18 Ga. 635 | Ga. | 1855
Lead Opinion
The Court not being unanimous, delivered their opinions seriatim.
The facts in this case are these: Bill, a negro fellow about twenty-five years old, and worth $1,000, had runaway from his owner, Absalom C. Cleveland, deceased, the intestate of the plaintiff, in 1852. His master resided in Marion County. It was in proof, by the testimony on the part of the plaintiff, that he ivas a negro of violent character, and considered a dangerous man in the neighborhood. He had knocked several negroes in the head; had been absent for sometime; and Mr. Cleveland admitted that he had had a difficulty with some one who had tried to catch him, and had “ made fight upon his pursuer with a stick.”
Being found lurking about a plantation in Upson County, having been run off from the fodder-house on the farm of Mr. Stafford, a little before day in the morning, application ivas made to the defendant to track him with his dogs, which were trained for that purpose. Mr. Powell being m feeble health, objected to going, but finally yielded, with the understanding that some one else must do the running, as ho was unable. Mr. Stephens, a neighbor, was sent for to assist.
When the dogs first struck tlio track, all the party started together. The defendant did not attempt to keep up ; and Stephens ivas bothered to keep the dogs on the trail. When they got the scent the second time, (after having lost it,) and led off, ..PoAvell followed. The last that Avas seen of him, he
There were two gun-shot wounds — one through the flesh of the thigh, entering about four inches above the knee, and passing on the inside of the bone, ranging upwards and backwards ; the other entered the back, about one inch to the left of the spine, about the fifth bone of the dorsal column, and Tanging upwards to the left side, below the collar bone, about the middle.
The only question in this case is, were the declarations of the defendant competent evidence ?
Mr. Greenleaf says: “ There are other declarations which are admitted as original evidence, being distinguished from Irearsay, by their connection with the principal fact under
True, the principal point to be observed in all cases is,, whether the declarations offered in proof were cotemporaneous with the main fact under consideration; for if they are-merely the narrative of a past occurrence, they cannot be received in evidence: still, much latitude of discretion is allowed!'to the Courts. And if the statements tend -to illustrate the-, issue and to assist the judgment which is to be formed upon the whole matter; if the declarations derive a degree-A of credit from their connection with the surrounding circum-( stances, and independently of any credit to be attached to speaker, they should, in such cases, be admitted in evidence-
What time elapsed between the homicide and the account-given of it to the witnesses, it is impossible to assume with, any degree of accuracy. It was certainly less than thirty-minutes ; because Stafford and Powell parted a half hour only before the killing, and Powell had to go one mile and as half before he came up with the boy. When the rest of the: company arrived, the negro is found dead in the swamp at the-head of the branch, to which point he was pursued by the-dogs ; he is not torn or lacerated; the dogs are cut so as to-be disabled from aiding in the capture; his stick and knife-.are l-y his side; there are signs of a scuffle having takea
We ask, do not his declarations -elucidate the facts with' which they were connected? Were not the Jury authorized to believe that they were made without premeditation or artifice, and without a view to the consequences? We think so, unquestionably.
Direct proof, in such a case, is impossible. The defendant, himself, was the only witness of the facts which constituted his defence. Not having anticipated the catastrophe, no prudence, no sagacity, no foresight, could have prompted the defendant to have prepared himself with evidence to prove Iris innocence. It is a hard rule of law which -presumes every homicide to be murder, and imposes upon the accused the burden of showing that the offence is of a mitigated character. It is equally hard to close the mouth of the prisoner from testifying as to the facts attending the homicide,., when no other evidence can be adduced — a principle known-only to the Common Law.
