Thе plaintiffs in error contend that no evidence was taken before the full board at the hearing on the granting of the lump-sum settlement as to probable future payments, and thus the award should be reversed. Code Ann. § 114-417 provides in essence that after weekly payments have been continued for not less than 26 weeks, a lump-sum settlеment may be awarded, in whole or in part, when it is deemed to be in the best interest of the employee or his dependents, or where it will prevent undue hardship to the employer or his insurance carrier, without prejudicing the interests of the employee or his dependents. This statute further provides that the lump-sum award shall in no case exceed the commutable value of future instalments which may be due under the law and it expressly requires that the lump sum shall be fixed at an amount which will equal “the total sum of the probable future payments, reduced to their present value upon the basis of interest calculated at five percent per annum.” (Emphasis added.) In this сase it *386 is to be noted that the original award of the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation, as affirmed by the full board, is in part as follows: “Wherefore, basеd on the above findings of fact and conclusion of law, the City of Villa Rica, employer, and/or Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, insurer, are hereby directеd to pay to the claimant, J. T. Fuller, compensation for temporary total disability, at the rate of $29.08 per week commencing October 5, 1958, and continuing for a period not to exceed 400 weeks as provided for by the statute.” (Emphasis added). The finding of fact by the Deputy Director who first made this award was that the claimant was “totally and tеmporarily disabled.” The subsequent proceedings before the board have not changed this finding that the claimant is temporarily disabled, although the final proceeding before the board stated that the award was for 343.87895 weeks at $29.08, or $10,000 which is the maximum amount of compensation allowable under the act for total permanеnt disability. But there is nowhere in the record or proceedings involved in this case any finding that the disability is in actuality permanent and total.
This appears to be a case of first impression before an appellate court in this State involving the situation where the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation -has awаrded a lump-sum settlement for attorney’s fees only, based on an award for temporary total disability of the claimant client. We cannot construe the workmen’s compensation statutes as authorizing this action. The opposing parties in this case both cite the case of
Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. McIntyre,
Each of the parties _ by brief debates the question as to whether the attorney’s fees can be awarded in a lump sum so as to be credited at the terminal period for which compensation is awarded. While we have found no case directly in point on the factual situation of the present case, there is precedent for the award of attorney’s fees in a lump sum for which the employer and insuranсe carrier were allowed to take credit at the end of the compensation period for the amount of attorney’s fees thus awarded. Seе
Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Pruitt,
In view of all of the contingenсies which could cause the cessation of payments either for death benefits or for temporary or total permanent disability, injustice will less likely occur if the award of lump-sum payments be sparingly granted, since, obviously, they may be paid in full in cases where the amount paid under the order might never accrue. But these awards are never within our province to initiate, or, indeed, to control except in those few circumstances authorized by the law. Furthermorе, we are bound to follow the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Pruitt,
Accordingly, we are constrained to hold that the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation is without authority, under Code Ann. § 114-417, to make a lump-sum awаrd of attorney’s fees with credit to be taken by the employer or insurer at the end of *389 the maximum compensation period, where the previous award was given for temporary total disability only.
The judgment of the superior court affirming the award of the board is hereby reversed.
Judgment reversed.