Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
After a company which processed tomato paste, tomatoes, and other fruits halted operations, petitioner leased all of its facilities, continuing only tomato paste processing. Applying the successorship doctrine, the National Labor Relations Board found that petitioner committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union recognized by the predecessor. Agreeing with the Board that direct purchase of the predecessor’s assets is not a prerequisite for successor status and finding that the Board’s application of the successorship test is supported by substantial evidence, we deny the petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.
I
Harter, Inc., the predecessor company, processed industrial tomato paste, prunes, canned tomatoes, and canned peaches in Yuba City, California. Employing about 1200 people, Harter was a member of a multiemployer association that entered into a series of collective bargaining agreements with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, an association composed of various labor organizations, including Cannery, Dried Fruit & Nut Workers’ Union, Local 849.
In July 1993, Harter sold its facilities and equipment — including a tomato paste processing plant, a nonoperational whole peeled tomato canning plant, a building for processing peaches and prunes, and a warehouse — to a general partnership which then leased them to petitioner Harter Tomato Products Company (“HTPC”), a recently incorporated enterprise previously unrelated to Harter. Through the lease, HTPC also obtained the right to use the “Harter” corporate name.
Like its predecessor, HTPC processes tomato paste, using the same equipment and production methods previously employed by Harter. Unlike Harter, HTPC processes no tomatoes, peaches, or prunes. During the 1993 season, HTPC employed about seventy people, two-thirds of whom had previously worked for Harter; it also employed seven former Harter managers — including its general manager, chief financial officer, and tomato processing plant manager — as its administrative team. Nearly sixty percent of HTPC’s customers previously bought tomato paste from Harter. HTPC produced almost the same amount of tomato paste, making nearly the same amount of money from its tomato paste sales as Harter had in the previous year.
About two weeks after HTPC began processing tomato paste, the Union asked HTPC to recognize and bargain with it as the exclusive representative of HTPC’s employees. HTPC refused. Instead, it filed a petition for a Board conducted election. The Board held HTPC’s petition in abeyance because the day after the company filed it, the Union charged HTPC with violating sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1994), which prohibit employers from “refusing] to bargain collectively with the representatives of [their] employees.” Id. § 158(a)(5). Some two weeks later, HTPC’s employees signed a petition stating that they no longer wished to be represented by the Union.
On May 8, 1995, an Administrative Law Judge found that HTPC was a successor to Harter and had therefore violated the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union. Appealing to the Board, Harter argued that the successorship doctrine should not apply when the alleged successor merely leases the assets of the predecessor company, that the ALJ failed to consider important differences between the two companies in finding successor status, and that HTPC believed in good faith that a majority of its employees no longer supported the Union. The Board rejected all of these arguments. To begin with, it held that “the direct transfer of
*937
assets to the successor is not a prerequisite to [successor] status” and that HTPC was “clear[ly]” a successor employer.
Harter Tomato Products Co.,
HTPC now petitions for review of the Board’s order. The Board cross-applies for enforcement. We review the Board’s factual conclusions for substantial evidence,
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
II
The National Labor Relations Act’s overriding purpose is the promotion of “industrial peace.”
Brooks v. NLRB,
The suceessorship question turns on whether, in view of the “totality of the circumstances,” there is “substantial continuity” between the new and predecessor employers.
Id.
at 43,
Emphasizing
Fall River’s
use of the word “acquired,” HTPC argues that it cannot be
'&
successor because it only leased Har-ter’s assets from a third party rather than purchasing them directly from Harter. Like the Board, we disagree. Nothing in the defi
*938
nition of “acquire” — “to come into possession, control, or power of disposal of often by some uncertain or unspecified means” — excludes leasing as a means of obtaining control. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 18 (1993). Although we have never squarely addressed this question, two of our sister circuits have held that a direct purchase of assets is not a prerequisite for successorship.
See NLRB v. Houston Bldg. Serv., Inc.,
HTPC next argues that the Board misapplied the successorship test, claiming that the agency “ ‘effectively disregarded’ the substantial continuity prong of the successor-ship analysis.” Again, we disagree. Drawing its factual findings from the parties’ joint stipulation of facts, the Board faithfully applied
Fall River’s
multifaetored successor-ship test, analyzing the results from the perspective of HTPC’s employees. The Board found many factors weighing in favor of suc-cessorship: HTPC leased Harter’s facilities, used its equipment, engaged in tomato paste processing, employed the same production method as Harter, hired Harter’s management team for similar positions, and sold to Harter’s customers. A majority of HTPC’s employees previously worked for Harter, and HTPC began its operation shortly after Harter went out of business.
Harter Tomato,
Pointing to differences in size, wages, benefits, training, customer base, managerial philosophy, and supplier contracts, among others, HTPC argues that the two companies .are substantially dissimilar and that HTPC’s employees would perceive a material difference between the two. Though plausible, this argument is unresponsive to the question we face. We ask not whether HTPC’s view of the facts supports its version of what happened, but rather whether the Board’s interpretation of the facts is “‘reasonably defensible.’”
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. NLRB,
Ill
HTPC argues that, even if it were a successor, it had no obligation to recognize the Union (and that its election petition should proceed) because it had a good faith belief that the Union no longer enjoyed majority support among its employees. According to the Board, the employees’ antiunion petition, on which HTPC primarily relies for its assertion of good-faith, was tainted by HTPC’s
*939
refusal to bargain.
Harter Tomato,
Relying on the Board’s holding that the rebuttable presumption will not operate in “unusual circumstances,”
Lee Lumber and Bldg. Material Corp.,
HTPC’s final argument, that it had a good faith belief in the Union’s nonmajority status because it leased Harter’s assets and because its workforce was smaller than Har-ter’s, suffers from the same defect. Although advancing this argument to the Board in general terms, HTPC never identified specific reasons for its good faith belief, contending only that this belief rested on “objective evidence” and “objective factors.” Because HTPC failed to present this argument to the Board clearly enough, we cannot consider it now.
Consolidated Freightways v. NLRB,
We deny the petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.
So ordered.