But to hold that this defendant could not exculpate him self by his own statement of the facts, and to leave him without redress, to be multced'in damages, and to pay the highest penalty known to the law, for reluctantly undertaking the performance of a^high dula, through mere kindness, would be cruel indeed. We do not say that the Jury were bound to believe the explanation. All such statements should be weighed with candor, but with circumspection. The party may not have acted in self-defence; he may have shot the negro in a spirit of revenge, and to save his dogs; the char-actor of the wounds may contradict his statement. All this and much more may be true; for we are aware that the defendant was under a strong temptation to give a favorable, not to say false, coloring to the case. All this, however’, was
In criminal proceedings, the declarations of prisoners have been received to explain their conduct, as in an indictment for larceny, that he took the goods, claiming the property.. (1 Hale’s Pl. Cr. 509. 2 Barn. 174.) The Jury hear the evidence, and then judge whether these declarations were genuine claims of property, though mistaken, or made to-color a stealing. In trials for murder, declarations of the prisoner, antecedent to the fact, are admissible to reconcile or explain his conduct, and to discover quo animo the fact was committed. And in the hottest times in trials for high treason, the declarations of a prisoner have been admitted in evidence to explain his acts. (Howell’s State Trials, passim.) Under any view of this ease, I should be unwilling to disturb the verdict of the Jury. This slave was in a state of revolcas every slave is when in open and forcible resistance to lawful-authority. This pursuer had a right to arrest him. ’ (Cobb’s Digest, 976, 1020.) He was in the performance of a meritorious service. The negro’s character was notoriously daring and dangerous. He was armed with a knife and a bludgeon,. the latter of which he had already used to prevent a previous-attempt to capture him. Under these circumstances, I should.| not feel inclined to scrutinize, with surgical skill, the "tion of the wounds, in order to ascertain how the boy was-.', -killed; nor to determine, with mathematical precision, the number of minutes which transpired bettveen the killing and the declarations. Indeed, the course of balls is frequently so extraordinary, that I should be exceedingly reluctant to-bankrupt any man in fortune and character, upon a mere hypothesis. I entertain the most profound respect for the medical profession; and yet, it must be admitted that theory and fact do not always harmonize asto gun-shot wounds. “Amicus Plato, Amicus Socrates, sed magis arnica veritas.”
It is related by Dr. Ilennen, as having occurred to a friend
Now wo have often heard of an individual being “ shot all to pieces,” but never before by one ball. Who would have-doubted — what adept in the science would not have testified— that this poor fellow had been shot a half dozen times ?
In another case, a ball which struck the breast of a man standing erect in the ranks, lodged, in the scrotum! The gallant and ever to be lamented Col. Craig, was Shot in the 'back at Cerro Gordo; the ball pursued a circuitous route around his body, on the outside of the skin, to the breast.
Rut we forbear to multiply examples. We are sustained by. the highest medical authority, in asserting that balls take Very unusual courses, “ not at all to be accounted for by any preconceived theories drawn from tjie doctrino of projectiles, nor to be explained by any diagrams formed upon mathematical rules.” (Med. Jur. by J. H. Paris, Fellow of the Poyal College of Physicians, and Q. S. M. Fonblanque, Esq. Barrister at Law, 2 Vol. 126.) “ These considerations,” continue the learned authors, “ ought to render the surgeon very cautious how ho delivers liis opinion as to the direction the shot'ivas fired.”
We would remark, in conclusion, that evidence must accommodate itself, and it is constantly doing so, to tho state of society and the concerns of the world around us. That the statements of Powell wore made a very short time, if not directly, after the homicide, is plainly proven. To preclude .this proof, would be to shut out the party’s only defence. It
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I cannot bring my mind to the conclusion that this testimony was a part of the res gestee of this transaction.
I know that it is difficult to define, what does always constitute the res gestae — that it is almost impossible always to determine what is precisely the necessary contemporaneousness in the. circumstances or declarations, which it is thought serve to elucidate the main fact under consideration. And that the admissibility of these has to be entrusted very much, as Mr. Greenleaf suggests, (1 Greenl Ev. 108,) to the Judge, “in the exercise of his sound discretion.” But whilst I recognize this difficulty, I think I see, very clearly, where there is no difficulty, and that is in never admitting the dcclara-tions of a party in interest, as part of the res gestee, where .they are not plainly, impulsively made, and where it is not clear that they were made without premeditation or artifice.
