This is an action for damages for personal injuries received by plaintiff npon the station platform of defendant company at Hillman City. The defendant owns and operates an electric railway between Seattle and Ren
There is but one assignment of error. It is urg jd that the court erred in giving the following instruction:
“You are instructed that the degree of care to 1 e exercised by a common carrier of passengers for hire is the highest degree of care that is consistent with the reasonable and practical operation of its business, in view of the method and means of conveyance employed.”
Appellant’s argument is that the high degree of (are required of earners of passengers applies only to those means for safety which the passenger must of necessity true t wholly to the carrier, and that the rule does not a] ply to
“You are instructed that it is the duty of a carrier of passengers to provide and keep the landing places and platforms used hy it for discharging passengers from its vehicles, and all passage ways leading to and from such places in a reasonably safe condition for the purposes intended; and for any violation of its duty in this respect which entails injury upon a passenger, without fault on his part, the carrier will be answerable in damages.”
The necessity for reasonable care was also repeated in other instructions. We think the instructions as a whole made it clear to the jury that it was the trial court’s view that not the highest possible degree, but a reasonable degree, of care was required. That at least such was required of appellant in the care of its station platform is sustained by the following: Bethmann v. Old Colony R. Co., 155 Mass. 352, 29 N. E. 587; Jordan v. New York etc. R. Co., 165 Mass. 346, 43 N. E. 111; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Wortham, 73 Tex. 25, 10 S. W. 741; Wallace v. Wilmington etc. R. Co., 8 Houston (Del.) 529, 18 Atl. 818; Knight v. Portland etc. R. Co., 56 Me. 234; Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaffrey, 173 Ill. 169, 50 N. E. 713. An examination of the above authorities discloses that most of them recognize that the necessary degree of care-, under such circumstances, is higher than merely ordinary and reasonable care. We think the instructions in the case at bar were at least within, and that they certainly did not go beyond, well recognized rules.
Mount, C. J., Fullerton, and Dunbar, JJ., concur.
Rudkin, Root, and Crow, JJ., took no part.