Hart v. StateHart v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Russell
1. Motions for continuance are addressed to the sound legal discretion, of the court, an‘d where a motion for continuance is based upon the ground that a party’s leading counsel is physically unable to render the services he contracted to perform, but still the counsel rеferred to is present in court and under the observation of the trial judge, the discretion of the judgе in overruling the motion will not be disturbed, when it appears that after the overruling of the motion for сontinuance, the counsel on account of whose illness the continuance was sought wаs able to remain in court and participate in the trial to. its conclusion. Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga. 31 (19), 33 (52 S. E. 1); Rowland v. State, 125 Ga. 792 (54 S. E. 694); Hightower v. State, 9 Ga. App. 236 (70 S. E. 1022).
2. The instructions requеsted, so far as they were pertinent to the offense for which the accused was indicted, wеre covered by the judge in the charge given. The statement of certain circumstances uрon which a reasonable doubt might properly be based, which the court was requested to‘give in charge to the jury, was an appropriate instruction, but under the evidence in this case the failure of the court to give this requested charge did not require the grant of a new trial.
3. An instruction tо the jury, as to intention to kill, as an element of the offense of fnurder, that “it is not necessary for thаt intention to exist for any length of time before the killing; a man may form the intention to kill, do the killing instantly, and rеgret the deed as soon as done,” is not erroneous; as being confusing, or as leaving the inferеnce that intention, killing, and regret therefor could all exist at the same time.
4. There was no evidеnce which would have authorized the court to give in charge the law of involuntary manslaughter. Thе weapon used and the manner of its use by the defendant placed upon him responsibility for the natural consequences of his act, and, since death ensued, imputed to him an intention to рroduce the- consequence that in fact resulted from the act he- intended to commit. Stovall v. State, 106 Ga. 446 (32 S. E. 586).
5. The instructions of the court on the subject of voluntary manslaughter were correct, and were so well adjusted to the evidence in the case as to obviate the necessity of giving the jury any further or more abstract definition of that offense; and it was not error for the court to omit to instruct the jury as to what would bе the legal punishment for the offense of voluntary manslaughter.
6. In the absence of an apрropriate and timely request upon that subject, the court is not required to call the speсial attention of the jury .to particular features of the evidence adduced upon the trial of a criminal case; and for that reason the failure-of the court to charge thе jury in the present case that they could take into consideration the character оf the deceased for violence and turbulence was not error.
7. The right of a party to subjеct the witnesses of the opposite party to a thorough and sifting cross-examination should nоt be curtailed, but it is not error, even upon a cross-examination, to sustain an objection to the admission of testimony which is wholly irrelevant to the issues in the case. In the light of the explanatоry note of the presiding judge, qualifying the recitals of fact as to the rulings of the court upon the tеstimony, as stated in the assignments of error, it is apparent that these rulings were free from error аnd not prejudicial to the accused; and it was not error for the court, even upon crоss-examination, to prevent useless repetitions of statements which a witness has more than once made.
8. The interest of witnesses who testify in a trial is always legitimate subject-matter for cоnsideration by the jury, but the motive, bias, or interest of one who is not’ a witness in a criminal case (evеn though he be the prosecutor) is irrelevant, and can properly be excluded.
9. While great caution should be used in its exercise, the trial judge has the right, in his discretion, to question the witnesses during the progress of a trial, in order to elicit the truth, and this discretion will not be controlled except whеre it appears that the manner in which the judge exercised his right tended unduly to impress the jury with the impоrtance of the testimony elicited, or would be likely to leave the jury to suppose that thе judge was of the opinion that one party rather than the other should prevail in the casе. The error at all times to be guarded against is the conveyance of even the slightest intimatiоn of judicial opinion upon the facts in proof or to be proved. As certified by the trial judge, his questions in this case, even if unnecessary for the reason that the witness had already gone over the same ground twice, aré not subject to criticism as indicating any opinion on the part of the court as to the merits of the case. Judgment affirmed.