Declarations of a party are admitted in evidence as part of the res gestee, only upon the presumption that they elucidate. the facts with which they are connected, having been made without premeditation or artifice, and without a view to the consequences. (1 Stark. Ev. 49. Scaggs vs. The State, 8 Smead. § M. 726.) Where such declarations are merely narrative of a past occurrence, they cannot be received as proof the existence of such occurrence. (1 Greenl. Ev. 110.)
This is certainly a safe and wise rule, if it be safe and wise to exclude hear-say testimony, and the declarations of a par-in interest, as to his own case. And to my mind, it is quite clear that the declarations of the defendant in error, in this case, do not fall within this rule.
It is admitted that the witnesses who speak to these declarations of Powell, did not come up to him after the slave was killed, until some minutes had elapsed. But it is said that Stafford, the principal of these witnesses, must have arrived a very few minutes after the slave’s death — so shortly as to render what the defendant in error- said to him, a part of the
It was said that this might have been submitted to the Jury. But it is the province of the Judge to determine what is evidence for the Jury, and especially such evidence as 'this; and he should have fo’tmd it evidence proper for the Jury, as I think, before he submitted it to them.
But if it be admitted that the witness did arrive at the '.place of, homicide only a few minutes after the transaction; .yet, the testimony shows that the defendant had blown his •horn for him, after the killing; had come out from the edge ■of the swamp, where the slave was shot, some thirty or fifty .steps; that some two or three other persons had come to the .spot from a neighboring house or field; all before the arrival of ’the witness, and the statements made to him by the defendant. If, in these few minutes, there was time for all these things to take place, can it be said that there was not time for premeditation and artifice, on the part of the defendant, with a a vieio to the consequences ?
The witness states that a half hour was about the time which had elapsed from his last seeing the defendant ahead of him with the dogs, and his coming up to him at the place of the homicide. If the defendant' and the dogs passed rapidly over the distance between the point where he speaks of seeing the defendant with the dogs, and.the place where the slave was killed, which distance, the witness says, was about one mile and a half, a very small portion of this half hour would have been consumed before the defendant came up with the slave; and the interval between the homicide and the arrival, of the witness would have been considerable. He tells us, that not being able to cross a branch with his mule, ho had to lido round a longer distance than was probably traversed by
As I have said, after the killing, and before the arrival of Stafford, the defendant had time to come out from the swamp, some thirty or fifty steps, and to blow his horn for the witness. It seems that there was time for the witness, Stumps, after the transaction, to come to the place from his field, which must have been at' some littlé distance; for he says, that when he got “ within seventy-five yards of the place,” the defendant called to him and asked him to go for a doctor. There was time, too, for one or two other persons to arrive at the place before the witness. If there was time for all these things, there surely was time for the defendant to resort to premeditation and artifice, in view of the consequences.
If, under such circumstances, these declarations be admitted, I do not see what is to prevent any man, who, unseen by others, stains his hands in his brother’s blood, from premeditating his story, and making his own account of the transaction evidence on the trial.
I think the judgment should have been reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I think it was right to admit the evidence.
The sayings must have been uttered within less than thirty minutes after the shooting; they may have boon uttered within five or two. They, were uttered before the defendant left the place of the occurrence. What we know is, that these sayings must have been uttered very soon after the doing of the act they went to explain ; how soon afterwards they were uttered, is what we do not know. If there is a doubt as to the admissibility of evidence, I think the side for admitting the evidence ought to have the benefit of the doubt. Suppose such evidence admitted, are the Jury obliged to believe it? Surely we may trust such evidence to twelve men ,of average sense, with their wits sharpened by the opposing arguments of “Counsel, and their frailty of judgment rectified by the charge of a Court. (11 Ga. R. 621, 13 do. 65, 1 Green. Ev. §108.)