMichael, Inc.,
For further examples of special statutory proceedings which have been distinguished by the courts of Connecticut from title 52 "civil actions" in order *615
to prevent the applicability of title 52 procedural requirements, see Jones v. Foote,
The issue thus raised is whether the defendant, after voluntarily accepting service from the plaintiff's attorney rather than from a sheriff, can thereafter challenge the jurisdiction of the court to conduct the limited hearing prescribed by
Accentuating the fact that the service of process requirements of title 52 do not apply to petitions brought pursuant to
Anticipating that the shortness of time between the issuance of the order and the hearing, *616
seventy-two hours, might make personal, manual service upon the appropriate party extremely difficult, the General Assembly provided that permissible service could be effected merely by "posting of such order on the premises in question." General Statutes
In the present case, service was effected upon the defendant in the "manner most reasonably calculated to give notice" — manual, personal service. In addition, the acceptance of service by the defendant constituted a waiver of any technical defects. See 1 Stephenson, Conn. Civ. Proc. 26d.
In several reported cases the Connecticut courts have held that a defendant's behavior can result in a court gaining jurisdiction despite any claim that the tribunal lacks such jurisdiction. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Beardsley,
In the present case, the defendant not only executed the express waiver, but he also proceeded with a trial on the merits, not only defending the claims against him, but also asserting counterclaims and setoffs.
There is no error.
In this opinion DRISCOLL and CRAMER, Js., concurred.
